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ABSTRACT
WONCHUL HWANG: Essays on Antitrust Issues.
(Under the direction of Gary Biglaiser.)
This dissertation consists of three essays on antitrust issues. In the first paper, I propose
two models based on quantity setting game to analyze the profitability of merger, its welfare
effect and price effect. In the second paper, I deal with the issue how uncertainty on other
firms’ discount rates affects the competitive behavior in oligopoly market. In the third paper,
I analyze two antitrust policy issues for effective cartel deterrence : leniency program and
crackdown policy.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
This document presents the three essays that form my dissertation in accordance with the
Graduate School and Economics Department at UNC at Chapel Hill.
Chapter 2, titled “The Incentive of Horizontal Merger and Its Welfare Effect”, reexamines
the result of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) on horizontal merger’s private profitability,
its welfare effect and price effect after I generalize their assumptions which include Cournot
competition pre- and post-merger, identical constant marginal costs among firms and no entry-
exit condition.
On one hand, collusion becomes easier post-merger if firms have constant and identical
marginal costs. If such collusive effect exists, a merger becomes profitable but socially more
injurious. On the other hand, cost saving from reallocation or synergies can make a merger
profitable even under Cournot competition pre- and post-merger. A merger gets more prof-
itable as insiders are more asymmetric, and outsiders are “less” efficient, while its welfare
effect improves as insiders are smaller or more asymmetric, and outsiders are “more” efficient.
Synergy-creating mergers are not always profitable or welfare-increasing. Consumer surplus
(CS) increasing mergers are profitable, and CS-decreasing merger improves another profitable
CS-decreasing merger’s profitability. Entry-inducing mergers are not always unprofitable while
exit-inducing mergers are always profitable. Entry reduces a merger’s price effect or may even
change the direction of it.
Chapter 3, titled “Collusion under Asymmetric Information on Discount Rates”, studies
collusion agreement and its sustainability when each firm’s discount factor is private infor-
mation. In order to analyze this issue, I construct a model where firms may have different
discount rates and each firm does not know the other firms’ discount rate, and also build up
an equivalent counterfactual model with perfect information. Then, I solve the model by using
Bayesian Nash equilibrium or perfect Bayesian equilibrium concept and compare the features
of equilibrium outcome with those under counterfactual model.
Under the private information, cartel could be agreed on even when each firm’s incentive
constraint for cartel sustainability is not satisfied, and hence cartel agreement contains the
possibility that cartel members produce more than cartel output from the beginning. If firms
are allowed to agree on the payoff less than monopoly profit, there might exist a continuum
of collusion equilibria where firms choose payoff below the monopoly payoff at the beginning.
But the output in the first period plays the role of signaling that reveals each firm’s discount
rate, so if both firms abide by the agreed output, perfect cartel output is produced from
period 2 and on. When firms are allowed to agree on the uneven split of monopoly profit after
communicating each other’s discount factor, truth-telling equilibrium does not exist under
money transfer and may or may not exist depending on parameter values under output quota.
Chapter 4, titled “Antitrust Policy Issues for Effective Cartel Deterrence”, deals with two
antitrust policy issues : leniency program and crackdown policy. To examine the effectiveness
of leniency program, I introduce cartel duration model and explain why self-reports are mostly
made from “dying cartels” and applied simultaneously by multiple cartel members. These
facts are the outcome path of stationary Markov perfect equilibrium in this model and the
increase in the number of discovered cartels does not necessarily imply that the introduced
leniency program is effective. Optimal law enforcement with leniency program, full exemption
to deviator with no reduction to simultaneous leniency applicants, would increase deterrence
to cartel if fines are sufficiently high or firm’s strategy against deviation is severe enough.
Crackdown policy, on the other hand, means that antitrust authority spends all the re-
sources for target industry’s cartel conviction at a period, moves its focus to another in the
next period, and so on. The efficacy of this policy depends on antitrust authority’s conviction
technology, and it is more likely to be effective when conviction technology is less concave.
2
CHAPTER 2
The Incentive of Horizontal Merger and Its Welfare Effect
2.1 Introduction
Since Stigler (1950) pointed out “free rider’s problem” in horizontal merger meaning that
firms who do not participate in a merger may get greater benefit than the constituent firms,
the incentive of horizontal merger has been an important research topic in oligopoly market
theory. Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) (“S-S-R” henceforth) provided one landmark
paper on this issue. Employing a symmetric Cournot model with linear demand and identical
constant marginal cost, S-S-R derived two surprising results on private profitability and social
desirability of merger: (1) an exogenous merger may reduce the joint profits of the firms that
are assumed to merge, and (2) a merger that provides efficiency gains may be socially beneficial
even if it is privately injurious to the merging parties. On the first result, which took the name
“The Merger Paradox”, they showed that it is sufficient for a merger to be unprofitable that
less than 80% of the firms merge if there is no efficiency gains from the merger.
Although there have been a variety of researches in an attempt to resolve the paradox thus
far, this paper’s approach is to start from the same setting that S-S-R constructed and then
to combine the results of merger’s profitability analysis with its welfare effect and price effect.
Given that mergers are so common in the real economy, an important question is basically
which mergers are profitable, and what will be the welfare effects and price effects of profitable
mergers.
To start with, I consider the possibility that firms are engaging in tacit collusion post-
merger. This extension shows that tacit collusion becomes easier after merger under the S-S-R
model. If such collusive effect exists, the merger becomes profitable whereas it hurts consumers
and worsens social welfare.
Another extension of the S-S-R model is to generalize the cost function. As Perry and
Porter (1985) pointed out, mergers are not well-defined conceptually in the S-S-R model be-
cause the merged entity does not differ from the others in their setting. In order to fix this
shortcoming of the S-S-R model, I adopt and slightly modify the cost function that Perry
and Porter (1985) proposed. This adjustment of the cost function enables me to capture the
cost savings not only from reallocation among the facilities of constituent firms but also from
synergies that a merger may create. In contrast, I maintain Cournot assumption of the S-S-R
in this exercise because a merger does not necessarily reduce competition under this setting.
The linear property of demand and marginal cost allows me to perform the direct analysis
on the incentive of merger and its welfare effect. This model shows that a merger without
synergies can be both privately profitable and socially desirable only when merging parties
have quite different efficiency levels and outsider is sufficiently efficient. While the synergy
effect improves both merger’s profitability and desirability, a merger with big synergies does
not always bring higher welfare or consumer surplus. This extension also shows that a CS-
increasing merger is always profitable. On the other hand, CS-decreasing merger may trigger
another CS-decreasing merger, which can become profitable after the former CS-decreasing
merger takes place.
Finally, I consider an environment where costless entry and exit is possible. Not surpris-
ingly, entry (exit) may occur in a merger that would have been CS-decreasing (CS-increasing)
under no entry-and-exit condition. Firms are less likely to merge under free entry condition,
because entry harms merger’s profitability. But entry-inducing mergers are not always un-
profitable whereas exit-inducing mergers are always profitable. The presence of entry or exit
reduces a merger’s impact on price and may even change the direction of price effect.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I briefly reviewed related literatures.
I set up the identical constant marginal cost model and analyze the incentive and welfare
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Table 2.1: Key Feature of Each Model
Marginal Cost Competition Behavior Entry-exit Condition
Section 2.3 identical + constant Cournot/collusion no entry-exit
Section 2.4 asymmetric + increasing Cournot no entry-exit
Section 2.5.1 identical + constant Cournot/collusion free entry-exit
Section 2.5.2 asymmetric + increasing Cournot free entry-exit
effect of merger in this environment in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, I construct the asymmetric
increasing marginal cost model and perform the analysis on the incentive and welfare effect of
merger in this setting. Section 2.5 extends these models in a direction where free entry or exit
is allowed after merger. Concluding remarks are following in Section 2.6.
2.2 Literature Review
After S-S-R’s research, there have been many attempts to check the robustness of their
results in various directions. Some researchers resolve the paradox by relaxing the assumption
of linear demand [Cheung (1992), Fauli-Oller (1997), Hennessy (2000)], and others find the
incentive of merger from product differentiation [Deneckere and Davidson (1985)], or earning
and strengthening the position of Stackelberg leader [Perry and Porter (1985), Mallela and
Nahata (1989)].
Although there is no literature, to the author’s knowledge, that addresses higher chance of
collusion explicitly in order to explain merger’s profitability, some papers study the relation
between the number of firms and the chance of collusion. For example, Ivaldi, Jullien, Ray,
Seabright, and Tirole (2003) considers a simple price competition model in an environment
where firms produce the homogenous good with the same unit variable cost. Assuming Nash
reversion strategy against unilateral deviation from collusion agreement, they illustrate that
collusion is less sustainable as there are more competitors. Kuhn (2008) also points out that
collusion gets harder with more firms “when we replicating the assets of firms as we increase
the number of firms in an industry.” This paper considers a quantity competition model under
the S-S-R setting and shows that the result of Ivaldi, Jullien, Ray, Seabright, and Tirole (2003)
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may hold in strategies other than trigger strategy.
When this paper deals with the collusive effect, it follows the “Folk Theorem” approach
based on an infinitely repeated game setting. [Friedman (1971), Abreu (1986), Fudenberg
and Maskin (1986) and etc.] In this approach, collusion is understood as a subgame perfect
equilibrium in the repeated game. In more detail, firms interacting repeatedly may be able to
maintain higher prices by agreeing that any deviation from the collusive path would trigger
some retaliation. For the agreement to be sustainable, such retaliation must be sufficiently
likely and costly to outweigh the short-term benefits from “cheating” on the collusive path.
This paper illustrates that collusive effect may exist under the various retaliation strategies.
Another approach closely related to this research is to modify the S-S-R’s cost function.
One attempt along this line is to use asymmetric but “constant” marginal cost functions across
firms. Using this cost function and the linear demand, Fauli-Oller (2002) found that a merger
can only be profitable if it involves firms that are asymmetric enough. This research confirms
Fauli-Oller’s point that cost asymmetry is an important source of merger’s profitability, but it
also shows that the degree of asymmetry necessary for a merger to be profitable depends on the
outsider’s size or efficiency if asymmetric “increasing” marginal cost functions are assumed.
Another modification of cost function dates back to the Perry-Porter model. The quadratic
cost function proposed by Perry-Porter ensures that the newly merged firm retains all of
its constituents’ capital. While Perry-Porter modified the S-S-R’s assumption of Cournot
competition as well, the following researches in this vein show that the introduction of convex
cost function alone may reduce the critical degree of concentration required for a merger to
be profitable. For example, Heywood and McGinty (2007) showed that any size of merger in
an industry with any number of identical firms can be profitable if cost function is sufficiently
convex. Although the cost function of the asymmetric increasing marginal cost model in this
paper is heavily indebted to the Perry-Porter model, it has two critical differences from the one
in the previous literatures. First, the cost function of each firm may vary due to both capital
stock and technology. So, two firms have different cost functions if they have either different
capital stock or different technologies with the same capital stock. The other distinctive feature
is that it can consider the cost synergies of merger explicitly. These two modifications enlarge
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the scope of merger analysis. In particular, I can check the profitability, welfare effect and
price effect of a merger with synergies.
This research is also closely related to the literatures on the welfare implications of merg-
ers. Assuming Cournot competition pre- and post-merger as in the S-S-R model, Farrell and
Shapiro (1990) provided the necessary and sufficient condition that a merger improves con-
sumer surplus (Proposition 1), and the sufficient condition that a profitable CS-decreasing
merger increases aggregate welfare (Proposition 5). As a special case where firms have asym-
metric constant marginal costs, Froeb and Werden (1998) derives the condition on marginal
cost reduction that restores the pre-merger price. The welfare analysis in this paper is another
exercise of the Farrell-Shapiro model where demand is linear and cost function is linear or
quadratic. Under these functional forms, I can derive a more specific and exact condition
for welfare-increasing merger than Farrell-Shapiro’s Proposition 5. In addition, combining the
welfare analysis of merger with the profitability analysis, I can get the properties of a merger
that is privately profitable and socially desirable. In contrast, their Proposition 1 plays an
essential role in my paper when I look at the profitability and welfare effect of a CS-increasing
merger.
McAfee and Williams (1992), on the other hand, examined the welfare implications of
horizontal mergers using linear demand and quadratic cost function with Cournot competition
pre- and post-merger. They suggested a necessary condition for a merger to increase welfare,
and showed that a merger reduces welfare if it creates a new largest firm or increases the size
of the largest firm under moderately elastic demand. The asymmetric increasing marginal
cost model has some common features with the McAfee-Williams model because both models
assume linear demand and quadratic cost function. But this paper extends their research in
that I include merger’s profitability and synergy effect into the scope of merger analysis. In
particular, this paper demonstrates that their elasticity condition - the prerequisite to apply
the McAfee-Williams’ condition - is too binding because profitable mergers fail to satisfy this
condition.
Finally, literatures on mergers with free entry also have close relation with this research.
Using Cournot model with linear demand and identical increasing marginal cost, Werden and
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Froeb (1998) showed that significant mergers are normally unprofitable or not so profitable
to induce entry. Their result depends on two critical assumptions: the symmetry of cost
function and no synergies. I illustrate that if these assumptions are relaxed, Cournot mergers
can induce entry or even exit. Based on Bertrand setting, Cabral (2003) showed that cost
efficiencies decreases the likelihood of entry, and thus benefit consumers less than under no
entry condition. I confirm this result under Cournot setting and add the potential possibility
that a marginal incumbent may exit post-merger under strong synergies. I also detail the price
effect of entry-inducing or exit-inducing mergers.
Davidson and Muhkerjee (2007), on the other hand, demonstrated that any merger is
profitable for any degree of cost synergy with free entry. Their result critically relies on the
identical constant marginal cost function. This research shows that mergers creating synergies
can be unprofitable even under no entry condition if the assumption on cost function is relaxed.
Spector (2003) studied the price effect of a merger under free entry condition, and showed
that any profitable Cournot merger failing to generate synergies raise price even if entry is
possible. His result is an extension of Farrell-Shapiro’s Proposition 2 which proves the same
argument under no entry condition. This research, in contrast, shows that if entry condition
is relaxed when there is relatively “small” degree of synergies in that the merger with that
amount of synergies would increase price under no entry condition, the merger’s price effect
becomes not decisive.
2.3 Identical Constant Marginal Cost Model
In this section, I build up the identical constant marginal cost model following the S-S-R
model. After I show that a merger in this model increases the scope of collusion, I classify all
possible merger cases according to firms’ competition pattern post-merger. The situation that
S-S-R assumed - firms compete a` la Cournot pre- and post-merger - becomes just one possible
case in this model. Then, I perform case analysis on a merger’s profitability and its welfare
effect.
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2.3.1 Model
The model of this section considers an exogenous merger as in the S-S-R model, but the
repeated game is constructed in order to see that the remaining firms makes collusion decision
post-merger unlike the S-S-R model.
 Demand and Supply : I assume linear demand and constant marginal cost. Specifically,
demand curve is normalized as P = 1 −Q and marginal cost as MC = 0.1 The demand and
marginal cost do not change in every period t ∈ {0, 1, 2, · · · }. There are N identical firms in
the industry at period 0 that produce homogenous goods. Each firm discounts future profit at
δ ∈ (0, 1), which is the same and common knowledge across firms. Entry or exit does not take
place in this economy.
 Game Structure : Merger is one-time exogenous event under this model in the sense that
all the remaining firms post-merger believe that there is no more merger. The timing of the
game is as follows.
1. Firms compete a` la Cournot pre-merger at period 0.
2. (M + 1) firms merge at the end of period 0, where M ∈ {0, 1, · · · , N − 1}.
3. Remaining firms make a collusion decision at the beginning of period 1.
4. Each firm chooses its output in every period t ≥ 1.
Each firm earns 1
(N+1)2
at period 0 since the industry compete a` la Cournot. M is exogenous
and represents the size of merger: no merger if M = 0; merger to monopoly if M = N − 1.
As in the S-S-R model, merger does not affect the marginal cost of merging firms. Efficiency
gains take the form of saved fixed cost, F , if exists, which is assumed to be the same across
all firms in the industry.
 Stage Game Payoff Post-Merger : (N −M) firms remain in the industry post-merger
and interact infinitely from period 1 and on. In each period post-merger, every firm would
1While the S-S-R’s original model assumed P = β − Q and MC = α, I normalize β = 1 and α = 0 for
computational convenience. But this normalization does not affect the result and inference of this paper.
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get 14(N−M) under perfect collusion with symmetric payoff,
1
(N−M+1)2 under Cournot-Nash
equilibrium. If a firm deviates with best response output when all other firms produce perfect
collusive output (
∑
j 6=i q
c
j =
N−M−1
2(N−M)), its stage payoff would be
(
N−M+1
4(N−M)
)2
.
2.3.2 The Effect of Merger on Firm’s Competitive Behavior
The merged entity is identical to the other remaining firms under this model. Let me
denote the number of firms post-merger by L = (N −M) in this subsection, which may take
a value from 1 to N . Then, the discounted payoff of each firm from perfect collusion is given
by piC(L, δ) = 14L(1−δ) if L firms split monopoly profit evenly post-merger. In contrast, each
firm’s discounted payoff becomes piD(L, δ) =
(
L+1
4L
)2
+r(δ, L) when it deviates and selects best
deviation output. Here, r(δ, L) represents the discounted continuation payoff achieved under
subgame perfect equilibrium in the punishment phase. It depends on firms’ strategy after
unilateral defection. For example, r(δ, L) is δ
(1−δ)(L+1)2 in Nash reversion strategy [Friedman
(1971)]. Then, collusion can be supported as subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if
piC(L, δ) ≥ piD(L, δ)
⇔ δ ≥
(
L− 1
L+ 1
)2
+
(
4L
L+ 1
)2
(1− δ) ∗ r(δ, L) (2.1)
Let δ∗ be the threshold discount rate such that piC(L, δ∗) = piD(L, δ∗). By solving this equation,
I can define δ∗ as a function of the number of firms (δ∗ = f(L)). If piC(L, δ) > piD(L, δ) for
all δ ∈ (0, 1), then f(L) ≡ 0, which means that collusion is agreed for any discount rate. If
piC(L, δ) < piD(L, δ) for all δ ∈ (0, 1), then f(L) ≡ 1, which means that collusion is never
agreed. I assume that firms compete a` la Cournot if δ ≤ δ∗ and collude with monopoly output
if δ > δ∗. So I do not allow partial collusion if monopoly output cannot be supported as
subgame perfect equilibrium outcome.
Note that a smaller L represents a larger size of merger when N is given. So, a larger size of
merger increases the scope of collusion if condition (2.1) is more easily satisfied for smaller L.
In the appendix, I show that Nash reversion strategy and optimal punishment strategy [Abreu
(1986)] satisfy this property. Put it differently, collusion gets more easily incentive compatible
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under these strategies as the number of firms decreases in the identical constant marginal cost
setting. Given this result, I can assume that the threshold discount rate is strictly increasing
in the number of firms (f ′(L) > 0).
2.3.3 Merger’s Profitability and Its Welfare Effect
Merger analysis of the identical constant marginal cost model also follows the S-S-R’s
framework. But I now consider the possibility that a merger changes firms’ competitive be-
havior, so I need to analyze a merger’s profitability and its welfare effect in all possible cases.
Framework of Merger Analysis
I will introduce some notations similar to the S-S-R for profitability analysis of merger.
Πpre(N,M) denotes insiders’ pre-merger joint profits each period when the insiders consist of
M + 1 firms in an industry with N firms. Πpost(N,M) represents each period’s profits of the
merged firm if the merger takes place among M + 1 constituent firms. The incentive of merger
function, denoted by g(N,M), is defined as the increase in joint profits each period when a
merger takes place among M + 1 insiders. So, by definition,
g(N,M) = Πpost(N,M)−Πpre(N,M)
Then if each firm’s per-period profit is given by Π(x) in an x-firm equilibrium, I get
Πpre(N,M) = (M + 1) ∗Π(N)
Πpost(N,M) = Π(N −M),
so g(N,M) comes to
g(N,M) = Π(N −M)− (M + 1) ∗Π(N) (2.2)
Given the assumptions on demand, marginal cost and firms’ competitive behavior, Π(x) = 14x
if δ > f(x) while Π(x) = 1
(x+1)2
if δ ≤ f(x).
In contrast, welfare effect of merger function, denoted by S(N,M), is introduced for the
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welfare analysis of merger. S(N,M) is defined as per-period increase in total surplus when
M + 1 firms merge in an industry with N firms.
S(N,M) = TS(N,M)− TS(N) (2.3)
Here, TS(N,M) and TS(N) represent post-merger total surplus and pre-merger total surplus
in each period, respectively. So, each term is defined by
TS(N,M) = CS(N,M) + (N −M) ∗Π(N −M)
TS(N) = CS(N) +N ∗Π(N),
where CS(N,M) and CS(N) represent post-merger and pre-merger consumer surplus in each
period, respectively.
In terms of firms’ competitive behavior post-merger, there are 3 possible cases depending
on the number of firms before merger (N), the size of merger (M) and firms’ discount rate
(δ); (Case 1) firms compete Cournot post-merger for every M 6= N − 1, (Case 2) firms collude
post-merger for every M 6= 0, and (Case 3) firms compete Cournot post-merger if merger size
is less than threshold size (M < M∗) whereas they collude post-merger if merger size is equal
to or larger than threshold size (M ≥M∗). In fact, (Case 2) is a special case of (Case 3) such
that M∗ = 1. For example, suppose N = 10 and Nash reversion strategy is used against the
unilateral defection. (Case 1) is applied for δ ≤ 917 , (Case 2) for 2534 < δ ≤ 121161 , and (Case 3)
for 917 < δ ≤ 2534 . In (Case 3), M∗ depends on the value of δ.2
Even though I consider the infinitely repeated game situation, g(N,M) exactly reflects the
private profitability of a merger to M + 1 insiders because g(N,M)1−δ will be insiders’ increase in
discounted profit from the merger, which is proportional to g(N,M). Then, it is enough to
proceed the analysis with g(N,M). The same holds for S(N,M) in welfare analysis of merger.
Case 1. (S-S-R Model) : δ ≤ f(2)
2If δ > 121
161
under our setting, firms are expected to collude pre-merger contrary to the assumption in this
paper. In that case, it is easy to show that any merger is not profitable and does not affect social welfare.
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This case happens when firms’ common discount factor is lower than threshold discount
rate under duopoly (δ ≤ f(2)). Since firms compete a` la Cournot pre- and post-merger under
any size of merger except the one to monopoly, this is the case where all the results of the
S-S-R model can be applicable.
 Incentive of Merger : g1(N,M), the incentive of merger function in (Case 1), yields
g1(N,M) =
1
(N −M + 1)2 −
M + 1
(N + 1)2
(2.4)
To compare with other cases, the results of S-S-R are summarized3:
Claim 1. [S-S-R] (a) A merger to form monopoly is profitable.
(b) For any N , it is sufficient for a merger to be unprofitable that less than
80% of the firms merge.
A merger in (Case 1) is profitable if the concentration ratio of the merger α = M+1N is
greater than the threshold concentration ratio αˆ(N) ≡ Mˆ+1N ∈ [0.8, 1). Put differently, every
merger combining Mˆ + 1 firms or more is profitable in (Case 1). I will call Mˆ as the threshold
merger size under the S-S-R.
 Welfare Effect of Merger : S1(N,M), the welfare effect function in (Case 1), becomes4
S1(N,M) =
N −M
(N −M + 1) −
N
N + 1
− 1
2
(
N −M
N −M + 1
)2
+
1
2
(
N
N + 1
)2
(2.5)
Using this function, we can get the following result.
Claim 2. [S-S-R] (a) Every merger decreases welfare. (S1(N,M) < 0 for all M 6= 0)
(b) Welfare decreases at a slower rate than the incentive of merger does
around M = 0.
(∣∣∣∂g1(N,0)∂M ∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∂S1(N,0)∂M ∣∣∣)
A merger in the S-S-R model decreases welfare because it does not bring any cost saving
with increasing the remaining firms’ market power. But part (b) of this Claim implies that
3Refer to Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983) p.191 ∼ p.195 for Claim 1 and Claim 2.
4Equation 2.5 is the same with the one in p.195 of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983).
13
Figure 2.1: Merger’s Profitability and Welfare Effect : Case 1 (S-S-R)
social loss is smaller than private loss when the size of merger is small enough. This is because
outsider’s profit gain outweighs consumers’ loss when a merger is sufficiently small.
 Existence of Efficiency Gains : Efficiency gains turns the incentive of merger function
into gˆ1(N,M) = g1(N,M)+M ∗F . So, a merger that creates efficiency gains from elimination
of fixed cost duplication may still cause losses depending on the parameter values F and M .
Social gain from a merger, on the other hand, becomes Sˆ1(N,M) = S1(N,M) +M ∗F . Since
∂g1(N,0)
∂M < 0,
∂S1(N,0)
∂M < 0, and
∣∣∣∂g1(N,0)∂M ∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣∣∂S1(N,0)∂M ∣∣∣ for all N ≥ 2, it is possible to select F so
that Sˆ1(N,M) > 0 > gˆ1(N,M) for some M.
5 Figure 2.1, which is quoted from Salant, Switzer,
5Refer to the discussion in p.195 of Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983).
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and Reynolds (1983) (Figure 4. in pp.196), illustrates that a merger is privately unprofitable
but socially desirable when the size of a merger (M) is less than k.
Case 2. f(N − 1) < δ ≤ f(N)
This case happens when firms’ common discount factor is lower than threshold discount rate
pre-merger, but becomes higher post-merger even under 2-firm merger (f(N − 1) < δ ≤ f(N)).
So any size of merger turns firms’ behavior into collusion in this case.
 Incentive of Merger : g2(N,M), the incentive of merger function in (Case 2), yields
g2(N,M) =

1
4(N−M) − M+1(N+1)2 if M > 0
0 if M = 0
(2.6)
Since lim
M→0+
∂g2(N,M)
∂M < 0 and g2(N,M) is convex,
6 I can obtain the following results:
Claim 3. (a) Every merger is profitable except M = N−12 while a merger is just break-even if
M = N−12 (g2(N,M) > 0 for all M 6= N−12 , and g2(N, N−12 ) = 0).
(b) A merger to form monopoly is strictly more profitable than a merger between
two firms. (g2(N,N − 1) > g2(N, 1) for all N > 3)
The proof of every result in this paper is provided in the appendix. Claim 3 (a) shows that
any size of merger is at least break-even to the insiders and strictly profitable if M 6= N−12 .
So, the incentive of a merger dramatically increases when the merger is expected to change
firms’ competitive behavior from Cournot competition to collusion. Claim 3 (b) implies that
a merger to monopoly is most profitable because g2(N,M) is convex and g2(N,
N−1
2 ) = 0.
 Welfare Effect of Merger : The equilibrium price and quantity under Cournot compe-
tition with N firms are given by P (N) = 1N+1 , Q(N) =
N
N+1 . So, consumer surplus amounts
to CS2(N) =
1
2
(
N
N+1
)2
, and total profit of the industry is N ∗ Π2(N) = N(N+1)2 . Hence,
TS2(N) =
1
2
(
N
N+1
)2
+ N
(N+1)2
. Since (N−M) firms collude post-merger in this case, the equi-
librium price and quantity are given by P (N −M) = 12 , Q(N −M) = 12 . So, the post-merger
6 lim
M→0+
∂g2(N,M)
∂M
= 1
4N2
− 1
(N+1)2
< 0 and ∂
2g2
∂M2
= 1
8(N−M)3 > 0
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Figure 2.2: Merger’s Profitability : Comparison
Figure 2.3: Merger’s Welfare Effect : Comparison
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total surplus, TS2(N,M), comes to TS2(N,M) = CS2(N,M) + (N −M) ∗ Π2(N −M) = 38 .
Hence, S2(N,M), the welfare effect function in (Case 2), yields
S2(N,M) =
 0 if M = 04−(N+1)2
8(N+1)2
if M 6= 0
(2.7)
It is easy to see that S2(N,M) =
4−(N+1)2
8(N+1)2
< 0 for all N ≥ 2. So every size of merger
causes social loss, and the amount of welfare loss does not depend on the size of merger. This
is because the remaining firms collude for every M in this case. Comparing the incentive of
merger and its welfare effect between (Case 1) and (Case 2), I can obtain the following result:
Corollary 1. Given the number of firms and the size of a merger not forming monopoly
(N,M),
(a) a merger in (Case 2) is more profitable than one in (Case 1) (g1(N,M) < g2(N,M));
(b) a merger in (Case 2) is socially more injurious than one in (Case 1) (S1(N,M) > S2(N,M)).
As expected, the private incentive to merge becomes higher and social welfare gets worse
if Cournot competition turns to collusion after merger compared with the case that firms
compete Cournot pre- and post-merger.
 Existence of Efficiency Gains : If each firm has a fixed cost, the incentive of merger
function comes to gˆ2(N,M) = g2(N,M) + M ∗ F . So every size of merger is profitable
because g2(N,M) ≥ 0 and M ∗ F > 0 for all M > 0. The welfare effect function turns
to Sˆ2(N,M) = S2(N,M) + M ∗ F . Note that Sˆ2(N,M) and gˆ2(N,M) are largest when
M = (N − 1). So every size of merger is socially injurious if F ≤ (N+1)2−4
8(N−1)(N+1)2 , whereas a
merger to monopoly is socially most desirable if F > (N+1)
2−4
8(N−1)(N+1)2 .
Case 3. f(N −M∗) < δ ≤ f(N −M∗ + 1) for some M∗ ≥ 2
This case happens when there is a threshold size of merger M∗ ≥ 2 such that firms collude
post-merger if merger size is greater than or equal to M∗. Given Cournot competition pre-
merger, firms’ post-merger competitive behavior depends on the discount rate (δ), the size of
merger (M), and the pre-merger number of firms in the industry (N).
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Figure 2.4: Merger’s Profitability and Welfare Effect : Case 2
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 Incentive of Merger : Without loss, suppose 2 ≤ M∗ ≤ N − 2.7 For M < M∗, the
post-merger competition is still Cournot. So, the gains of merging firms are g1(N,M) in this
area. For M ≥ M∗, firms collude post-merger. So, in this area, the gains of merging firms
becomes g2(N,M). Hence, g3(N,M), the incentive of merger function in (Case 3), comes to
g3(N,M) =
 g1(N,M) if M < M
∗
g2(N,M) if M ≥M∗
(2.8)
Note that g3(N,M) is convex both in [0,M
∗) and [M∗, N − 1]. A merger turns from privately
unprofitable to profitable to the merging firms at M∗ if g1(N,M∗) < 0, and the merger becomes
more profitable at M∗ if g1(N,M∗) ≥ 0 due to the change in competitive behavior. Formally,
define M∗∗ be such that g3(N,M∗∗) ≥ 0 and g3(N,M) < 0 for all M ∈ (0,M∗∗). Similar to
(Case 1), M∗∗ can be called as the threshold merger size in (Case 3). I know that M∗∗ > 1
because g3(N, 1) = g1(N, 1) < 0 for all N ≥ 4 in this case. Then, I obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. Threshold merger size in (Case 3) is not greater than that in the S-S-R.(
M∗∗ ≤ Mˆ
)
This result shows that collusive effect reduces the minimum size of a profitable merger.
Hence, if α∗ ≡ M∗+1N is less than 80%, Claim 3 and Proposition 1 imply that the minimum
concentration ratio also falls below 80%.
Welfare Effect of Merger : For the same reason, social gains from a merger are S1(N,M)
if M < M∗, and S2(N,M) if M > M∗. So S3(N,M), the welfare effect function in (Case 3),
can be derived as
S3(N,M) =
 S1(N,M) if M < M
∗
S2(N,M) if M >M∗
(2.9)
So, social welfare always worsens for any size of merger (S3(N,M) < 0 for all M > 0), and it
decreases discontinuously at M∗. The social loss from a merger is the same in collusion regime
regardless of the size of merger.
7(Case 2) can be applied if M∗ = 1, while (Case 1) is applied if M∗ = N − 1. This case also requires that
N is greater than or equal to 4.
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Figure 2.5: Merger’s Profitability and Welfare Effect : Case 3 (No Efficiency Gain)
20
The regime change at M∗ is depicted in Figure 2.5. Social gains from a merger are drawn
by a blue line while its private profitability is drawn by a red line. They follows (Case 1) for
M < M∗, (Case 2) for M >M∗, and there is a break at M∗. So a merger to monopoly is the
best for insiders, but socially most harmful.
 Existence of Efficiency Gains : When there exist efficiency gains from merger, private
gain of merging firms turns to gˆ3(N,M) = g3(N,M)+M ∗F and social surplus from a merger
is provided by Sˆ3(N,M) = S3(N,M)+M ∗F . Note that Sˆ3(N,M) is monotonically increasing
in M for collusion area (M ≥ M∗). Since M∗ ≥ 2, I know that gˆ3(N, 1) = 1N2 − 2(N+1)2 + F
and Sˆ3(N, 1) =
N−1
N − NN+1 − 12
(
N−1
N
)2
+ 12
(
N
N+1
)2
+ F . Hence, depending on the F value,
there can be three possible cases in terms of the signs of gˆ3(N, 1) and Sˆ3(N, 1).
(1) gˆ3(N, 1) ≥ 0, Sˆ3(N, 1) > 0 if F ≥ 2(N+1)2 − 1N2
(2) gˆ3(N, 1) < 0, Sˆ3(N, 1) ≥ 0 if −N−1N + NN+1 + 12
(
N−1
N
)2− 12 ( NN+1)2 ≤ F < 2(N+1)2 − 1N2
(3) gˆ3(N, 1) < 0, Sˆ3(N, 1) < 0 if F < −N−1N + NN+1 + 12
(
N−1
N
)2 − 12 ( NN+1)2
In the appendix, I show the following: the merger of optimal size is welfare increasing
and profitable if efficiency gain is large (F ≥ 2
(N+1)2
− 1
N2
); every profitable merger is socially
injurious if efficiency gain is small (F < −N−1N + NN+1 + 12
(
N−1
N
)2 − 12 ( NN+1)2); the optimal
size of merger may be welfare increasing but unprofitable if efficiency gain is intermediate.
Summary of Merger Analysis
Table 2.2 summarizes the merger analysis in the identical constant marginal cost model.
This table is made on the assumption that there is no fixed cost. If a merger does not change
firms competitive behavior as in (Case 1), the merger is usually not profitable. But the setting
of the paper makes it easier for firms to collude after merger. If this collusive effect works
in a merger as in (Case 2) and (Case 3), the merger’s profitability improves dramatically. It
happens because the merged entity can obtain monopoly profit divided by the number of post-
merger firms under any merger having collusive effect. In terms of welfare effect, every merger
harms social welfare under this model because it reduces the aggregate output without any
efficiency gains. This negative effect on social welfare is larger when firms collude post-merger.
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Table 2.2: Profitability and Welfare Effect of Merger
Type of Merger Profitability Welfare Effect Note
Case 1 loss if M+1N < 0.8 negative S-S-R model
Case 2 benefit negative∗ worse than S-S-R in welfare
Case 3 benefit if M ≥M∗ negative∗ worse than S-S-R if M ≥M∗
2.4 Asymmetric Increasing Marginal Cost Model
As I discussed in the introduction, the merger concept of the S-S-R and the identical
constant marginal cost model is not realistic. In this section, I build up the asymmetric
increasing marginal cost model where a merged entity has bigger size or better technology
than its constituent firms. Having this model, I perform the merger analysis similar to Section
2.3. Since a merger in this model may create cost saving from synergies, merger analysis
includes its price effect as well.
2.4.1 Model
This model also basically follows the S-S-R model except that the cost function is modified.
 Demand and Supply : I keep using linear demand curve P = 1−Q. There are N firms
before merger. In order to deal with cost asymmetry, I will introduce cost function similar to
the one used by Perry and Porter (1985), McAfee and Williams (1992), Rothschild (1999) and
etc. :
Ci(qi) =
q2i
2ei
, ei > 0 (2.10)
So the marginal cost of firm i is a linear function MCi(qi) =
qi
ei
, and increases as output
increases in this setting. Here, ei can be seen as efficiency coefficient or technology-adjusted
capital stock, and the S-S-R setting is a specific case that ei is infinity. In order to focus on
cost saving effect from reallocation or synergy effect of merger, I assume that there is no fixed
cost in this model.
This cost function is slightly different from the Perry-Porter model in that it uses efficiency
coefficient instead of capital stock. So it is possible that two firms with the same capital stock
may have different cost functions under this setting. I made this modification in order to
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analyze the incentive and welfare effect of a merger that creates synergy effect.
 Merger Scenario : I will consider a 2-firm merger between firm 1 and firm 2 in this
section. Two types of cost saving are analyzed : rationalization and synergy effect. Following
the definition of Farrell and Shapiro (1990), rationalization model deals with the case that “the
combined entity can better allocate outputs across facilities but its production possibilities are
no different from those of the insiders (jointly) before the merger”. In fact, the merger concept
in the Perry-Porter or McAfee-Williams model exactly coincides with rationalization. On the
other hand, synergy effect model looks at the situation where the merged firm’s production
possibilities are better than those of the constituent firms. Economies of scale or learning effect
can be sources of synergy effect.
 Firms’ Competitive Behavior : In this model, I assume firms compete a` la Cournot pre-
and post-merger like the S-S-R model. So I rule out the collusive effect as a motive of merger.
There is no entry nor exit in this section.
I can derive Cournot-Nash equilibrium when there are N firms. Each firm i solves the
following profit maximization problem:
pii(q) = (1−
N∑
k=1
qk)qi − q
2
i
2ei
, where q = (q1, · · · , qN ) (2.11)
Let me denote λk =
ek
1+ek
. Then, Cournot-Nash equilibrium output and price are given by
Q∗N =
∑N
k=1 λk
1 +
∑N
k=1 λk
(2.12)
P ∗N =
1
1 +
∑N
k=1 λk
(2.13)
and each firm i’s output and market share amount to
q∗i =
λi
1 +
∑N
k=1 λk
(2.14)
s∗i =
λi∑N
k=1 λk
(2.15)
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As ei gets bigger, firm i’s market share becomes higher. Then, each firm’s profit yields
pi∗i =
λi(1 + λi)
2(1 +
∑N
k=1 λk)
2
(2.16)
2.4.2 Analysis of Merger with Rationalization Effect
Having the equilibrium output, price and profit of each firm, I can analyze the incentive
and welfare effect of a merger with rationalization. To this end, I need to derive cost function
of a merged entity. In order to minimize its cost, the merged firm solves
min
q1,q2
q21
2e1
+
q22
2e2
subject to qM = q1 + q2
So, its cost function becomes C1+2(qM ) =
q2M
2(e1+e2)
. Note that the merged firm’s efficiency is
equal to the sum of its constituent firms’ efficiency when a merger brings cost saving only from
rationalization.
Incentive of Merger
Suppose that firm 1 and 2 merge, then a merged firm’s profit at post-merger Cournot-Nash
equilibrium, denoted by pi1+2M , would be
pi1+2M =
λ1+2(1 + λ1+2)
2(1 + λ1+2 +
∑N
k=3 λk)
2
, where λ1+2 =
e1 + e2
1 + e1 + e2
(2.17)
Then, the incentive of merger function, g1+2R (e), is defined by using equation (2.16) and (2.17).
g1+2R (e) = pi
1+2
M (e)− (pi∗1(e) + pi∗2(e)), where e = (e1, · · · , eN ) (2.18)
=
λ1+2(1 + λ1+2)
2(1 + λ1+2 +
∑N
k=3 λk)
2
− λ1(1 + λ1) + λ2(1 + λ2)
2(1 +
∑N
k=1 λk)
2
So merger incentive depends not only on the merger participants’ efficiency (e1, e2) but also
on outsider’s efficiency (e3, · · · , eN ).
To see the detail of merger’s profitability, let me consider a simplest case where there are
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Figure 2.6: Incentive of Merger - Rationalization
3 firms pre-merger (N = 3), then g1+2R (e) yields
g1+2R (e1, e2, e3) = pi
1+2
M (e1, e2, e3)− (pi∗1(e1, e2, e3) + pi∗2(e1, e2, e3)) (2.19)
Figure 2.6 shows the space where a merger is profitable
(
g1+2R (e1, e2, e3) > 0
)
when each firm’s
efficiency takes a value between 0.1 and 10
(
(e1, e2, e3) ∈ [0.1, 10]3
)
. Recall that any merger
between 2 firms in triopoly market is not profitable under the S-S-R model because g1(3, 1) =
1
9 − 18 = − 172 from equation (2.4). So, this example shows that “merger paradox” does not
always hold when cost saving from reallocation is possible.
Given that a merger may be profitable, the important question is how outsider’s or insiders’
efficiency affects the incentive of merger. We can get some intuitions from Figure 2.7. Panel
(A) shows that any merger with rationalization is profitable when outsider’s efficiency level is
low (e3 = .3). If outsider is efficient enough as in panel (B) and (C), however, there should be
an asymmetry in efficiency coefficients between constituent firms so that a merger is profitable
(e3 = 1 or e3 = 5). Panel (B) and (C) also implies that the required asymmetry in efficiency
level gets bigger as outsider is more efficient. Claim 4 provides the formal relation between
outsider’s efficiency and a merger’s profitability.
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Figure 2.7: Outsider’s Efficiency and Incentive of Merger
Claim 4. Suppose that a merger is at least break-even at e = (e1, · · · , eN ). If any outsider
gets more efficient, the merger becomes less profitable or unprofitable. (If g1+2R (e) ≥ 0, then
∂
∂ej
g1+2R (e) < 0 for j ≥ 3.)8
It is useful to look at outsider’s response to a merger in order to understand this result.
Using equation (2.13), (2.14) and (2.16), I can get the post-merger equilibrium price, outsider’s
output and profit and can compare them with the equivalent pre-merger values.
P 1+2N =
1
1 + λ1+2 +
∑N
k=3 λk
>
1
1 + λ1 + λ2 +
∑N
k=3 λk
= P ∗N
q1+2o =
λo
1 + λ1+2 +
∑N
k=3 λk
>
λo
1 +
∑N
k=1 λk
= q∗o
pi1+2o =
λo(1 + λo)
2(1 + λ1+2 +
∑N
k=3 λk)
2
>
λo(1 + λo)
2(1 + λ1 + λ2 +
∑N
k=3 λk)
2
= pi∗o
The inequalities comes from λ1 +λ2 > λ1+2. Since the equilibrium price and outsider’s output
increase after a merger, the merged firm’s output q1+2M should be less than the sum of its
constituent firms’ pre-merger output q∗1 + q∗2. It depends on outsider’s efficiency how much
the merged firm’s output decreases. To see that, note that λi = −dqidQ from the first order
condition of (2.11). So, λi represents firm i’s responsiveness with respect to the change in
8A sufficient condition (g1+2R (e) ≥ 0) is required to establish this result analytically, but numerically I could
check that this condition is not necessary to get the result when N = 3. See the appendix.
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market equilibrium output. Therefore, the more efficient an outsider is, the more it increases
its output after merger because higher ei is equivalent to higher λi. Big reaction of an efficient
outsider, in turn, harms the merged firm’s profitability.
Next, look at the relationship between cost asymmetry of constituent firms and the merger’s
profitability. Note first that marginal costs are different among firms. From equation (2.14)
and cost function, firm i’s marginal cost is given by MCi(q∗i ) =
[
(1 + ei)
(
1 +
∑N
k=1 λk
)]−1
.
So more efficient firm produces at lower marginal cost in Nash equilibrium. When 2 firms
are combined by merger, the merged firm makes the marginal costs of these two facilities
equal through reallocation of output in order to minimize its cost. Larger difference in merg-
ing parties’ efficiencies is equivalent to larger difference in their marginal costs at pre-merger
Nash equilibrium. So the merged entity can save more cost through reallocation. Formally,
fix e1 + e2 = es and let e1 = (1 − ν)es and e2 = νes for ν ∈ [0.5, 1). Then asymmetry
between firm 1 and firm 2 comes to e2e1 =
ν
1−ν , so larger ν is equivalent to bigger asymme-
try. Using (es, ν), I can redefine the incentive of merger function as g
1+2
R (es, e3, · · · , eN , ν).
Then, I could show the following numerical result in the appendix: if a merger under N = 3
is not profitable, increase in asymmetry between insiders improves the incentive of merger(
if g1+2R (es, e3, ν) ≤ 0, ∂∂ν g1+2R (es, e3, ν) > 0 for all (es, e3) ∈ R2+
)
.
Welfare Effect of a Merger
As shown in previous subsection, a merger with rationalization increases price and out-
siders’ output, while the merged firm’s output is lower than the sum of its constituent firms’
pre-merger output. So, this type of merger increases outsider’s profit and decreases consumer
surplus. But merger’s profitability is not decisive. The merger’s overall effect on aggregate
welfare depends on the relative magnitude of these 3 effects.
Since pre- and post-merger price and each firm’s profit have analytical solutions thanks
to linear demand and marginal cost, welfare analysis can be performed directly. Given the
characterization of pre- and post-merger Nash equilibrium, welfare effect of a merger yields
w1+2R (e) = g
1+2
R (e) +
∑N
k=3
(pi1+2k (e)− pi∗k(e))−
∫ P 1+2N (e)
P ∗N (e)
(1− P )dP (2.20)
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So the welfare effect of a merger depends on both the merger participants’ efficiency (e1, e2)
and outsiders’ efficiency (e3, · · · , eN ) as merger’s profitability does. It is not surprising be-
cause firms’ interaction affects consumer surplus and each firm’s profit in oligopoly mar-
ket. With equation (2.20), I can check whether a merger is welfare-enhancing or not when
e = (e1, · · · , eN ) is given. Moreover, e can be identified from ei1+ei =
q∗i
P ∗N
even when it is unob-
servable. Using equation (2.13), (2.14), (2.20) with cost function, we can obtain the necessary
and sufficient condition for welfare-increasing merger9
∑N
k=1
q∗kMC
k(q∗k)− q1+2M MC1+2(q1+2M )−
∑N
k=3
q1+2k MC
k(q1+2k ) > (P
1+2
N )
2 − (P ∗N )2 (2.21)
This condition says that the decrease in output-weighted marginal cost outweighs the increase
in square of price in welfare-increasing merger. Because of the linearity of demand and marginal
cost, half of left-hand side in condition (2.21) is equal to the decrease in total cost of the
industry from the merger whereas half of right-hand side represents decrease in total revenue
and consumer surplus. So, this condition requires that the industry’s profit increase from
output rationalization outweighs decrease in consumer surplus under welfare-increasing merger.
In order to see when this condition is satisfied in more detail, revisit the example where
N = 3. Then, I can check the welfare effect of merger in the cube e ∈ [0.1, 10]3 using equation
(2.20). Figure 2.8 shows the space where a merger increases welfare (w1+2R (e1, e2, e3) > 0).
This picture illustrates that a merger is more likely to increase social welfare if joint market
share of merger participants is small and the outsider has the largest market share. Higher
social welfare mainly comes from output reallocation between insiders and outsider in this case.
Firm 3’s output increases after merger whereas aggregate output of firm 1 and 2 decreases.
Since firm i’s marginal cost is equal to 1(1+ei)(1+λ1+λ2+λ3) in Nash equilibrium before merger,
firm 3’s marginal cost is lowest if e3 is largest. Moreover, since larger e3 implies larger λ3,
firm 3 responds more to the decrease in aggregate output from merger. Therefore, a merger
between small firms enables efficient outsider to produce more and relatively inefficient merged
9See the appendix for the derivation of condition (2.21).
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Figure 2.8: Welfare Effect of Merger - Rationalization
entity to produce less, which makes it possible for social welfare to increase.10
On the other hand, Figure 2.8 shows that there is another type of welfare-enhancing merger,
which combines a big firm and a small firm given the presence of a sufficiently efficient outsider.
Output reallocation between insiders can be an additional source of higher welfare in this case.
It happens because a merged firm can save its cost by increasing the output of the efficient
participant and decreasing the output of the inefficient participant. So, the merger might
enhance social welfare even when the efficient participant’s initial market share is larger than
the outsider’s market share.
As shown in panel (A) of Figure 2.9, a merger between firms with small market share is
rarely privately profitable although this merger may increase social welfare. So the second fea-
ture of the S-S-R model may occur in a merger with rationalization. Since this kind of merger
cannot benefit from cost asymmetry between participants by much, cost saving effect from
10This is a different observation from the argument that a merger is more likely to be welfare enhancing if the
non-merging firms are more concentrated. [Farrell and Shapiro (1990, 1991), Werden (1991), and McAfee and
Williams (1992)] In this example, the rest of the industry is completely concentrated for all parameter value of
e3 because there is only one firm out of merger.
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Figure 2.9: Profitability and Welfare Effect of Merger with Rationalization
reallocation is restricted for the merged entity. Moreover, the output response of efficient out-
sider is big, which harms the merged firm’s profitability. So it is unlikely for a merger between
small inefficient firms to occur in the market. In contrast, a merger is privately profitable and
welfare enhancing when there is a sufficiently efficient outsider and a big asymmetry in cost
efficiency between participants as is illustrated in panel (B). Asymmetry of insiders improves
both profitability and welfare effect of merger while outsider’s response improves welfare but
hurts merger’s profitability. Overall, the cost saving effect from big asymmetry outweighs
profit loss due to outsider’s output increase in this case. Panel (C) in Figure 2.9 shows the
space where a merger is profitable but welfare-decreasing. This is the type of merger which
antitrust policy has to concern about because it is likely to occur but socially undesirable.
The fact that the welfare effect of a merger depends on outsider’s efficiency level and
insiders’ asymmetry has some policy implication as well. A merger with the same efficiency
combination (e1, e2) of participants might be either socially beneficial or harmful depending on
outsider’s efficiency level. Similarly, a merger with the same post-merger efficiency es = e1 +e2
might be either socially beneficial or harmful depending on asymmetry level and e3.
30
2.4.3 Analysis of Merger with Synergy Effect
Merger models that I analyzed so far have adverse effects on consumer surplus because
the equilibrium price increases after merger. It is quite a natural result from Proposition 2
of Farrell-Shapiro, which proves that a merger without synergy effect causes the equilibrium
price to rise. Now I will move the scope of analysis to the type of merger creating synergy
effect. For that purpose, I let the merged firm’s cost function as C1+2(qM ) =
q2M
2eM
such that
eM > e1 + e2 holds. Here, eM represents the merged firm’s efficiency level.
Incentive of Merger
Given the merged firm’s cost function, its profit at post-merger Cournot-Nash equilibrium
would be
pi1+2M =
λM (1 + λM )
2(1 + λM +
∑N
k=3 λk)
2
, where λM =
eM
1 + eM
(2.22)
Then, using arguments similar to those in the rationalization case, the incentive of merger
function, denoted by g1+2S (e, eM ), becomes
g1+2S (e, eM ) = pi
1+2
M (eM , e3, · · · , eN )− (pi∗1(e) + pi∗2(e)), where e = (e1, · · · , eN ) (2.23)
=
λM (1 + λM )
2(1 + λM +
∑N
k=3 λk)
2
− λ1(1 + λ1) + λ2(1 + λ2)
2(1 +
∑N
k=1 λk)
2
Now the incentive of merger depends on the magnitude of synergy effect besides the insiders’
and outsider’s efficiency level. Then, the relationship between the magnitude of synergy effect
and the incentive of merger can be derived.
Claim 5. A merger’s profitability improves as synergies get stronger.
g1+2S (e, eM ) > g
1+2
R (e) is immediate from this Claim. I can obtain some economic rationale
of this result from the comparison between a merged firm’s output in a rationalization merger,
denoted by q1+2M , and that in the equivalent merger with synergies, denoted by q
1+2
M (eM ). From
equation (2.14), q1+2M and q
1+2
M (eM ) are given by
q1+2M =
λ1+2
1 + λ1+2 +
∑N
k=3 λk
<
λM
1 + λM +
∑N
k=3 λk
= q1+2M (eM )
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The inequality comes from λM > λ1+2. The equilibrium output of the merged firm becomes
larger as synergy effect gets stronger. In contrast, outsider’s output in a rationalization merger
is higher than that in an equivalent synergy effect merger
(
q1+2o > q
1+2
o (eM )
)
. Hence, the
presence of synergy effect restricts the amount of outsider’s output response after merger, which
in turn improves the merger’s profitability. For the same reason, outsider’s post-merger profit,
or equivalently “free rider’s problem” proposed by J.Stigler, gets smaller with the stronger
synergy.
pi1+2o =
λo(1 + λo)
2(1 + λ1+2 +
∑N
k=3 λk)
2
>
λo(1 + λo)
2(1 + λM +
∑N
k=3 λk)
2
= pi1+2o (eM ) (2.24)
Welfare Effect of Merger
The post-merger equilibrium price is given by
P 1+2N (eM ) =
1
1 + λM +
∑N
k=3 λk
(2.25)
While the effect of merger on consumer and outsider is not decisive, equation (2.24) and (2.25)
imply that higher synergy lowers post-merger equilibrium price and outsider’s profit. Given
these equations, welfare effect of a merger with synergy effect yields
w1+2S (e, eM ) = g
1+2
S (e, eM ) +
N∑
k=3
(pi1+2k (eM )− pi∗k(e))−
∫ P 1+2N (eM )
P ∗N (e)
(1− P )dP (2.26)
As in the incentive of merger, the welfare effect depends on the magnitude of synergy effect in
addition to the insiders’ and outsider’s efficiency level. Using equation (2.13), (2.14) and cost
function, I can transform equation (2.26) into the necessary sufficient condition for welfare-
increasing merger (w1+2S (e, eM ) > 0).
N∑
k=1
q∗kMC
k(q∗k)− q1+2M (eM )MC1+2(q1+2M (eM ))−
N∑
k=3
q1+2k (eM )MC
k(q1+2k (eM ))
> (P 1+2N (eM ))
2 − (P ∗N )2 (2.27)
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Figure 2.10: Welfare Effect of Profitable Merger - Synergy
Condition (2.27) is similar to condition (2.21), but each term (q1+2M (eM ), MC
1+2(q1+2M (eM )),
q1+2k (eM ), MC
k(q1+2k (eM )) and P
1+2
N (eM )) has a different value from rationalization case and
varies depending on the level of synergy. Using equation (2.26), we can derive the relationship
between the magnitude of synergy effect and the welfare effect of merger.
Claim 6. A merger’s welfare effect improves as synergies get stronger if and only if eM satisfies
eM >
−1− 2∑Nk=3 λ2kek +∑Nk=3 λk
4 + 2
∑N
k=3
λ2k
ek
+
∑N
k=3 λk
(2.28)
Claim 6 shows that stronger synergy always improves merger’s welfare effect for N = 3,
and it does for N ≥ 4 unless eM is too small. In order to compare with rationalization type
merger, let me consider the case of N = 3 again. Since synergy effect improves both a merger’s
profitability and welfare effect in this case, it expands the scope for privately profitable and
socially desirable mergers.
Suppose 10% of synergy effect (i.e. eM = 1.1 ∗ (e1 + e2)). The shaded space in panel (A) of
Figure 2.10 plots the space where a merger with this amount of synergy effect is profitable and
welfare-enhancing for e ∈ [0.1, 10]3. It encompasses all the relevant space in panel (B) of Figure
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Figure 2.11: Synergy Effect and Profitability of Welfare-Increasing Merger
2.9, so mergers with synergy are profitable and welfare-enhancing in wider range. In fact, the
blue shape includes all the unprofitable welfare-increasing mergers without synergy (panel (A)
of Figure 2.9) as well. The profitability of a merger with synergy improves not only because
the merged entity can save its cost from both reallocation and synergy, but also because the
enhanced productivity of the merged firm restricts outsider’s output increase post-merger.
It is also worthwhile to note that there still exist profitable welfare-decreasing mergers with
10% synergy from panel (B) in Figure 2.10. This yellow shape do not disappear even with
stronger synergy effect, say 100%. So the presence of strong synergy effect is not sufficient for
welfare to increase after merger.
Another interesting question is how much synergy is required for a welfare-increasing merger
to be profitable for merging parties. Figure 2.11 answers this question in my example. Panel
(A) in Figure 2.11 plots the space of unprofitable welfare-increasing merger when there is no
synergy. This shape gets smaller in panel (B) with 1% of synergy, and eventually disappears
with about 1.84% synergy effect or above, as shown in panel (C). In other words, a welfare-
increasing merger with 1.84% synergy or above is always privately profitable. But the inverse
is not true; even a profitable merger with 10% synergy may be welfare-decreasing as panel (B)
of Figure 2.10 implies.
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Synergy Effect of Merger and Consumer Surplus
Farrell-Shapiro’s Proposition 1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a merger
to improve consumer surplus. When two firms merge, the condition comes to MC1(q∗1) −
MC1+2(q∗1 + q∗2) > P ∗N −MC2(q∗2). Given the functional form of demand and cost function,
this condition boils down to the following result.
Claim 7. [Farrell-Shapiro] A merger improves consumer surplus if and only if
λ1 + λ2 < λM (2.29)
There are two things to note on this Claim. First, it only depends on insiders’ efficiency and
the magnitude of synergy whether a merger is CS-increasing or not, which is in contrast with
welfare effect of merger. More surprisingly, if the constituent firms of a merger are efficient
enough in the sense that λ1 + λ2 > 1, then the merger cannot improve consumer surplus
irrespective of the magnitude of its synergy effect. Using Claim 7, I can check the profitability
of any CS-increasing merger.
Claim 8. Any CS-increasing merger is profitable for merging firms.11
Claim 8 is also in contrast with a welfare-increasing merger, which is not always profitable.
This result holds because sufficient synergy effect is required for a merger to improve consumer
surplus. But the inverse is not true because a profitable merger is not necessarily CS-increasing.
This model confirms the well-documented fact that a merger increases consumer surplus
if and only if outsider’s profit decrease. [Stillman (1983), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), Duso,
Neven, and Roller (2007), etc.] To see this, using equation (2.16) yields
pi1+2o (eM ) =
λo(1 + λo)
2(1 + λM +
∑N
k=3 λk)
2
<
λo(1 + λo)
2(1 + λ1 + λ2 +
∑N
k=3 λk)
2
= pi∗o
11Claim 8 holds in a very general setting. This result only requires the following two conditions, which Farrell
and Shapiro (1990) assumes. See the appendix.
Condition 3 : p′(Q) + qip′′(Q) < 0, i = 1, · · · , N
Condition 4 : d
2
dq2i
Ci(qi) > p
′(Q), i = 1, · · · , N
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Table 2.3: The Welfare Effect of Horizontal Merger
Type of Merger Insiders Outsiders Consumer Net Effect
1. CS-decreasing non-definite benefit loss non-definite
2. CS-neutral benefit neutral neutral positive
3. CS-increasing benefit loss benefit positive
Here, pi1+2o (eM ) represents the outsider o’s post-merger profit whereas pi
∗
o denotes its pre-merger
profit, and the inequality comes from λ1 + λ2 < λM . So, “free rider’s problem” completely
disappears in a CS-neutral and CS-increasing merger. Further, a CS-increasing merger reduces
outsider’s output and its market share as well. Denote the outsider’s pre-merger output and
market share by q∗o and s∗o, and its post-merger output and market share by q1+2o (eM ) and
s1+2o (eM ). From equation (2.14) and (2.15), I can obtain
q1+2o (eM ) =
λo
1 + λM +
∑N
k=3 λk
<
λo
1 +
∑N
k=1 λk
= q∗o
s1+2o (eM ) =
λo
λM +
∑N
k=3 λk
<
λo∑N
k=1 λk
= s∗o
Again, the inequality comes from λ1 + λ2 < λM . Therefore, the merged firm’s market share
gets larger than the joint pre-merger market share of its constituent firms in a CS-increasing
merger.
Using these results enables me to check the welfare effect of a CS-neutral merger. Any
CS-neutral merger does not affect consumer surplus by definition, nor the outsiders’ profit. So
the welfare effect of CS-neutral merger is simplified into w1+2S (e, eM ) = g
1+2
S (e, eM ). The proof
of Claim 8 shows that a CS-neutral merger is profitable, so it is welfare increasing.
Table 2.3 summarizes the discussion so far on the profitability and welfare effect of a
merger. The profitability of CS-decreasing merger is not decisive but improves as insiders are
more asymmetric, outsiders are “less” efficient and the merger creates bigger synergies while
CS-neutral or CS-increasing merger is profitable.
There is no merger that all the economic agents benefit from it. Given that only profitable
mergers are proposed, the one who gets hurt from a merger would be either outsider or con-
sumer but not both, and the dividing line is the merger’s price effect. For example, a merger
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in the S-S-R model or rationalization type merger is also always CS-decreasing, so outsiders
benefit from both kinds of merger.
The welfare effect of CS-decreasing merger is not decisive but improves as insiders are
“smaller” or more asymmetric, outsiders are “more” efficient and the merger creates bigger
synergies whereas CS-neutral or CS-increasing merger is welfare-increasing in general.12
2.4.4 One Merger’s Effect on Another Merger’s Profitability
The comparative statics in this subsection is how one merger affects another merger’s
profitability. If a merger enhances the profitability of another merger(s), then mergers are
more likely to occur simultaneously or in chain, which is called “merger wave”.
To deal with this issue, it is useful to rewrite g1+2S (e, eM ) in (2.23) using y ≡
∑N
k=3 λk.
Then, the incentive of merger function becomes
g1+2(e1, e2, eM , y) =
λM (1 + λM )
2(1 + λM + y)2
− λ1(1 + λ1) + λ2(1 + λ2)
2(1 + λ1 + λ2 + y)2
Besides a merger between firm 1 and 2 (merger A), let me consider another merger between
firm 3 and 4 (merger B) without loss. After merger B, y comes to y′ = λ′M +
∑N
k=5 λk, where
λ′M =
e
′
M
1+e
′
M
and e
′
M represents the efficiency level of the merged firm coming from merger
B. Claim 7 implies that y decreases (increases) if and only if merger B is CS-decreasing.
(CS-increasing, resp.) Taking a partial of g1+2(e1, e2, eM , y) with respect to y, I can obtain
∂
∂y
g1+2(e1, e2, eM , y) =
λM (1 + λM )
(1 + λM + y)2
[
1
1 + λ1 + λ2 + y
− 1
1 + λM + y
]
−2g
1+2(e1, e2, eM , y)
1 + λ1 + λ2 + y
(2.30)
Equation (2.30) brings me the following result.
Claim 9. Suppose that merger A is break-even without merger B. Another CS-decreasing
merger B may trigger the occurrence of merger A.
12If condition (2.28) holds, Claim 6 and Claim 8 implies that a CS-increasing merger is welfare-increasing.
But it does not hold in all environment. Cheung (1992) shows one example where a CS-increasing merger may
be welfare-decreasing under linear demand and constant marginal cost setting.
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This Claim provides a sufficient condition where a merger becomes more profitable after the
occurrence of another CS-decreasing merger: g1+2(e1, e2, eM , y) ≥ 0 and λ1 + λ2 ≥ λM . Since
this is a sufficient condition, even unprofitable mergers may turn profitable after the occurrence
of another CS-decreasing merger. To see this, suppose that merger A is unprofitable before
merger B happens. Then λ1 + λ2 > λM and g
1+2(e1, e2, eM , y) < 0 hold. If the loss of merger
A is small enough, ∂∂yg
1+2(e1, e2, eM , y) < 0 holds from equation (2.30). So it can be the case
that g1+2(e1, e2, eM , y
′) > 0.
The reason why this Claim holds is again related to the output response of outsiders.
Without merger B, merger A causes firm 3 and 4 to adjust their output individually. But if
firm 3 and 4 are combined by merger B, this merged entity will best respond to the change in
aggregate output caused by merger A. Since merger B is CS-decreasing, λ3 + λ4 > λ
′
M holds.
Recall that λi is firm i’s responsiveness with respect to the change in market equilibrium
output. So, the merged entity’s output response is smaller than the joint output response
of firm 3 and 4 for a given aggregate output change. Hence, the presence of a CS-decreasing
merger reduces the output response of outsider(s), which improves the profitability of a merger
between firm 1 and 2. Claim 9 and this discussion partly explains why mergers are apt to
occur simultaneously or in chain.
2.4.5 General Linear Demand and Merger Analysis
In order to analyze the effect of demand side on profitability and welfare effect of merger,
I will assume P = a − bQ in this subsection, where a > 0 and b > 0. So, a is related to the
market size while b is related to elasticity. If I do the same exercise with this demand function,
the incentive of merger function, denoted by g1+2(e, eM , a, b), comes to
g1+2(e, eM , a, b) =
a2
2b
[
µM (1 + µM )
(1 + µM +
∑N
k=3 µk)
2
− µ1(1 + µ1) + µ2(1 + µ2)
(1 +
∑N
k=1 µk)
2
], (2.31)
where µM =
beM
1+beM
and µk =
bek
1+bek
Note that if eM = e1 + e2 and a = b = 1, g
1+2(e, eM , a, b) = g
1+2(e, e1 + e2, 1, 1) = g
1+2
R (e)
in equation (2.18) and if eM > e1 + e2 and a = b = 1, g
1+2(e, eM , a, b) = g
1+2(e, eM , 1, 1) =
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g1+2S (e, eM ) in equation (2.23). The change in outsider o’s profit from the merger yields
pi1+2o −pi∗o =
a2
2b
[
µo(1 + µo)
(1 + µM +
∑N
k=3 µk)
2
− µo(1 + µo)
(1 +
∑N
k=1 µk)
2
]
Since pre-merger and post-merger Nash equilibrium price is given by
P ∗N =
a
1+
∑N
k=1 µk
, P 1+2N =
a
1 + µM+
∑N
k=3 µk
, (2.32)
the welfare effect of merger, denoted by w1+2(e, eM , a, b), comes to
w1+2(e, eM , a, b)=g
1+2(e, eM , a, b)+
N∑
k=3
(pi1+2k −pi∗o)−
1
b
∫ P 1+2N
P ∗N
(a− P )dP (2.33)
Similarly, if eM = e1 + e2 and a = b = 1, w
1+2(e, eM , a, b) = w
1+2(e, e1 + e2, 1, 1) = w
1+2
R (e)
in equation (2.20) and if eM > e1 + e2 and a = b = 1, w
1+2(e, eM , a, b) = w
1+2(e, eM , 1, 1) =
w1+2S (e, eM ) in equation (2.26). Equation (2.31), (2.32), and (2.33) give the following result,
immediately.
Claim 10. (a) g1+2(e, eM , a, b) =
a2
b g
1+2(be, beM )
(b) w1+2(e, eM , a, b) =
a2
b w
1+2(be, beM )
(c) A merger improves consumer surplus if and only if µ1 + µ2 < µM .
So, g1+2(e, eM , a, b) > 0 is equivalent to g
1+2(be, beM ) > 0, as is w
1+2(e, eM , a, b) > 0
equivalent to w1+2(be, beM ) > 0. Then, while market size variable a affects the magnitude of
merger’s profitability and welfare effect, it relies only on (e, eM , b) whether a merger is profitable
or welfare-increasing. In addition, it only depends on (e1, e2, eM , b) and not on market size
variable a whether a merger is CS-increasing. Hence, Claim 10 shows that qualitative merger
analysis can be done with demand P = 1−Q if I substitute (e, eM ) with (be, beM ) even when
the real demand is P = a− bQ.
Note that (e, eM , b) is all the information requirement for the qualitative welfare analysis of
a merger whereas (e1, e2, eM , b) is required for the qualitative price effect analysis of a merger.
Moreover, if one parameter of demand function (either a or b) is identified, it is possible to
derive (e, b) from the observable variables at pre-merger Nash equilibrium. So, we can evaluate
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the welfare effect of rationalization type merger (eM = e1 +e2). If synergy effect (eM > e1 +e2)
is observable, we can also evaluate the welfare effect and price effect of a merger with synergy.
2.4.6 Evaluation of Merger Review Criteria in the Literature
Farrell-Shapiro’s Sufficient Condition
Proposition 5 of Farrell and Shapiro (1990) provides a sufficient condition for merger to
increase welfare :
PROPOSITION 5 (Farrell-Shapiro): Consider a proposed merger among firms i ∈
I, and suppose that their initial (joint) market share sI does not exceed
∑
k∈O λksk.
Suppose further that P ′′, P ′′′, and d
2
dq2i
Ci are all nonnegative and d
3
dq3i
Ci is non-
positive in the relevant ranges and for all nonparticipant firms i. Then, if the
merger is profitable and would raise the market price, it would also raise welfare.
In the model setting of this section, P ′′ = P ′′′ = d
3
dq3i
Ci = 0 and d
2
dq2i
Ci = 1ei > 0 hold. On
the other hand, the initial market share condition in a merger between firm 1 and 2 becomes13
λ1 + λ2 <
N∑
k=3
λ2k (2.34)
Hence, a profitable CS-decreasing merger would raise welfare if it satisfies condition (2.34).
There are two observations on this condition. First, there is a risk that a welfare-enhancing
merger does not satisfy this condition because condition (2.34) is a sufficient condition. Second,
this condition does not depend on the magnitude of synergy effect, so it gives the same condition
whether a merger only has a rationalization or even synergy effect.
In order to see the property of condition (2.34) in more detail, revisit the example of
N = 3. Then this condition comes to λ1 + λ2 < λ
2
3. Compare the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition
with w1+2R (e) > 0 for e ∈ [0.1, 10]3. Panel (A) in Figure 2.12 plots the space where the Farrell-
Shapiro’s condition is satisfied whereas panel (B) shows welfare-enhancing mergers where this
condition cannot capture. So, there exists the risk of type-2 error in which a welfare-enhancing
merger fails to satisfy Farrell-Shapiro’s condition.
13This condition is equivalent with equation (17) in Farrell and Shapiro (1990) or equation (6) in Werden
(1991) because si =
λi∑N
k=1
λk
and ε = 1∑N
k=1
λk
under the our model.
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Figure 2.12: Farrell-Shapiro’s Condition and Welfare-Increasing Merger
Figure 2.13: Farrell-Shapiro’s Condition and Profitable Welfare-Increasing Merger
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Figure 2.14: Welfare-Increasing Merger Failing Farrell-Shapiro (10% Synergy)
Figure 2.13 illustrates a more negative feature of this condition in a rationalization type
merger. Panel (A) in Figure 2.13 shows that no profitable merger satisfies the Farrell-Shapiro’s
condition, so this condition deals with the merger that is not likely to occur in this specific
case. This is because a merger can satisfy the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition when it combines
two small firms. So, cost saving from reallocation is restricted whereas the merged entity’s
output decreases a lot because of the efficient outsider’s large output increase. In contrast,
panel (B) in Figure 2.13 plots the space where merger is profitable and welfare-enhancing but
fails to satisfy the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition. Hence, the merger, which is socially desirable
and more likely to occur, would be disapproved under the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition.
Next, move to the kind of merger with synergy effect. I will assume that synergy effect
eM = 1.1 ∗ (e1 + e2), and compare the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition with w1+2S (e, eM ) > 0
for e ∈ [0.1, 10]3. Since the presence of synergy effect does not change this condition, the
area where the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition is satisfied is again given by panel (A) of Figure
2.12. But then, the space of welfare-enhancing mergers which fail to satisfy this condition,
which is shown in Figure 2.14, becomes bigger than the case of rationalization merger. So, the
probability that the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition causes type-2 error gets higher as synergy effect
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gets stronger. While some profitable mergers with synergy satisfy this condition, profitable
and welfare-enhancing mergers more frequently fail to satisfy the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition
in this case.
In sum, this exercise illustrates the possibility that the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition may not
be useful as a merger review criterion. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) also noticed that a policy
of allowing only mergers satisfying this condition is too restrictive even though they did not
analyze the magnitude of this potential type-2 error in detail.
McAfee-Williams’ Necessary Condition
McAfee and Williams (1992), on the other hand, provides a condition for welfare-enhancing
merger under the same setting with the rationalization model:
E ≥ 2
3
⇒ s∗(hc, E, z) ≤ hc
hc + 1
, where
E : elasticity of demand
hc =
∑N
k=3
s2k
(1−s)2 , where s = s1 + s2 and hc ∈ [0, 1]
z = s1s2
s2
, where z ∈ [0, 14 ]
Here, s is the joint pre-merger market share of firm 1 and 2, s∗(hc, E, z) is the critical value on
s for a merger to improve welfare, and hc represents the Herfindahl of the non-merging firms.
Since a merger improves welfare if and only if s ≤ s∗(hc, E, z), the implied necessary condition
for welfare-enhancing merger comes to s ≤ hchc+1 when the demand is at least moderately elastic
(E ≥ 23). Using this condition, they proved that no merger should be allowed that will either
create a new largest firm or increase the market share of the largest firm.
There are a few remarks on this condition. First, this condition cannot be used when
the demand is not elastic (E < 23). Second, there might be a type-1 error where a welfare-
decreasing merger satisfies this condition because it is a necessary condition. Finally, the
McAfee-Williams model only consider the rationalization effect of merger, so their condition
is not applicable to a merger with synergy effect.
To see the property of this condition in more detail, revisit the example that N = 3. Unlike
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Figure 2.15: McAfee-Williams’ condition and Welfare-Increasing Merger
the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition, I only need to check a merger with rationalization. Since I have
only firm 3 out of merger, hc is equal to 1 in this case. So the McAfee-Williams’ condition
comes to s1 + s2 ≤ 12 if E ≥ 23 holds.
Figure 2.15 and Figure 2.16 illustrate the feature of elasticity condition (E ≥ 23). Panel (A)
in Figure 2.15 plots the space of welfare-improving mergers satisfying E ≥ 23 , so the McAfee-
Williams’ condition is applicable to the merger in this shape. Panel (B) in Figure 2.15 shows
the welfare-improving mergers that the McAfee-Williams’ condition cannot be used because
elasticity condition fails. So, this condition is not applied to the welfare-increasing merger
with big cost asymmetry between merging firms.
Panel (A) in Figure 2.16 shows that none of welfare-increasing mergers with E ≥ 23 is
profitable for merging parties. So, the McAfee-Williams’ condition only deals with mergers
that are not likely to occur for the same reason with the Farrell-Shapiro’s condition. Panel
(B) in Figure 2.16 plots the space of profitable welfare-increasing mergers but the McAfee-
Williams’ condition cannot be applied. Hence, this condition cannot tell the welfare effect of
this socially desirable merger that is more likely to occur. Finally, panel (C) in Figure 2.16
demonstrates that there may exist a profitable welfare-increasing merger which increases the
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Figure 2.16: McAfee-Williams’ condition and Profitable Welfare-Increasing Merger
largest firm’s market share. This may happen when the largest firm take over a small firm
although the elasticity condition does not hold in this case.
Regarding to the magnitude of a type-1 error in this condition, I could check that some
welfare-decreasing mergers satisfy the McAfee-Williams’ condition, but none of them is prof-
itable. Hence, type-1 error is not an important problem of this condition.
2.5 Merger Analysis under Free Entry-Exit
Hitherto, this research assumes no entry-exit. The meaning of this assumption was ex-
plained by footnote 8 in Farrell and Shapiro (1990): “Our analysis can easily accommodate
entry by, or the existence of price-taking fringe firms, if we reinterpret the demand curve as
the residual demand curve facing the oligopolists that we model. What we are ruling out is
entry by additional large firm that behave oligopolistically.” The analysis up to the previous
section can be interpreted in the same way. In this extension, I will consider the other extreme
setting where free entry and exit is possible.
45
2.5.1 Identical Constant Marginal Cost Model under Free Entry-Exit
I assume free entry and exit but the presence of fixed cost F as in Davidson and Muhkerjee
(2007). At pre-merger equilibrium, firms compete Nash in Cournot fashion as in Section 2.3.
In this section, I let pin be the net operating profit (before F is deducted) accruing to firm n
when there are n firms in the industry. Then the (pre-merger) number of firms at free-entry
equilibrium, N∗, satisfies
piN∗ > F > piN∗+1 (2.35)
I will assume N∗ ≥ 3 for merger analysis. Given the assumption of linear demand and constant
marginal cost, piN∗ =
1
(N∗+1)2 under Cournot competition. So, pil > pin is equivalent to l < n
if firms’ competitive behavior is the same at l and n. For the same n, on the other hand, pin
from collusion is higher than pin from Cournot competition.
Consider an exogenous merger combining (M+1) firms. Note that the post-merger number
of firms (N∗ −M) fails to satisfy condition (2.35) regardless of whether the industry with
(N∗ −M) firms competes Cournot or collude. This condition is recovered when M new entries
occur after merger. Hence, if I assume that the duplication of fixed cost is eliminated after
merger, the incentive of merger yields
g(N∗,M) = (piN∗ − F )− (M + 1)(piN∗ − F ) = −M(piN∗ − F ) < 0
So any size of merger is not profitable. Because the number of firms is the same at pre- and
post-merger, the market structure and firms’ competitive behavior do not change. As a result,
the presence of free entry removes any effect of merger on outsider’s profit, welfare, or consumer
surplus. Hence, “merger paradox” is reestablished, but “free rider’s problem” disappears.
2.5.2 Asymmetric Increasing Marginal Cost Model under Free Entry-Exit
Model Modification
I build up a simple dynamic game under the asymmetric increasing marginal cost model
setting in order to analyze how free entry and exit affects the incentive of merger, post-merger
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price and welfare. The game structure is basically similar to Spector (2003), but my analysis
includes mergers with or without synergies under a specific functional form while Spector
(2003) deals with rationalization type mergers alone using a general functional form.
 Game Structure : The timing of the game is as the follows:
1. Nature picks a decreasing sequence 〈en〉∞n=1 for each potential entrant n.
2. Initial entry decision is made.
3. Merger occurs between incumbent i and j.
4. Entry or exit decision is made by incumbents or potential entrants.
 Entry/Exit : I assume free entry and exit but there is a fixed cost F . So firm i′s cost
function comes to Ci(qi) =
q2i
2ei
+ F . Sequential entry or exit is assumed in (Step 2) and (Step
4), which means that entry or exit occurs according to the efficiency order. So, the least
efficient incumbent is more efficient than the most efficient potential entrant.
Market Structure at Pre- and Post-Merger
Let N∗ be the number of firms at free-entry equilibrium in (Step 2). Then, firm N∗ is the
least efficient incumbent from the sequential entry assumption, and its net operating profit
amounts to
piN∗ =
λN∗(1 + λN∗)
2(1 +
∑N∗
k=1 λk)
2
(2.36)
Note that pil > pin holds for every (l, n) such that l < n. pil (pin) represents the operating
profit of firm l (firm n) when there are the most efficient l (n) firms in the industry. Then N∗
satisfies piN∗ > F > piN∗+1. I will assume N
∗ ≥ 3 for merger analysis.
In (Step 3), a merger occurs between incumbent i and j such that i < j ≤ N∗. Let firm
N † /∈ {i, j} be the least efficient post-merger incumbent - except the merged entity if it is the
least efficient firm -, then the net operating profit of firm N † comes to
pii+j
N† =
λN†(1 + λN†)
2(1 + λM +
∑N†
k 6=i,j λk)2
(2.37)
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Similarly, pii+jp > pi
i+j
q holds for every (p, q) /∈ {i, j} such that p < q. pii+jp (pii+jq ) represents
the operating profit of firm p (firm q) when firm p (firm q) is the least efficient post-merger
incumbent (except the merged firm if necessary). In addition, free-entry-and-exit equilibrium
implies that N † has to satisfy14
pii+j
N† > F > pi
i+j
N†+1 (2.38)
The post-merger number of firms at the free-entry-and-exit equilibrium is
(
N † + 1
)
if N † < i,
N † if i < N † < j, and
(
N † − 1) if N † > j.
Case Analysis of Merger under Free Entry-Exit
Sequential entry and exit assumption implies that firm (N∗ + 1) enters post-merger if
and only if a merger induces entry. Similarly, an exit-inducing merger always causes the least
efficient pre-merger incumbent except insiders to exit. If I denote this least efficient incumbent
by firm L, then L = N∗ for j 6= N∗, L = (N∗ − 1) for i 6= (N∗ − 1) and j = N∗, and
L = (N∗ − 2) for i = (N∗ − 1) and j = N∗.
pii+jN∗+1 > piN∗+1 is a necessary condition so that a merger induces entry, and equation (2.36)
and (2.37) imply that pii+jN∗+1 > piN∗+1 is equivalent to λM < λi+λj . In contrast, the operating
profit of firm L should decrease so that a merger may induce exit. Let me denote piL(N
∗) be
the pre-merger operating profit of firm L, then piL(N
∗) is given by
piL(N
∗) =
λL(1 + λL)
2(1 +
∑N∗
k=1 λk)
2
(2.39)
Then, pii+jL < piL(N
∗) is a necessary condition that a merger induces exit, and equation (2.37)
and (2.39) imply that pii+jL < piL(N
∗) is equivalent to λM > λi + λj . From this observation, I
can divide a merger scenario into 3 cases: (Case 1) λM = λi + λj , (Case 2) λM < λi + λj , and
(Case 3) λM > λi + λj .
14More precisely, condition (2.38) is satisfied if and only if
(
N† + 1
)
/∈ {i, j}. pii+j
N† > F > pi
i+j
N†+2 holds if(
N† + 1
) ∈ {i, j} and (N† + 2) /∈ {i, j}, and pii+j
N† > F > pi
i+j
N†+3 holds if
(
N† + 1
)
= i and
(
N† + 2
)
= j. So
there is a slight abuse of notation in pii+j
N†+1.
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(Case 1 : λM = λi+λj) In this case, equation (2.36), (2.37) and (2.39) show that piL(N
∗) =
pii+jL and piN∗+1 = pi
i+j
N∗+1 hold. So, there is no entry from F > piN∗+1 = pi
i+j
N∗+1, nor exit from
F < piN∗ ≤ piL(N∗) = pii+jL post-merger. The incentive of merger function becomes15
gi+jN∗ (e, eM ) =
λM (1 + λM )
2(1 + λM +
∑N∗
k 6=i,j λk)2
− λi(1 + λi) + λj(1 + λj)
2(1 +
∑N∗
k=1 λk)
2
(2.40)
=
λiλj
(1 +
∑N∗
k=1 λk)
2
The last equality holds from λM = λi + λj . Then welfare effect function yields
wi+jN∗ (e, eM ) = g
i+j
N∗ (e, eM ) +
∑N∗
k 6=i,j(pi
i+j
k (L)− pik(N∗))−
∫ P i+j
N∗
P ∗
N∗
(1− P )dP,
where pii+jk (L) =
λk(1+λk)
2(1+λM+
∑N∗
l6=i,j λl)2
,
pik(N
∗) = λk(1+λk)
2(1+
∑N∗
l=1 λl)
2
= gi+jN∗ (e, eM ) (2.41)
Here, pik(N
∗) denotes the pre-merger operating profit of firm k ∈ {1, · · · , N∗}\{i, j} when N∗
is the least efficient pre-merger incumbent, whereas pii+jk (L) denotes its post-merger operating
profit when L is the least efficient post-merger incumbent (except the merged firm if necessary).
The second equality comes from pik(N
∗) = pi1+2k (L) for all k and P
∗
N∗ = P
1+2
N∗ . Then, Claim
7 and 8 imply that a merger satisfying λM = λi + λj is profitable, welfare-increasing and
CS-neutral irrespective of entry or exit condition.
(Case 2 : λM < λi + λj) Given pi
i+j
N∗+1 > piN∗+1 in this case, merger induces entry if and
only if pii+jN∗+1 > F > piN∗+1. But exit cannot occur because pi
i+j
L > piL(N
∗) ≥ piN∗ > F .(
i.e. N † ≥ L) Because pii+jN∗+1 gets larger as eM becomes smaller, entry is more likely to occur
in a merger with no or weak synergies. Due to the potential possibility of entry, the incentive
15I do not assume the elimination of fixed cost duplication in this model where the merging firms’ facilities
are not shut down in general. If I assume some fixed cost can be saved, αF can be added to the incentive of
merger function for α ∈ (0, 1]. But the presence of this term does not matter in the following analysis by much.
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of merger function comes to
gi+j
N† (e, eM ) =
λM (1 + λM )
2(1 + λM +
∑N†
k 6=i,j λk)2
− λi(1 + λi) + λj(1 + λj)
2(1 +
∑N∗
k=1 λk)
2
(2.42)
Note that the summation is taken over k ∈ {1, · · · , N †}\{i, j} for λ′ks in the denominator of
the first term. Equation (2.42) shows that the incentive of merger gets weaker (gi+j
N† (e, eM ) <
gi+jN∗ (e, eM )) if any merger-induced entry takes place. Here are two examples to show this
aspect.
Example 2.1 (Case that Entry Prevents a Welfare-Increasing Merger) Let the
sequence 〈en〉∞n=1 be 〈e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, · · · 〉 = 〈0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.15, 0, · · · 〉, F = 0.019, and consider
a merger between firm 2 and firm 3. Then, pi3 > F > pi4 (⇔ 0.0415 > 0.019 > 0.0188), so
N∗ = 3 and P ∗N∗ = P
∗
3 = 0.5406 in (Step 2). Suppose eM = 0.8, then eM > e2 + e3 and
λM < λ2 + λ3 hold. Then, pi
2+3
4 > F > pi
2+3
5 (⇔ 0.02 > 0.019 > 0), so firm 4 enters the
market post-merger. The incentive of merger comes to g2+3N∗ (e, eM ) = 0.006 under no entry,
and g2+3
N† (e, eM ) = −0.007 < 0 under free-entry. In addition, the welfare effect of this merger
is given by w2+3N∗ (e, eM ) = 0.0019 under no entry condition.
Example 2.2 (Case that Entry Prevents a Welfare-Decreasing Merger) Consider
the same sequence and fixed cost with [Example 2.1], but a merger between firm 1 and firm 2.
Now suppose eM = 0.9, then eM = e1 + e2 and λM < λ1 + λ2 hold. Since pi
1+2
4 > F > pi
1+2
5
(⇔ 0.022 > 0.019 > 0), firm 4 enters the market post-merger. The incentive of merger comes
to g1+2N∗ (e, eM ) = 0.0015 under no entry, and g
1+2
N† (e, eM ) = −0.015 < 0 under free-entry. In
contrast, the welfare effect of this merger is given by w1+2N∗ (e, eM ) = −0.0112 under no entry
condition.
These two examples shows that significant entry can make otherwise profitable mergers
unprofitable, and firms are less likely to merge under free entry condition. As these examples
show, the merger blocked by the presence of free entry may be either welfare-increasing or
welfare-decreasing under no entry condition.
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Further, because a merger with synergies is not necessarily profitable even under no entry-
exit environment, synergy-creating merger may be unprofitable under the free entry condition
as well. [Example 2.1] shows that even profitable synergy-creating merger under no entry
condition may become unprofitable under the free entry. This is in contrast to Proposition
1 of Davidson and Muhkerjee (2007) that any merger is profitable for any degree of cost
synergy. This difference shows that their result relies on the assumption of the identical
constant marginal cost function. On the other hand, a merger’s profitability improves as
synergies get stronger as in no entry condition. There are two reasons why Claim 5 can be
extended to a merger under the free entry condition: if entry consequence of a merger is the
same under two different synergy levels, the one with stronger synergy is more profitable; in
addition, the likelihood of entry is smaller in a merger with stronger synergies.
Next look at the price effect. If a merger does not induce entry
(
F > pii+jN∗+1 > piN∗+1
)
,
Claim 7 implies that the post-merger equilibrium price increases under free-entry condition
as well. If a merger induces entry
(
pii+jN∗+1 > F > piN∗+1
)
, however, the equilibrium price
may decrease post-merger even if λM < λi + λj holds, which cannot happen under no entry
condition. Here is one example to illustrate this possibility.
Example 2.3 (Case that Entry-Inducing Merger is Profitable and CS-increasing)
Again, let the sequence 〈en〉∞n=1 be 〈e1, e2, e3, e4, e5, · · · 〉 = 〈0.5, 0.4, 0.3, 0.15, 0, · · · 〉 and fixed
cost is F = 0.019. Now consider a merger between firm 2 and firm 3. Suppose eM = 1, then
eM > e2 + e3 (⇔ 1 > 0.7) and λM < λ2 + λ3 (⇔ 0.5 < 0.5164) hold. So this merger creates
synergy but would increase price post-merger under no entry condition. Then, pi2+34 > F >
pi2+35 (⇔ 0.0191 > 0.019 > 0), so firm 4 enters the market post-merger. P 2+3N† = P 2+34 = 0.5092
in (Step 4). Hence, this merger decreases the equilibrium price. Furthermore, this merger is
profitable because g2+3
N† (e, eM ) = 0.0021.
This example shows a scenario where an entry-inducing merger decreases price post-merger.
This example also illustrates that an entry-inducing merger might be profitable. Although a
merger satisfying λM < λi + λj may decrease the price as in [Example 2.3], there is a lower
bound where the post-merger price can go down.
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Claim 11. If λM < λi + λj , post-merger price is higher than the price that would have been
formed if firm (N∗ + 1) had been an incumbent pre-merger.
(
P ∗N∗+1 < P
i+j
N†
)
Claim 11 says that a merger either increases price post-merger
(
P ∗N∗+1 < P
∗
N∗ < P
i+j
N†
)
, or
would increase if firm (N∗ + 1) had been an incumbent pre-merger
(
P ∗N∗+1 < P
i+j
N† ≤ P ∗N∗
)
.
In [Example 2.3], if firm 4 had been an incumbent before merger, the pre-merger price would
have been P ∗N∗+1 = P
∗
4 = 0.5049. So P
∗
N∗+1 < P
i+j
N† holds, as expected. The reason of this
result is simple. If firm (N∗ + 1) had entered pre-merger, the price would have been P ∗N∗+1.
We know that firm (N∗ + 1) could not have earned the operating profit greater than fixed cost
under this price. Hence, its post-merger operating profit would also be less than fixed cost for
any post-merger price equal to or lower than P ∗N∗+1. But then, firm (N
∗ + 1) would not enter
the market, which contradicts that it is an incumbent after merger.
It is worth contrasting this result with Farrell-Shapiro’s Proposition 1·2 and Spector’s
Proposition 1. Proposition 2 of Farrell-Shapiro proves that any merger failing to create
cost synergies increases price under no entry assumption. Under the asymmetric increasing
marginal cost model, Claim 7 confirms Farrell-Shapiro’s result because λM = λi+j < λi + λj
holds in a merger without synergies. Spector (2003) extended Farrell-Shapiro’s Proposition 2
by showing that the post-merger price increases irrespective of entry condition when a prof-
itable merger does not create synergies. In contrast, Claim 11 and [Example 2.3] imply that
the price effect of a profitable merger becomes non-decisive when it creates synergies within the
degree such that λM < λi + λj . So Farrell-Shapiro’s Proposition 1 is not valid if no entry as-
sumption is relaxed and Spector’s result cannot be extended up to synergy-creating profitable
mergers. More precisely, if I relax no synergy condition in Farrell-Shapiro’s Proposition 2 up to
the extent with which a merger would increase price under no entry condition, the equivalent
merger with the same synergies may decrease price under free entry condition. Even when it
happens, however, the post-merger price is at least higher than P ∗N∗+1 due to the degree of
synergies.
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Finally, welfare effect function of this case comes to
wi+j
N† (e, eM ) = g
i+j
N† (e, eM ) +
∑N∗
k 6=i,j(pi
i+j
k (N
†)− pik(N∗)) (2.43)
+
∑N†
k=N∗+1
(pii+jk (N
†)− F )−
∫ P i+j
N†
P ∗
N∗
(1− P )dP
where, pii+jk (N
†) = λk(1+λk)
2(1+λM+
∑N†
l 6=i,j λl)2
Here, pii+jk (N
†) denotes firm k′s post-merger operating profit given that N † is the least efficient
firm at post-merger equilibrium. If entry does not occur (L = N †),
∑N†
k=N∗+1(pi
1+2
k (N
†)− F )
is defined by zero. If entry occurs (L < N †), the first two terms in the right-hand side of
equation (2.43) are smaller than those under no entry condition. This negative effect of entry
on welfare, which is called “business stealing effect” by Mankiw and Whinston (1986), takes
place because entrant takes away some of the incumbents’ output. In contrast, the other two
terms affect positively on welfare effect because the entrant earns positive profit and price does
not increase as much as it does under no entry. Entry’s influence on welfare effect of a merger
relies on the relative magnitude of these two conflicting effects. In the case of [Example 2.3],
the welfare effect of this merger is given by w2+3
N† (e, eM ) = 0.0098. Since w
2+3
N∗ (e, eM ) = 0.0153
under no entry condition, this example shows the possibility that entry makes the welfare
effect of merger worse.
(Case 3 : λM > λi + λj) The merger analysis of this case is almost symmetric with (Case
2). Given pii+jL < piL(N
∗) in this case, exit arises if and only if piL(N∗) > F > pi
i+j
L . But
merger does not induce entry because pii+jN∗+1 < piN∗+1 < F . The incentive of merger function
is again given by equation (2.42), but L ≥ N † holds in this case due to the possibility of exit.
Clearly, the incentive of a merger improves when it induces an exit of a marginal incumbent
(i.e. gi+j
N† (e, eM ) > g
i+j
N∗ (e, eM ) if L > N
†). Combined with Claim 8, this result implies that
any merger satisfying λM > λi +λj is profitable regardless of entry-exit condition. A merger’s
profitability improves as synergies get stronger as in (Case 2) for similar reasons: if exit
consequence of a merger is the same under two different synergy level, the one with stronger
synergy is more profitable; in addition, the likelihood of exit becomes higher in a merger with
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stronger synergies because pii+jL is smaller under this merger.
Next consider the price effect of merger. If a merger does not induce exit (piL(N
∗) > pii+jL >
F ), Claim 7 implies that the post-merger equilibrium price decreases under free-exit condition
as well. If a merger induces exit (piL(N
∗) > F > pii+jL ), however, the equilibrium price may
increase post-merger even if λM > λi + λj holds. But there is a ceiling on the post-merger
price even if it rises.
Claim 12. If λM > λi+λj , post-merger price (a) either decreases
(
P i+j
N† < P
∗
N∗
)
or (b) would
decrease if the merger induced one less exit
(
P i+j
N†+1 < P
∗
N∗ ≤ P i+jN†
)
.
Claim 12 (b) shows that no more exit arises as soon as an exit raises the post-merger price
above the pre-merger price. This holds because if an exit raises price above the pre-merger
level, every remaining incumbent will make its operating profit greater than fixed cost at the
price level. Otherwise, it could not have earned the operating profit greater than fixed cost at
the pre-merger price either, which contradicts that it was an incumbent before merger.
Finally, consider the welfare effect function, which is given by
wi+j
N† (e, eM ) = g
i+j
N† (e, eM ) +
N†∑
k 6=i,j
(pii+jk (N
†)− pik(N∗)) (2.44)
−
∑
k∈{N†+1,··· ,N∗}\{i,j}(pik(N
∗)− F )−
∫ P i+j
N†
P ∗
N∗
(1− P )dP
If exit does not occur (L = N †),
∑
k∈{N†+1,··· ,N∗}\{i,j}(pik(N
∗)− F ) is defined by zero. Else if
exit occurs (N † < L), the first two terms in the right-hand side of equation (2.44) get bigger
than those under no entry condition. Contrary to (Case 2), exit brings “business recovering
effect” to the remaining incumbents. But the other two terms affect negatively on welfare
effect because the exiting incumbent’s profit disappears and price does not decrease as much
as it does under no exit. Exit’s influence on welfare effect of a merger relies on the relative
magnitude of these two effects.
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Table 2.4: Merger’s Profitability and Price Effect under Free Entry-Exit Condition
Type of Merger λM = λi + λj λM < λi + λj λM > λi + λj
Entry/Exit none entry only if any exit only if any
Profitability profitable indefinite profitable
- Comparison same with no entry not better than no entry not worse than no exit
Price Effect CS-neutral indefinite w/ bottom indefinite w/ ceiling
- Comparison same with no entry not worse than no entry not better than no exit
Summary of Merger Analysis under Free Entry-Exit
This case analysis brings a few results on the incentive of merger, its price effect and
welfare effect under the free-entry-and-exit environment.
First, condition (2.29) - the necessary sufficient condition for CS-increasing merger un-
der no entry-exit assumption - becomes a necessary condition that exit occurs after merger.
More generally, Farrell-Shapiro’s condition for CS-increasing merger (Proposition 1) becomes
a necessary condition for exit to occur when free entry and exit is allowed in their model.
Second, free entry-exit condition affects merger’s profitability as follows: an exit-inducing
merger is always profitable; an entry-inducing merger is not necessarily unprofitable although
its profitability gets harmed due to entry; as in no entry-exit condition, stronger synergies
improve a merger’s profitability and a synergy-creating merger is not necessarily profitable.
Third, entry or exit, if it occurs, reduces the extent of a merger’s price effect and its effect
on the remaining outsider(s). Note that exit might occur under free entry-exit model in a
situation where the merger decreases price under no entry-exit model. Hence exit reduces the
amount of price decrease, or may even increase the price. A symmetric inference is possible for
entry. Since exit and entry reduces price effect, there is smaller change in aggregate output.
But then, outsider’s output response gets smaller as well.
Finally, this case analysis could not determine how free entry-exit affects merger’s welfare
effect. But, it can be the case that merger-induced entry worsens the merger’s welfare effect
whereas merger-induced exit improves it.
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2.6 Concluding Remarks
I studied a merger’s profitability, its welfare effect and price effect under two different
settings in this paper. One model deals with identical and constant marginal cost whereas the
other model assumes asymmetric and increasing marginal costs across firms.
The identical constant marginal cost model highlights on how the change in firms’ competi-
tive behavior affects a merger’s profitability and its welfare effect. In contrast, the asymmetric
increasing marginal cost model shows the importance of cost savings from reallocation or
synergies on a merger’s profitability, its welfare effect and price effect. These two models
illustrate that “merger paradox” in the S-S-R model requires a very specific environment in
which marginal cost is constant and identical and firms’ competitive behavior does not change.
Their model setting eliminates not only the possibility of cost saving from a merger but also
the potential benefit from reduced competition. Clearly, these are the important sources that
firms try to achieve through a horizontal merger.
Regarding to the second result of S-S-R, the asymmetric increasing marginal cost model
agrees that a welfare-increasing merger may be unprofitable as shown in a merger without
synergies between small firms. But this model also shows that welfare-increasing merger
becomes profitable if it creates strong enough synergies. In particular, CS-increasing mergers
are always profitable in general setting. So, the S-S-R’s point that socially desirable mergers
may not be privately enforceable only holds in a merger where its synergies are relatively
“weak” under more general setting, and disappears under consumer surplus criterion.
Rather, more realistic risk in horizontal mergers seems that socially undesirable mergers
are more likely to take place. The identical constant marginal cost model shows that a merger
with collusive effect is more profitable, but worsens social welfare. The asymmetric increasing
marginal cost model implies that the presence of a bigger outsider helps social welfare but
harms a merger’s profitability. So each firm may have an incentive to find a bigger merger
partner, and a socially undesirable merger between “big” firms is more likely to occur than
others. Moreover, CS-decreasing mergers may occur simultaneously or in chain.
Hence, the conflict between merger incentive and social welfare should be the target issue
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which antitrust policy has to concern about. Proposition 1 of Farrell-Shapiro provides the
exact criteria for a CS-increasing Cournot merger under no entry condition. Two models in
this paper adds merger review criteria to measure the welfare effect when linear approximation
is possible for demand and marginal cost. Clearly, they are not sufficient to our goal. There
can be many cases that linearity assumption is not maintained for demand or marginal cost.
In addition, as this research showed, the price effect or welfare effect of a synergy-creating
merger depends on entry-exit condition as well.
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CHAPTER 3
Collusion under Asymmetric Information on Discount Rates
3.1 Introduction
The goal of this research is to see how uncertainty on other firms’ discount rates affects
the competitive behavior in oligopoly market. To this end, this paper considers the situation
where each firm in oligopoly market may have a different discount factor and no firm can
observe other firms’ discount rates.
To my knowledge, Harrington (1989) is the only literature that analyzed the cartel forma-
tion issue in an environment where firms may have different discount rates. He pointed out
that incomplete capital market or agency problem between shareholders and manager may
be the sources of different discount factors. Harrington (1989) analyzed the problem under
perfect information using Bertrand model, whereas I constructed Cournot model under the
incomplete information on other firms’ discount rate in order to see the environment where
price competition is not important but there is a private information on each firm’s patience.
Asymmetric information issue among cartel members has been analyzed in quite many
literatures. Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti (1986, 1990) are the representative ones in that
regards. These papers focus on the situation where each cartel member cannot monitor com-
petitors’ behavior perfectly, and derived the Bang-Bang result as an optimal cartel equilibrium
outcome path. My research looks at different situation from Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti
(1986, 1990) in that each firm can monitor competitors’ behavior perfectly but is uncertain
about their discount factors.
Athey, Bagwell, and Sanchirico (2004) studied the optimal cartel scheme under the situ-
ation where there is a asymmetric information on each firm’s cost and firms exchange cost
information each period before cartel chooses price. My research is similar to Athey, Bagwell,
and Sanchirico (2004) in that uncertainty is about competitors’ type instead of their behavior,
but two researches take different approach to treat this asymmetric information. Athey, Bag-
well, and Sanchirico (2004) explicitly considered the process to exchange the cost information
on each firm who receives a privately observed, i.i.d. cost shock in each period. In contrast,
I do not consider the information exchange process explicitly (baseline model), or analyze it
with cheap talk game setting (extended model). Firm’s output serves as a signal which may
reveal each firm’s type in my model.
Sobel (1985) is also related to one extension in this paper, which studies the possibility that
a firm with low discount rate may not deviate from cartel agreement for some periods. The
key distinction between two researches is that Sobel (1985) studies sender-receiver model while
this paper looks at the situation where both firms are a sender and receiver simultaneously.
This paper, however, focuses only on the pure strategy equilibrium because I do not consider
the trust building process.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces perfect information
model as a counterfactual, and then Bayesian model is constructed in order to look at the main
topic of this paper in Section 3.3. After finding the equilibrium, I compare the properties of
equilibrium outcome in each model. I perform some comparative statics, such as entry, exit or
merger in both settings. The following two sections extend the baseline model; Section 3.4 deals
with the environment where firms can agree on a collusion with less than monopoly profit until
the uncertainty on the other firm’s discount rate is resolved, and Section 3.5 introduces the
possibility that firms communicate each other on their discount rate in a cheap talk pregame
and may agree on uneven split of monopoly profit. Conclusion follows in Section 3.6.
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3.2 Perfect Information Model : Counterfactual
Assume an oligopoly industry with perfect information on each other’s discount rate across
firms. I consider a problem whether there is a collusion equilibrium in this environment. A
general way to deal with collusion is to use the infinitely repeated game. But the same
problem can be analyzed by using a strategic game form where payoff is given by the sum of
current payoff and continuation payoff. In this section I will characterize the equilibrium after
I represent a dynamic game of complete information with an equivalent strategic game. The
same analysis can be done by subgame perfect equilibrium concept, but the main result does
not change from the following analysis.
3.2.1 Duopoly Collusion Game
As a simplest counterfactual, I will start from a perfect information duopoly game. There
are two firms in the industry, and i ∈ {1, 2} denotes each firm. Nature draws firm i′s discount
rate δi ∈ ∆ ≡ {δL, δH | δL < δH} with Pr(δH) = γ, and each firm knows not only its own
discount rate δi, but also the other firm’s discount rate δ−i in this section. Put it differently,
there is uncertainty in the ex-ante sense, but the uncertainty is removed in the interim sense.
pii(qi, q−i) represents firm i’s profit when it produces qi while the other produces q−i. pii(qi, q−i)
is strictly concave in qi, decreasing in q−i, continuous, and continuously differentiable. Each
firm chooses whether to join cartel or not. If any firm chooses not to join, cartel cannot be
agreed on and each firm earns Cournot-Nash equilibrium profit pin = pi1(q
n, qn) = pi2(q
n, qn)
in each period. I assume that there exists a unique stage game Nash equilibrium. If both
firms choose to join, cartel is agreed upon. In this case, they can also choose their output.
If each firm chooses cartel output qc, cartel is sustained and each firm gets cartel payoff
pic = pi1(q
c, qc) = pi2(q
c, qc) in each period.1 If at least one firm chooses output qi different
from qc, cartel breaks down and (1 − δi)pii(qi, q−i) + δipir would be each firm’s average profit
per period. This payoff captures the punishment phase after any one firm’s deviation from
1In this paper, I assume symmetric payoff for simplicity and comparative statics discussed in Section 3.2.3
and Section 3.3.3
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Table 3.1: Payoff Matrix of Duopoly Game
F 1 \ F 2 Join, qc Join, q2\qc Not Join
Join, qc [pic, pic] [(1− δ1)pi1(qc, q2) + δ1pir, [pin, pin]
(1− δ2)pi2(q2, qc) + δ2pir]
Join, q1\qc [(1− δ1)pi1(q1, qc) + δ1pir, [(1− δ1)pi1(q1, q2) + δ1pir, [pin, pin]
(1− δ2)pi2(qc, q1) + δ2pir] (1− δ2)pi2(q2, q1) + δ2pir]
Not Join [pin, pin] [pin, pin] [pin, pin]
cartel agreement. Here, pir is the per-period profit of firm i in the punishment phase after at
least one firm deviates. Note that I am using per-period profit instead of discounted profit,
but this adjustment does not affect the result. Under this setting, the strategic game can be
represented by
GFID = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ) , where
N = {1, 2} is a set of firms
A = Π2i=1Ai is action space, where
Ai = {(Join, qi), (Not Join) | qi ∈ R+}
pi = {pi1, pi2} is a payoff vector, where pii : A 7→ R s.t
pii(si, s−i | δi) =

pic if si = (Join, q
c) for ∀ i
pin if si = (Not Join) for ∃ i
(1− δi)pii(qi, q−i) + δipir otherwise
Suppose that∞ > pid+ > pic > pin > pid− > 0, where pid+ = pi(q(qc), qc) and pid− = pi(qc, q(qc)).
Here, q(qc) is one firm’s best response output to the other firm’s cartel output. Given the
strategy profile s = (s1, s2) ∈ A, the payoff matrix of the game GFID = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ) is given
by Table 3.1.
Let the threshold discount factor δ∗ be the smallest δ ∈ (0, 1) which satisfies pic ≥ (1 −
δ)pid+ + δpir for all δ ∈ [δ∗, 1). If δ∗ ≤ δL, it is easy to see that s∗ = Π2i=1(Join, qc)i is a unique
efficient Nash equilibrium. If δH ≤ δ∗, on the other hand, s∗ = Π2i=1(Not Join)i is a unique
Nash equilibrium. Put it in extensive form terminology, cartel can be supported as subgame
perfect equilibrium if the discount rates of all types are greater than δ∗, while cartel cannot
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be supported as subgame perfect equilibrium if all of them are less than δ∗.
The most interesting case is when δL < δ∗ < δH . In the perfect information setting,
however, there is no uncertainty on δ−i when firms move, so it is common knowledge which is
the case that they face between (1) δi = δ
H > δ∗ for every firm i ∈ N and (2) δi = δL < δ∗ for
some firm i ∈ N . Clearly, collusion can be supported as a unique efficient Nash equilibrium
only in case (1) while s∗ = Π2i=1(Not Join)i is a unique Nash equilibrium in case (2).
2 From
the ex-ante point of view, if δL < δ∗ < δH holds, the probability that cartel is supported as
an efficient Nash equilibrium is given by γ2 for every γ ∈ [0, 1]. It is also easy to see that
cartel can be sustained forever if it is supported as an efficient Nash equilibrium. Claim 13
summarizes the argument so far.
Claim 13. Given GFID = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ) and δ∗ ∈ (0, 1), the ex-ante equilibrium outcome in
the duopoly market is given as follows.
(a) firms collude for sure if δ∗ ≤ δL,
(b) firms do not collude for sure if δ∗ ≥ δH , and
(c) firms collude with probability γ2 and do not with probability (1− γ2) if δL < δ∗ < δH .
Moreover, if they collude in the equilibrium outcome, the cartel is sustained forever.
3.2.2 Oligopoly Collusion Game
I now consider an oligopoly market where there are n firms. As before, nature draws
each firm i′s discount rate δi ∈ ∆ with Pr(δH) = γ, and the uncertainty on discount rates is
removed when firms move. So each firm knows both its discount rate δi and all other firms’
discount rate vector δ−i = (δ1, · · · , δi−1, δi+1, · · · , δn).
2I do not allow the possibility that cartel members split monopoly profit unevenly in this baseline model.
This possibility is introduced in Section 3.5.
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Then, the strategic game can be represented as follows.
GFIO = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ) , where
N = {1, 2, · · · , n}
A = Πni=1Ai s.t Ai = {(Join, qi), (Not Join) | qi ∈ R+}
pi = {pi1, pi2, · · · , pin}, where pii : A 7→ R s.t
pii(si, s−i | δi) =

pic if si = (Join, q
c) for ∀ i
pin if si = (Not Join) for ∃ i
(1− δi)pii(qi, q−i) + δipir otherwise
Similar to duopoly case, I assume that ∞ > pid+ > pic > pin > 0, where pid+ = pii(q(qc−i), qc−i).
Here, q(qc−i) represents each firm’s best response output when all other (n-1) firms produce
cartel output qc. Let δ∗ = f(n) be the smallest δ which satisfies pic ≥ (1 − δ)pid+ + δpir
for all δ ∈ [δ∗, 1). The threshold discount rate δ∗ depends on the number of firms. Then,
s∗ = Πni=1(Join, q
c)i is a unique efficient Nash equilibrium for δ
∗ ≤ δL, whereas s∗ = Πni=1(Not
Join)i is a unique Nash equilibrium for δ
H ≤ δ∗. Suppose δ∗ ∈ (δL, δH). Since there is no
uncertainty on δ−i when firms move, it is common knowledge which is the case that they face
between (1) δi = δ
H for every firm i ∈ N and (2) δi = δL < δ∗ for some firm i ∈ N . Using the
same argument in duopoly case, I can obtain the result similar to Claim 13.
Claim 14. Given GFIO = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ) and δ∗ ∈ (0, 1), the ex-ante equilibrium outcome in
the oligopoly market is given as follows.
(a) firms collude for sure if δ∗ ≤ δL,
(b) firms do not collude for sure if δ∗ ≥ δH , and
(c) firms collude with probability γn and do not with probability (1− γn) if δL < δ∗ < δH .
Moreover, if they collude in the equilibrium outcome, then the cartel is sustained forever.
3.2.3 Comparative Statics under Perfect Information
Given this characterization of equilibrium outcome in GFIO = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ), it is possible
to see how entry, exit or merger affects the competitive behavior of firms in the industry. I
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assume f ′(n) > 0 for this comparative statics.3
Entry
An entrant is assumed to have δE ∈ ∆ with Pr(δE = δH) = γ like the incumbents. Denote
γu(n) ≡ 1δH>f(n)∗γ+1δL>f(n)∗(1−γ), where 1δx >f(n) is an indicator function. In the ex-ante
sense, the industry would be colluding with probability (γu(n))
n before this entry. If a firm
enters the industry, the threshold discount rate δ∗ increases from f(n) to f(n + 1). Hence,
γu(n+ 1) ≤ γu(n) holds. But then, it is clear that (γu(n+ 1))n+1 ≤ (γu(n))n, where equality
holds if and only if γu(n+ 1) = γu(n) = 1 (⇔ δL > f(n+ 1) > f(n)) or γu(n+ 1) = γu(n) = 0
(⇔ f(n + 1) > f(n) ≥ δH). Therefore, entry decreases the probability that an oligopoly
industry colludes in the ex-ante sense.
For the interim analysis, suppose that an industry was colluding before entry. Then,
this cartel would collapse either if there exists an incumbent i ∈ N whose discount rate
δi ∈ [f(n), f(n+ 1)) or if δE < f(n+ 1). If the industry was not colluding before entry, there
exists at least one firm i among incumbents such that δi < f(n). Since δi < f(n) < f(n + 1)
holds for the firm i, this industry does not collude after entry either.
Exit and Merger
An exit from an oligopoly market has exactly the opposite effect compared with entry.
Since (γu(n))
n ≤ (γu(n − 1))n−1, exit increases the probability that an oligopoly industry
colludes in the ex-ante sense. For the interim analysis, suppose an industry was not colluding
before exit. The industry would collude after exit if δi > f(n− 1) holds for all the remaining
firms and not collude if there is at least one firm i among the remaining firms such that
δi ≤ f(n− 1). If the industry was colluding before exit, it clearly colludes after exit as well.
In order to see the effect of merger on firms’ competitive behavior, I need to assume the
merged firm’s discount rate δM . Suppose that a merger is implemented between two firms
indexed by (n − 1) and n, and that δM is arbitrarily picked between δn−1 and δn. Then, all
3If we have linear demand and identical constant marginal cost like Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds (1983), the
appendix of Chapter 2 shows that this assumption holds for Nash reversion and optimal punishment strategy.
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results in the case of exit can be equally applied to merger case.
One important characteristic in these comparative statics is that the ex-ante probability of
collusion strictly increases after exit or merger as long as either f(n) ∈ (δL, δH) or f(n− 1) ∈
(δL, δH) holds under this perfect information model.
3.3 Asymmetric Information Model on Discount rate
I now introduce asymmetric information about each other’s discount rate. In order to
analyze collusion formation and sustainability under this setting, I construct a Bayesian game.
I perform the analysis after I represent a dynamic game of incomplete information with an
equivalent Bayesian game form. The same analysis can be done by using perfect Bayesian
equilibrium concept, but the main result does not change from the following analysis.
3.3.1 Duopoly Bayesian Collusion Game
All the settings of the duopoly Bayesian game are exactly the same with GFID = (N,A, pi
| ∆, γ) in Section 3.2 except the presence of asymmetric information on the other’s discount
rate. So each firm i knows its own discount rate δi, but does not know the other firm’s type
δ−i except γ. Under this setting, the Bayesian game GBD = (N,A,Θ, pi, p) is given by
GBD = (N,A,Θ, pi, p) , where
N = {1, 2}
A = Π2i=1Ai s.t Ai = {(Join, qi), (Not Join) | qi ∈ R+}
Θ = Π2i=1Θi is type space, where Θi = ∆
pi = {pi1, pi2}, where pii : A X Θi 7→ R s.t
pii(si, s−i| δi) =

pic if si = (Join, q
c) for ∀ i
pin if si = (Not Join) for ∃ i
(1− δi)pii(qi, q−i) + δipir otherwise
p ∈ ∆(Θ) is the prior type distribution such that δ1 ⊥ δ2 and Pr(δH) = γ
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Suppose again∞ > pid+ > pic > pin > pid− > 0. A firm i′s pure strategy is a map Si : Θi 7→ Ai,
and a pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium (PBNE) of this game is defined as a strategy
profile s∗ = {s∗1, s∗2} such that
γpii(s
∗
i (δi), s
∗
−i(δ
H); δi) + (1− γ)pii(s∗i (δi), s∗−i(δL); δi)
≥ γpii(ai, s∗−i(δH); δi) + (1− γ)pii(ai, s∗−i(δL); δi)
for every i ∈ N, δi ∈ Θi, and ai ∈ Ai.
(3.1)
Similar to the perfect information game, if the threshold discount rate δ∗ ≤ δL, s∗i (δi) =
(Join, qc) is an efficient PBNE for each firm i ∈ N . Likewise, if δH ≤ δ∗, s∗i (δi) = (Not Join)
is a unique PBNE for each firm i ∈ N . In other words, cartel is supported as PBNE if the
discount rate of every type is greater than δ∗, while cartel is not supported as PBNE if the
discount rate of every type is less than δ∗.
The most interesting case is when δL < δ∗ < δH . One trivial PBNE is s∗i (δi) = (Not Join)
for all firm i ∈ N as in other cases. Let me consider a pure strategy in which both type of firms
choose to join and a firm with δi = δ
H produces cartel output qc. Since δL < δ∗, any firm with
δi = δ
L has an incentive to deviate. But there is a possibility (1− γ) that the other firm also
has low discount factor. So when the low type firm chooses its output, it has to consider the
possibility that the other firm may also deviate. Formally, suppose the other firm produces
qc when δ−i = δH and a given output q−i when δ−i = δL. Then, in order to maximize the
expected profit of current period, the low type firm i has to solve
max
qi
γpii(qi, q
c) + (1− γ)pii(qi, q−i)
This optimization problem gives me each firm’s best-response function qi = q
d(q−i, γ). Hence,
I can get qd = qd(γ) as a fixed point. Then I can derive a useful result for the following
analysis.
Lemma 1. If p′(Q) + qip′′(Q) < 0, then dq
d
dγ > 0 holds.
Proof. See the appendix.
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p′(Q) + qip′′(Q) < 0 is a standard and weak assumption in quantity setting game. [Dixit
(1986), Farrell and Shapiro (1990), etc.] Lemma 1 says that higher belief on δ−i = δH induces
low type firm to produce more when it deviates. Here is one example that illustrates the
argument so far.
Example 3.1. Assume that P = 1 − Q and MCi = 0 for i = 1, 2. Then, qc = 14 for each
firm. In order to get qd(γ), solve
max
qi
γ(1− qi − 1
4
)qi + (1− γ)(1− qi − q−i)qi
Then, the best-response function is given by qi =
3
8γ +
1
2(1 − γ)(1 − q−i). So, the fixed point
comes to
qd(γ) = (
4− γ
12− 4γ ,
4− γ
12− 4γ )
Hence, dq
d
dγ =
1
4(3−γ)2 > 0 holds, as expected.
Using the fixed point output qd(γ), I can construct one pure strategy s¯i(δi):
s¯i(δi) =
 (Join, q
c) if δi = δ
H
(Join, qd(γ)) if δi = δ
L
(3.2)
This strategy shows that both type of firms join collusion but low type firm deviates by
choosing the output reflecting its belief on δ−i = δH . Under this strategy, the interim payoff
of firm i with δH is given by
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δH) = γpic + (1− γ)
[
(1− δH)pii(qc, qd(γ)) + δHpir
]
(3.3)
The other firm has δH with probability γ, and the payoff of firm i comes to pic in this case
because both firms stick to cartel agreement. But the other firm has δL with probability
(1− γ), and it deviates with the fixed point output qd(γ). So pii(qc, qd(γ)) is the current payoff
of firm i and pir is the continuation payoff in this case.
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Similarly, the interim payoff of firm i with δL yields
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL) = γ
[
(1− δL)pii(qd(γ), qc) + δLpir
]
+(1− γ)
[
(1− δL)pii(qd(γ), qd(γ)) + δLpir
]
(3.4)
Then I get the fundamental result of this research.
Proposition 2. Suppose δL < δ∗ < δH . Then, there exists γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that a strategy
profile s¯ = (s¯1(δ1), s¯2(δ2)) in equation (3.2) can be supported as a PBNE for all γ ∈ (γ∗, 1) in
the Bayesian game GBD = (N,A,Θ, pi, p).
Proof. See the appendix.
To see why this result holds, suppose that the belief γ is greater than the threshold belief
γ∗. Then, a firm with high discount factor can expect higher payoff when it sticks to cartel
agreement because it believes that cartel is sustained with sufficiently high probability. On
the other hand, a firm with low discount rate also believes that the chance of δ−i = δH is high
enough so that it benefits from joining and deviating the cartel. PBNE s¯ = (s¯1(δ1), s¯2(δ2)),
if exists, is clearly more efficient than another PBNE s∗ = ((Not Join), (Not Join)). The
equilibrium outcome of PBNE s¯ is determined by the combination of two firms’ discount
rates.
Corollary 2. Suppose that δL < δ∗ < δH and γ ∈ (γ∗, 1). Then, the equilibrium outcome of
a PBNE s¯ = (s¯1(δ1), s¯2(δ2)) is given as follows.
(a) if (δ1, δ2) = (δ
H , δH), then cartel is agreed and sustained.
(b) if (δ1, δ2) 6= (δH , δH), then cartel is agreed but is not sustained.
The probability of each outcome equals to γ2 and
(
1− γ2) , respectively.
So if there is asymmetric information about the other firm’s discount rate, it is possible
that cartel is agreed on even when one or both firms’ incentive constraint for sustaining cartel
in subsequent periods is not satisfied. Hence, cartel under this Bayesian environment may
collapse with probability
(
1− γ2). Put it differently, punishment phase can be an equilibrium
outcome path in the Bayesian game, which never happens under the perfect information.
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Another interesting feature occurs when γ ≤ γ∗ and both firms have high discount rates.
This case may happen with probability γ2. In that case, even though all firms satisfy the
incentive constraint for collusion under perfect information, the lack of belief on δ−i = δH
prevents them from agreeing on collusion. It happens because each firm puts the possibility
of its partner’s deviation too high to collude. If I compare these results with the perfect
information game GFID = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ), I obtain the following result.
Corollary 3. Suppose that δL < δ∗ < δH .
(a) While firms collude with (ex-ante) probability γ2 and do not with (ex-ante) probability
(1−γ2) for every γ ∈ (0, 1) in GFID = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ), firms agree on collusion with probability
1 for any γ ∈ (γ∗, 1) in GBD = (N,A,Θ, pi, p).
(b) Moreover, while cartel is sustained forever if it is agreed on in GFID = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ),
the cartel agreement in GBD = (N,A,Θ, pi, p) has the probability
(
1− γ2) of deviation.
3.3.2 Oligopoly Bayesian Collusion Game
I can extend the duopoly Bayesian game into the environment where there are n firms
and 2 types of discount rates. Then the Bayesian game comes to
GBO = (N,A,Θ, pi, p) , where
N = {1, 2, · · · , n}
A = Πni=1Ai s.t Ai = {(Join, qi), (Not Join) | qi ∈ R+}
Θ = Πni=1Θi s.t Θi = ∆
pi = {pi1, pi2, · · · , pin}, where pii : A X Θi 7→ R s.t
pii(si, s−i | δi) =

pic if si = (Join, q
c
i ) for ∀ i
pin if si = (Not Join) for ∃ i
(1− δi)pii(qi, q−i) + δipir otherwise
p ∈ ∆(Θ) s.t δi ∼ i.i.d with Pr(δi = δH) = γ
Each firm knows its type δi ∈ Θi, but does not know the other firm’s type vector δ−i except γ.
A firm i′s pure strategy is a map Si : Θi 7→ Ai, and a PBNE of the game is a strategy profile
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s∗ = (s∗1, s∗2, · · · , s∗n) such that
n−1∑
j=0
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)jpii(s∗i (δi), s∗−i(δ−i(j)); δi)
≥
n−1∑
j=0
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)jpii(ai, s∗−i(δ−i(j)); δi)
for every i ∈ N, δi ∈ Θi and ai ∈ Ai.
(3.5)
Here, δ−i(j) = (δ1, · · · , δi−1, δi+1, · · · , δn) is a vector representing (n-1) other firms’ discount
rate profiles in which j many firms have type δL and (n-j-1) many firms have type δH . Like
the perfect information game, s∗ = Πni=1(Join, q
c)i is a unique efficient PBNE if δ
∗ ≤ δL while
s∗ = Πni=1(Not Join)i is a unique PBNE if δ
H ≤ δ∗.
Suppose that δ∗ ∈ (δL, δH) similar to the duopoly case. One trivial PBNE is s∗i (δi) = (Not
Join) for each firm i ∈ N . Again, consider a pure strategy in which both type of firms choose
to join the cartel and a firm with δi = δ
H produces cartel output qc. While any firm with
δi = δ
L has an incentive to deviate, there is a possibility of (1− γn−1) that one or more other
firms also have low discount rate δL. When it deviates, it has to maximize the expected profit
given (q−i, γ), where q−i = (q1, · · · , qi−1, qi+1, · · · qn) is other firms’ given output profile in
which firm 1 is assumed to choose q1 when δ1 = δ
L, firm 2 choose q2 when δ2 = δ
L and so on.
Formally, given (q−i, γ), firm i solves
max
qi
n−1∑
j=0
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)jpii(qi, qj−i), where qj−i = qc−i(n− 1− j) + q−i(j)
Here, qc−i(n − 1 − j) represents (n − 1) dimensional vector that has (n − 1 − j) many cartel
output qc and j many 0′s, and q−i(j) denotes (n− 1) dimensional vector that has (n− 1− j)
many 0′s in the coordinate where qc−i(n − 1 − j) has qc as its element and has j many given
qk for k ∈ {1, · · · , i − 1, i + 1, · · · , n} in the coordinate where qc−i(n − 1 − j) has 0 as its
element. Note that there are n−1Cj cases with (n− 1− j) many cartel output qc and j many
given qk. pii(qi, q
j
−i) is defined by the average profit of all those cases given q−i. If n = 2,
then the above problem is exactly the same with the duopoly case. This optimization problem
gives me the best-response function qi = q
d(q−i, γ) for each firm. Again, I can construct
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qd = (qd(γ), qd(γ), · · · , qd(γ)) as a fixed point. Now, I can define the pure strategy for each
firm i ∈ N, which is equivalent to the duopoly case.
s¯i(δi) =
 (Join, q
c) if δi = δ
H
(Join, qd(γ)) if δi = δ
L
(3.6)
I will denote firm i’s average payoff when firm i chooses qi given that j many other firms have
low discount factor by pi
j−i
i (qi) = pii(qi, q
d
−i(j)), where q
d
−i(j) = (q1, q2, · · · , qi−1, qi+1, · · · , qn)
with j many qd(γ) and (n−1−j) many qc. Under the strategy s¯ = (s¯1(δ1), s¯2(δ2), · · · , s¯n(δn)),
the interim payoff of firm i with type δH is given by
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δH) = γn−1pic +
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j [(1− δH)pij−ii (qc) + δHpir] (3.7)
while the interim payoff of firm i with type δL yields
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL) = γn−1[(1− δL)pii(qd(γ), qc−i) + δLpir] + (3.8)
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j [(1− δL)pij−ii (qd(γ)) + δLpir]
Using the same technique, I can get an equivalent result with Proposition 2.
Proposition 3. Suppose δL < δ∗ < δH . Then, there exists γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that a strategy
profile s¯ = (s¯1(δ1), s¯2(δ2), · · · , s¯n(δn)) in equation (3.6) can be supported as a PBNE for all
γ ∈ (γ∗, 1) in the Bayesian game GBO = (N,A,Θ, pi, p).
Proof. See the appendix.
The result holds for the same reason with the duopoly case. If γ is higher than the threshold
belief γ∗, a high type firm expects higher payoff when it sticks to cartel agreement because it
believes that cartel is sustained with sufficiently high probability. On the other hand, a low
type firm also believes that the chance of δ−i = (δH , · · · , δH) is high and that it benefits from
cartel agreement and unilateral deviation. This belief makes it possible for cartel to be agreed
on when one or more firms fail to satisfy the incentive constraint. As in the duopoly, a PBNE
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s¯ = (s¯1(δ1), s¯2(δ2), · · · , s¯n(δn)) is more efficient than another PBNE s∗ = Πni=1(Not Join)i.
The equilibrium outcome of PBNE s¯ depends on the combination of n firms’ discount factors.
Corollary 4. Suppose that γ ∈ (γ∗, 1). Then, the equilibrium outcome of a PBNE s¯ =
(s¯1(δ1), s¯2(δ2), · · · , s¯n(δn)) is given as follows.
(a) if δi = δ
H for all firm i, then cartel is agreed and sustained.
(b) if δi = δ
L for a firm i, then cartel is agreed but is not sustained.
The probability of each outcome equals to γn and (1− γn), respectively.
The implication of this result is also the same with the duopoly case. Collusion in this
Bayesian environment may collapse from the beginning with probability (1 − γn). Again, as
in the duopoly case, if γ < γ∗ holds, collusion cannot be agreed on even when all firms satisfy
the incentive constraint (i.e δi = δ
H for all firm i). Comparison with the perfect information
game GFIO = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ) gives the following result.
Corollary 5. Suppose δL < δ∗ < δH .
(a) While firms collude with (ex-ante) probability γn and do not collude with (ex-ante)
probability (1 − γn) for every γ ∈ (0, 1) in GFIO = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ), firms agree on collusion
with probability 1 for any γ ∈ (γ∗, 1) in GBO = (N,A,Θ, pi, p).
(b) Moreover, while cartel is sustained forever if it is agreed on in GFIO = (N,A, pi | ∆, γ),
the cartel agreement in GBO = (N,A,Θ, pi, p) has the probability (1− γn) of deviation from the
beginning.
3.3.3 Implication to comparative statistics
Given the above characterization of equilibrium outcome in GBO = (N,A,Θ, pi, p), I revisit
the problem how entry, exit or merger affects the competitive behavior of firms in the industry.
I maintain the assumption that δ∗ = f(n) is an increasing function with respect to n.
Entry
As in the perfect information setting, an entrant is assumed to have δE ∈ ∆ = {δH , δL}
with Pr(δE = δ
H) = γ. Before entry, the industry would be in one situation among 3 possible
cases : (1) γ ∈ (0, γ∗(n)), (2) γ ∈ (γ∗(n), 1) and δi = δL < f(n) for at least one firm i ∈ N ,
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(3) γ ∈ (γ∗(n), 1) and δi ≥ f(n) for all firm i ∈ N. Here, γ∗(n) represents the threshold belief
γ∗ when there are n firms in the industry. Then, γ∗(n) = 1 and cartel agreement is impossible
if f(n) ≥ δH , whereas γ∗(n) = 0 and cartel is agreed for sure if f(n) ≤ δL.
If γ ∈ (0, γ∗(n)) holds, firms could not agree on collusion pre-entry. So the belief γ is not
updated. On the other hand, entry changes each firm’s payoff (pid+, pic, pin, pij−i , pir etc.) and
increases the number of firms in the industry. Hence, (n + 1) firms including entrant play a
similar Bayesian game GBO = (N,A,Θ, pi, p). If γ
∗(n + 1) in the new Bayesian game is still
greater than γ, firms do not agree on cartel post-entry either.
Next suppose that γ ∈ (γ∗(n), 1) and δi = δL < f(n) for at least one firm i ∈ N pre-entry.
Then, the industry would be in the punishment phase before entry because firm i deviates
after cartel agreement. Moreover, δi = δ
L is common knowledge for all incumbents and the
entrant. Hence, the industry does not collude after entry either because all firms know that
firm i will deviate again due to δi = δ
L < f(n) < f(n+ 1).
Finally, consider the case that γ ∈ (γ∗(n), 1) and δi ≥ f(n) for all firm i ∈ N . In this case,
firms collude before entry and it is common knowledge that δi ≥ f(n) holds for all incumbents.
Clearly, cartel is impossible after entry if f(n + 1) ≥ δH while cartel is always possible after
entry if f(n) < f(n + 1) ≤ δL. If δL < f(n + 1) < δH , two different kinds of Bayesian game
can be played.
One is the subcase that f(n) ≤ δL < f(n + 1) < δH holds. In this case, there is no
update on the incumbents’ discount rates. So the incumbents and the entrant play a Bayesian
oligopoly game GBO = (N,A,Θ, pi, p) similar to case 1. For the same reason, firms will not
agree on collusion after entry if γ∗(n+ 1) > γ holds, while they continue to agree on cartel if
γ∗(n+ 1) < γ holds. In the latter case, cartel may collapse with probability (1− γn+1).
The other is the subcase that δL < f(n) < f(n+ 1) < δH holds. Since cartel was sustained
before entry, it is common knowledge that δi = δ
H > f(n+ 1) > f(n) for all incumbents. So
the only uncertainty is about the entrant’s discount rate δE . Because every incumbent’s type
is revealed as δH , its strategy is just to pick si ∈ Ai = {(Join, qi), (Not Join) | qi ∈ R+}.
On the other hand, the entrant’s strategy is a function ∆ → AE = {(Join, qE), (Not Join)
| qE ∈ R+}. In order to support cartel agreement as equilibrium outcome, each incumbent i
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has to choose s¯i = (Join, q
c) and the entrant has to choose
s¯E(δE) =
 (Join, q
c) if δE = δ
H
(Join, q(nqc)) if δE = δ
L
In words, the entrant joins the cartel and chooses cartel output when its type is δH while it
chooses to join but deviates with best response output against sum of incumbents’ cartel out-
put. Then, each incumbent’s expected payoff under the strategy profile s¯ = (s¯1, · · · , s¯n, s¯E(δE))
≡ (s¯In, s¯E(δE)) is given by
Πi(s¯i, s¯−i, s¯E(δE); δH) = γpic + (1− γ)[(1− δH)pii(qcIn, q(nqc)) + δHpir]
and the entrant’s payoff would depend on its type.
ΠE(s¯E(δE), s¯In; δ
H) = pic
ΠE(s¯E(δE), s¯In; δ
L) = (1− δL)piE(q(nqc), qcIn) + δLpir
Then, similar arguments with Proposition 2 and 3 imply that there exists γ∗∗ ∈ (0, 1) such
that s¯ = (s¯In, s¯E(δE)) can be supported as PBNE for all γ ∈ (γ∗∗, 1). Since I already know
that γ ∈ (γ∗, 1), I have the following result.
Claim 15. Suppose that δL < f(n) < f(n + 1) < δH holds and the industry was colluding
before entry without deviation. Then,
(a) if γ ≥ max{γ∗, γ∗∗} holds, the industry still agrees on collusion after entry. In this
case, the collusion will be sustained with probability γ after entry while it breaks down with
probability (1− γ).
(b) If γ∗∗ > γ > γ∗, the industry does not agree on collusion after entry any longer.
Exit
As in the previous subsection, the industry would be in one situation among 3 possible
cases before exit : (1) γ ∈ (0, γ∗(n)), (2) γ ∈ (γ∗(n), 1) and δi = δL < f(n) for some firm
i ∈ N , (3) γ ∈ (γ∗(n), 1) and δi ≥ f(n) for all firm i ∈ N.
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If γ ∈ (0, γ∗(n)) holds, firms could not agree on collusion pre-exit. So the belief γ is
not updated. On the other hand, exit changes each firm’s payoff (pid+, pic, pin, pij−i , pir etc.)
and decreases the number of firms in the industry. Hence, the remaining (n − 1) firms play
a similar Bayesian game GBO = (N,A,Θ, pi, p). If the threshold belief γ
∗ decreases below γ
(γ∗(n − 1) < γ < γ∗(n)), firms will agree on cartel post-exit. In this case, cartel can break
down with probability
(
1− γn−1). Else if γ < γ∗(n− 1) holds, firms do not agree on collusion
post-exit either.
Next suppose that γ ∈ (γ∗(n), 1) and δi = δL < f(n) for some firm i ∈ N before exit. Then,
the industry is in the punishment phase before exit because the firm i deviates. Moreover,
δi = δ
L is common knowledge for all firms. If f(n − 1) < δL < f(n) holds, the industry
will collude for sure after exit. Suppose instead that δL < f(n − 1) < f(n) holds. Then the
industry will collude after exit only if the firm who exits is a unique deviator. If they collude
after exit in any case, the cartel is sustained because f(n − 1) < δL in the first case and
δi = δ
H > f(n− 1) for all the remaining firms in the other case.
Finally, consider the case where γ ∈ (γ∗(n), 1) and δi ≥ f(n) for every firm i ∈ N . If
δL ≥ f(n) > f(n− 1), firms continue to collude after exit. If f(n) > δL, then δi = δH > f(n)
is common knowledge for every firm i ∈ N . So the industry will keep colluding after exit
because δi = δ
H > f(n) > f(n− 1) holds for all the remaining firms.
Merger
We can analyze merger’s effect on firms’ competitive behavior similarly. Suppose that
there are n firms competing a` la Cournot before merger, and that (m + 1) firms merge. So
there remain (n−m) firms post-merger. Without loss, I = {n−m,n−m+1, · · · , n}, a subset
of N, is the set of insiders in the merger. If you recall γu(n) ≡ 1δH>f(n) ∗ γ+ 1δL>f(n) ∗ (1− γ),
γu(n) ≤ γ∗(n) is implied from the fact that n firms competes a` la Cournot pre-merger. For
simplicity, assume that merger does not change the support of discount rates ∆ = {δL, δH}
and the merged firm picks its discount rate δM arbitrarily among the set of insiders’ discount
rates ∆IN = {δn−m, δn−m+1, · · · , δn}.
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Then, the analysis is the same with exit case. Merger affects the remaining firms’ com-
petitive behavior in two different ways. First, merger decreases δ∗ = f(n) due to f ′ > 0.
This effect weakly increases γu given the distribution of δ. Second, merger also affects the
threshold belief γ∗ because it changes each firm’s payoff (pid+, pic, pin, pij−i , piretc.) and de-
creases the number of firms in the industry. As a result, it can be the case that a pure strategy
s¯ = (s¯1(δ1), s¯2(δ2), · · · , s¯n−m−1(δn−m−1), s¯M (δM )) is supported as a PBNE after merger if
γu(n−m) > γ∗(n−m) is satisfied.
Note that the change in firms’ competitive behavior takes a cutoff property. Even when
merger increases γu and decreases γ
∗, firms still compete a` la Cournot until γu < γ∗ holds. In
contrast, if γu > γ
∗ is satisfied post-merger, then firms choose a collusive PBNE.
In sum, 3 different scenarios may arise post-merger. If γu = 1 or equivalently δ
∗ < δL post-
merger, then cartel is agreed and sustained for sure. If γu ∈ (γ∗, 1), then cartel is agreed on and
sustained with probability γn−m while cartel is agreed on but not sustained with probability
(1 − γn−m). Finally, if γu < γ∗, the remaining firms after merger continue to compete a` la
Cournot irrespective of their real discount factors.
3.4 Collusion with Less than Monopoly Profit
Thus far, firms are only allowed to agree on perfect cartel. In this section I extend the
model in a direction where cartel agreement might include the payoff less than monopoly profit
until the uncertainty on the other firm’s discount rate is not removed.
3.4.1 Dynamic Bayesian Game Structure
Here, I explicitly consider a dynamic Bayesian game which deals with cartel formation
and its sustainability in a duopoly market where there is asymmetric information on the
other firm’s discount rate. Before game starts, nature picks each firm’s discount rate δi ∈ ∆
with Pr(δH) = γ0 and γ0 is a common knowledge. At the beginning of the game, each
firm chooses whether to join the cartel or not, and then decides its output in every period
t ≥ 1. Given firm i’s output profile qi = (qi1, qi2, · · · , qit, · · · ), its (averaged) payoff is given by
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Πi(qi, q−i) = (1− δi)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1
i pii(qit, q−it), where pii(qit, q−it) is firm i’s profit at period t when
each firm chooses its output as (qit, q−it). I assume δ∗ ∈ (δL, δH) like the baseline model. So
the dynamic Bayesian game GDBD = (N,A,Θ,Π, p) comes to
GDBD = (N,A,Θ,Π, p) , where
N = {1, 2}
A = Π2i=1Ai, where
Ai = (Ait)
∞
t=0 s.t Ai0 = {(Join), (Not Join)}, Ait = { qit ∈ R+} for t ≥ 1
Θ = Π2i=1Θi s.t Θi = ∆
Π = {Π1,Π2}, where
Πi : A X Θi 7→ R s.t Πi(qi, q−i; δi) = (1− δi)
∑∞
t=1 δ
t−1
i pii(qit, q−it)
p ∈ ∆(Θ) s.t δ1 ⊥ δ2 and Pr(δH) = γ0
Perfect monitoring is assumed. Let γit be firm i’s updated belief at period t ≥ 1 on δ−i = δH .
Define history Ht = A
t−1 and H = ∪∞t=1Ht, where At = (A1s, A2s)ts=0 for t ≥ 0. Firm
i′s pure strategy si = (sit)∞t=0 is a map Si : H X Θi 7→ Ai, so the pure strategy perfect
Bayesian equilibrium of this game (PBE) is defined as a pair (s∗, γ∗), where a strategy profile
s∗ = {s∗1, s∗2} and a system of beliefs γ∗ = (γ∗1t, γ∗2t)∞t=0 with the initial γ0 = γ∗10 = γ∗20 such that
(1) (s∗, γ∗) is sequentially rational, or equivalently
Πit(s
∗
i |ht, s∗−i|ht ; δi, γ∗it) ≥ Πit(si|ht, s∗−i|ht ; δi, γ∗it)
for every i ∈ N, δi ∈ Θi, ht ∈ Ht and si|ht ∈ (Ais)∞s=t
(2) γ∗ is obtained from s∗ using Bayes rule whenever it is applicable,
(3.9)
where Πit( · ; δi, γ∗it) represents firm i’s continuation payoff at period t and si|ht represents firm
i’s continuation strategy at history ht ∈ Ht.
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3.4.2 Construction of Belief and Strategy
A System of Belief
Given the initial belief γ0, each firm’s belief is updated by Bayes rule in every period
whenever it is applicable. If a−i0 = Join and q−i = (qc1, · · · , qct , · · · ), where qct is determined
by the strategy s¯−it that I construct in the next subsection, then firm i’s belief is updated as
following.
γ0 = γ10 = γ20 : initial belief (Given)
γi1 =
γ0 Pr(Join| δH)
γ0 Pr(Join| δH) + (1− γ0) Pr(Join| δL)
γit =
γit−1 Pr(qct−1| δH)
γit−1 Pr(qct−1| δH) + (1− γit−1) Pr(qct−1| δL)
for t ≥ 2
Suppose that both types of firms choose (Join) and a firm with δH always produces qct . Given
that Pr(Join| δH) = Pr(Join| δL) = Pr(qct−1| δH) = 1, I get
γ0 = γi1, γit =
γit−1
γit−1 + (1− γit−1) Pr(qct−1| δL)
(3.10)
Hence, γit−1 = γit if Pr(qct−1| δL) = 1, and γit = 1 if Pr(qct−1| δL) = 0.
If a firm i observes a−i0 = (Not Join), its belief is updated as γi1 = 0. If ht is such that
h1 = (Join, Join) coupled with either (1) q−i1 6= qc1 or (2) qt−2i = qt−2−i = (qc1, · · · , qct−2) and
q−it−1 6= qct−1 for t ≥ 3, firm i’s belief is also updated as γit = 0. If γit = 0 at ht, then γis = 0
at all the history hs following ht.
Construction of Strategy
If duopolists do not agree on collusion, each firm gets stage Nash payoff pin every period.
In order to find a collusion equilibrium in this game, suppose that high type firm chooses
symmetric collusion output qct ∈ [qc, qn) in every period t insofar as its partner chose collusion
output qcs for s ∈ {1, · · · , t−1}. Next I need to look at when the low type firm deviates. Let t∗
denote the optimal deviation period of low type firm. Then, it coordinates with output qct until
period (t∗−1) but deviates for sure at period t∗, which means that Pr(qc1| δL) = · · · = Pr(qct∗−1|
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δL) = 1 and Pr(qct∗ | δL) = 0. So firms agree on not only collusion but also each period’s output
level of collusion in this setting. After any one firm deviates at period t∗, each firm will get
(average) punishment payoff pir from period (t∗ + 1) and on. Equation (3.10) yields γit = γ0
for all i ∈ N and t = 1, ..., t∗ while γit∗+1 = 1 if q−it = qct and γit∗+1 = 0 if q−it 6= qct . Since
there is no update in γ, it is a natural assumption that each firm’s collusion profit is the same
in every period until period (t∗ − 1). Let me denote each firm’s collusion profit and output
until period (t∗ − 1) by p¯ic and q¯c, respectively. If both firms choose qit∗ = q¯c at period t∗,
then each firm’s collusion profit pict can be updated into pi
c from period (t∗+1) and on because
γit∗+1 is updated into 1 for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Given that γit∗ = γ0 and Pr(q¯c| δL) = 0 for t = t∗,
low type firm chooses its output by maximizing the following optimization problem.
max
qi
γ0pii(qi, q¯
c) + (1− γ0)pii(qi, q−i)
From this problem, I can get the best response function qit∗ = q
d(γ0, q¯
c, q−i) and fixed point
output qt∗ = q
d(γ0, q¯
c).
Example 3.2 Assume again that P = 1−Q and MCi = 0 for i = 1, 2. Now, two firms can
agree on q¯c between [14 ,
1
3). In order to get fixed point output q
d = (qd(γ0, q¯
c), qd(γ0, q¯
c)), first
I have to solve
max
qi
γ0(1− qi − q¯c)qi + (1− γ0)(1− qi − q−i)qi
Then, the best-response function is given by qi =
1
2{γ0(1 − q¯c) + (1 − γ0)(1 − q−i)}. So, the
fixed point output is given by
qd(γ0, q¯
c) =
1− γ0q¯c
3− γ0
If I let q¯c = qc = 14 , then q
d(γ0, q¯
c) = 4−γ012−4γ0 , which is the same with what I obtained in
[Example 3.1.]
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When low-type firm deviates at period t∗ with fixed point output qd(γ0, q¯c), its expected
payoff amounts to
Πi(t
∗; δL, γ0)
= γ0[(1− (δL)t∗−1)p¯ic + (1− δL)(δL)t∗−1pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c) + (δL)t∗pir]
+(1− γ0)[(1− (δL)t∗−1)p¯ic + (1− δL)(δL)t∗−1pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c)) + (δL)t∗pir]
= p¯ic + (δL)t
∗−1[γ0pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c) + (1− γ0)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c))− p¯ic]
+(δL)t
∗
[pir − γ0pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c)− (1− γ0)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c))]
Taking a derivative with respect to t∗ in order to get the optimal deviation period, I obtain
dΠi(t
∗)
dt∗
= (δL)t
∗−1 log δL ∗ (3.11)
[(1− δL){γ0pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c) + (1− γ0)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c))}+ δLpir − p¯ic]
Using equation (3.11), I can define f : X 7−→ R such that
X = [0, 1]× [qc, qn]
f(γ, q) = (1− δL)(γpi(qd(γ, q), q) + (1− γ)pi(qd(γ, q), qd(γ, q))) + δLpir − pi(q, q)
Then, f(γ, q) is continuous and X ⊂ R2 is a compact set. Let me define an upper contour set
U(0) = {(γ, q) ∈ X | f(γ, q) > 0} and a lower contour set L(0) = {(γ, q) ∈ X | f(γ, q) < 0}.
U(0) is non-empty because f(1, qc) = (1 − δL)pid+ + δLpir − pic > 0. If pir < pin, L(0) is also
non-empty because f(0, qn) = δL(pir − pin) < 0. U(0) and L(0) are open because f(γ, q)
is continuous. Hence, there is ε1 > 0 such that Bε1(1, q
c) ⊂ U(0) and ε2 > 0 such that
Bε2(0, q
n) ⊂ L(0). So, U(0) and L(0) have interior points. Since sign(dΠi(t∗)dt∗ ) is equal to
−sign(f(γ0, q¯c)) due to log δL < 0, Πi(t∗; δL, γ0) is monotonically increasing or decreasing
depending on sign(f(γ0, q¯
c)). Then, it is most profitable that a low type firm deviates at
period 1 if (γ, q) ∈ U(0), and that it does not deviate forever if (γ, q) ∈ L(0).
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Based on these observations, I construct the strategy for each type according to the sign
of f(γ0, q¯
c). If f(γ0, q¯
c) > 0 holds, the (continuation) strategy of a high type firm is given by
s¯i|ht(δH ; f(γ0, q¯c) > 0) =

Join if t = 0
qn if t ≥ 1, h1 6= (Join, Join)
q¯c if t = 1, h1 = (Join, Join)
qc if

Given h1 = (Join, Join),
t = 2, q1i = q
1
−i = q¯
c or
t ≥ 3, qt−1i = qt−1−i = (q¯c, qc, · · · , qc)
qr if otherwise
(3.12)
Here, qt−1i and q
t−1
−i are (t−1) dimensional vectors which represent history of each firm’s output
from period 1 to period (t-1). In words, this strategy is constructed in the following way: high
type firm joins cartel at the beginning of the game; if collusion was not agreed on, it chooses
Cournot-Nash output every period; if collusion was agreed on at period 1, it chooses restricted
cartel output at period 1 and perfect cartel output at period t ≥ 2 insofar as collusion has been
sustained; if collusion had been agreed on but one firm deviated at some period, it chooses
output in the punishment phase.
When f(γ0, q¯
c) > 0 holds, the (continuation) strategy of a low type firm is given by
s¯i|ht(δL; f(γ0, q¯c) > 0) =

Join if t = 0
qn if t ≥ 1, h1 6= (Join, Join)
qd(γ0, q¯
c) if t = 1, h1 = (Join, Join)
qd+ if

Given h1 = (Join, Join),
t = 2, q1i = q
1
−i = q¯
c or
t ≥ 3, qt−1i = qt−1−i = (q¯c, qc, · · · , qc)
qr if otherwise
(3.13)
Low type firm’s strategy is different from high type firm’s strategy only at the history where
cartel was agreed on and has not collapsed: low type firm chooses fixed point output at period
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1 and deviation output under perfect information at period t ≥ 2 at this class of history.
If f(γ0, q¯
c) < 0 holds instead, the strategy of both types is the same as follows.
s¯i|ht(δH ; f(γ0, q¯c) < 0) = s¯i|ht(δL; f(γ0, q¯c) < 0)
=

Join if t = 0
qn if t ≥ 1, h1 6= (Join, Join)
q¯c if

Given h1 = (Join, Join),
t = 1 or
t ≥ 2, qt−1i = qt−1−i = (q¯c, · · · , q¯c)
qr if otherwise
(3.14)
Each firm’s strategy in this case is different from high type firm’s strategy in (3.12) only at the
history where cartel was agreed on and has not collapsed: each firm chooses restricted cartel
output at this class of history. This construction reflects that low type firm does not deviate
forever when f(γ0, q¯
c) < 0 holds.
3.4.3 Characterization of PBE and Its Outcome
Case 1 : f(γ0, q¯
c) > 0
Given with the constructed strategy and system of belief (s¯, γ), I can obtain the expected
payoff or the expected continuation payoffs. The high type firm’s expected payoff of the game
amounts to
Πi(s¯i, s¯−i ; δH , γ0) = γ0[(1− δH)p¯ic + δHpic] + (1− γ0)[(1− δH)pi(q¯c, qd(γ0, q¯c)) + δHpir]
With (s¯, γ) , h1 = (Join, Join) is on the outcome path and γi1 = γ0. So Πi1(s¯i|h1, s¯−i|h1
; δH , γi1) = Πi(s¯i, s¯−i ; δH , γ0) is immediate. On the other hand, the expected payoff of a firm
with δL under (s¯, γ) is given by
Πi(s¯i, s¯−i ; δL, γ0) = γ0[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c) + δLpir]
+(1− γ0)[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c)) + δLpir]
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As in the high type, I have Πi1(s¯i|h1, s¯−i|h1 ; δL, γi1) = Πi(s¯i, s¯−i ; δL, γ0). If ht ∈ Ht is either
q1i = q
1
−i = q¯
c for t = 2 or qt−1i = q
t−1
−i = (q¯
c, qc, · · · , qc) for t ≥ 3 given with h1 = (Join, Join),
the continuation payoff of a firm with δH is given by
Πit(s¯i|ht, s¯−i|ht ; δH , γit = 1) = pic
and the continuation payoff of a low-type firm yields
Πit(s¯i|ht, s¯−i|ht ; δL, γit = 1) = (1− δL)pid+ + δLpir
If ht ∈ Ht is either (1) q1i 6= q¯c or q1−i 6= q¯c for t = 2, or (2) qt−1i 6= (q¯c, qc, · · · , qc) or
qt−1−i 6= (q¯c, qc, · · · , qc) for t ≥ 3 given with h1 = (Join, Join), the continuation payoff of a firm
with any type is given by
Πit(s¯i|ht, s¯−i|ht ; δi, γit) = pir, where γit ∈ {0, 1} and γit = 0 for some i, δi ∈ ∆
and if ht ∈ Ht is any history such that h1 6= (Join, Join), the continuation payoff of a firm
with any type is given by
Πit(s¯i|ht, s¯−i|ht ; δi, γit) = pin, where γit = 0 for some i, δi ∈ ∆
Now, I can derive a result similar to Proposition 2 in the baseline model.
Proposition 4. Suppose δL < δ∗ < δH . Then, there exists ∗ > 0 such that (s¯, γ) , con-
structed in subsection 3.4.2, can be supported as PBE in the dynamic Bayesian game GDBD =
(N,A,Θ,Π, p) for all (γ0, q¯
c) ∈ B∗(1, qc).
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 4 shows that there are a continuum of equilibria in which each firm in duopoly
market agrees on restricted initial collusion payoff p¯ic < pic if the initial belief γ0 is close to 1.
Given this characterization of PBE, the equilibrium outcome can be derived.
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Corollary 6. Suppose that δL < δ∗ < δH and (γ0, q¯c) ∈ B∗(1, qc). Then, the equilibrium
outcome of PBE (s¯, γ) is given as follows.
(a) if (δ1, δ2) = (δ
H , δH), cartel is agreed and sustained. Each firm’s output path is given
by q = (q¯c, qc, qc, · · · ) in this case.
(b) if (δ1, δ2) 6= (δH , δH), cartel is agreed but is not sustained. In this case, high type
firm’s output path is given by q = (q¯c, qr, qr, · · · ) while low type firm’s output path is given by
q = (qd(γ0, q¯
c), qr, qr, · · · ).
The ex-ante probability of each outcome path equals to γ20 and 1− γ20 , respectively.
Like the baseline model, this extended model also shows that cartel can be agreed on even
when each firm’s incentive constraint is not satisfied and the punishment phase can be an
equilibrium outcome path. One interesting feature of this equilibrium outcome, which is in
contrast with the baseline model, is that when both firms have high type cartel may start
from the payoff below full collusion payoff pic but can achieve pic from period 2 and on. The
reason why this happens is that uncertainty on the other firm’s discount rate might prevent
duopolists from agreeing on full cartel output qc from the beginning, but they reach the perfect
cartel from period 2 and on because uncertainty is removed after observing the other firm’s
output at period 1.
Case 2 : f(γ0, q¯
c) < 0
In this case, the outcome path from (s¯, γ) would be h1 = (Join, Join) and ht is such that
h1 = (Join, Join) and q
t−1
i = q
t−1
−i = (q¯
c, q¯c, · · · , q¯c) for t ≥ 2 while the belief is γ0 = γit for
all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0. So the expected payoff and the expected continuation payoff of this game
on the outcome path from (s¯, γ) would be
Πi(s¯i, s¯−i ; δi, γ0) = Πit(s¯i|ht, s¯−i|ht; δi, γit = γ0) = p¯ic
for all i ∈ N, δi ∈ Θi and t ≥ 1. For any history ht such that h1 6= (Join, Join), the
continuation payoff of this game comes to Πit(s¯i|ht, s¯−i|ht; δi, γit) = pin. If ht ∈ Ht is such that
qt−1i 6= (q¯c, q¯c, · · · , q¯c) or qt−1−i 6= (q¯c, q¯c, · · · , q¯c) for t ≥ 2 given with h1 = (Join, Join), the
continuation payoff of a firm with any type is given by Πit(s¯i|ht, s¯−i|ht ; δi, γit) = pir.
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Proposition 5. Suppose that δ∗ > δL and pir < pin. The strategy profile and system of belief
(s¯, γ) , constructed in subsection 3.4.2, can be supported as PBE in the dynamic Bayesian game
GDBD = (N,A,Θ,Π, p) as q¯
c approaches to qn.
Proof. See the appendix.
One thing to note in Proposition 5 is that PBE of this case only requires δL < δ∗, so this
low payoff cartel equilibrium is possible even when δ∗ ≥ δH . In fact, it can be shown that this
low payoff cartel equilibrium exists when two firms have common discount rate δ or there is
no asymmetric information on the other firm’s discount rate. To see this, construct a function
f(q) = pi(q, q)−(1−δi)pi(qd(γ, q), q)−δipir, then I get lim
q→qn f(q) = δi(pi
n−pir). This implies that
p¯ic > (1− δi)pi(qd(q¯c), q¯c) + δipir if q¯c is close enough to qn and pin > pir. Hence, the important
assumption in Proposition 5 is about firms’ strategy against deviation because this low payoff
cartel equilibrium is possible only when each firm retaliates more severely than stage Nash
payoff against deviation. Given with PBE in Proposition 5, the equilibrium outcome path is
given by q1 = q2 = (q¯
c, q¯c, q¯c, · · · ) irrespective of each firm’s type.
3.5 Collusion with Uneven Split of Monopoly Profit
This section considers the situation where duopolists exchange the information on their
discount factor and may agree on collusion with uneven split of monopoly profit based on
their updated belief on the other firm’s discount rate. In order to deal with this extension, I
introduce cheap talk game before each firm makes cartel and output decision.
3.5.1 Characteristics of the Extension
Duopolists can split the monopoly profit unevenly in two different ways: one is to set a
different output quota, and the other is to use money transfer after two firms produce the
same output. Let me introduce one simple example under perfect information.
Example 3.3 Assume P = 1 - Q and MC = 0 as before. Then, pid = 964 , pi
c = 18 , pi
n = 19 ,
and monopoly profit pim = 14 . Consider first even split and Nash reversion strategy against
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deviation, then I have pir = 19 and the threshold discount factor δ
∗ = 917 . I also get q
c = 14 ,
qd = 38 , and q
n = qr = 13 . Let (δ
L, δH) = ( 717 ,
15
17), so δ
L < δ∗ < δH holds. Suppose that
duopolists with different discount rates set their output quota (qcL, q
c
H) = (
19
72 ,
17
72). For any given
(qcL, q
c
H) , the cartel payoff is given by (pi(q
c
L, q
c
H), pi(q
c
H , q
c
L)) = (
qcL
2 ,
qcH
2 ) whereas the deviation
payoff is equal to pid(qcL) ≡ pi(qd(qcL), qcL) = (1−q
c
L)
2
4 and pi
d(qcH) ≡ pi(qd(qcH), qcH) = (1−q
c
H)
2
4 . So
for (qcL, q
c
H) = (
19
72 ,
17
72), each firm’s cartel and deviation profit come to (pi(q
c
L, q
c
H), pi(q
c
H , q
c
L)) =
( 19144 ,
17
144) and
(
pid(qcL), pi
d(qcH)
)
= (0.1354, 0.1458), respectively. Then, pi(qcH , q
c
L) =
17
144 >
0.1139 = (1 − δH)pid(qcL) + δHpir and pi(qcL, qcH) = 19144 > 0.1315 = (1 − δL)pid(qcH) + δLpir.
Hence, cartel can be sustained under this uneven split of output quota.
Now consider uneven split of monopoly profit through money transfer. Each firm produces
cartel output qc = 14 under the given demand and cost function. Suppose that money transfer
in each period is m = 1144 . In other words, the high type firm gives the low type firm
1
144
from its profit every period. So, each firm’s per-period profit after this transfer comes to
(picL, pi
c
H) ≡ (pic +m,pic −m) = ( 19144 , 17144). Then, cartel can be sustained under this profit
sharing because (δ∗L, δ
∗
H) = (
5
17 ,
13
17) and δ
∗
L < δ
L < δ∗H < δ
H holds.
This example shows a few characteristics of this extension. First of all, for a given δH > δ∗,
there is a lower bound of threshold discount rate, δˆ∗L, such that there is an uneven split of
monopoly profit satisfying each type’s incentive constraint for any δL > δˆ∗L. I can let δˆ
∗
L = f(δ
H)
such that f
′
< 0, which reflects that a high type firm can yield more portion of monopoly profit
to a low type firm as it is more patient. Note that if δL < δˆ∗L holds, there is no way to satisfy
incentive constraint for the low type firm with any feasible uneven split. I make the following
assumption in order to exclude this case:
Assumption 1. δˆ∗L < δ
L < δ∗
Second, if there is one profit split satisfying incentive constraint for each type, then there
is a continuum of ways to split monopoly profit that satisfy incentive constraint of each type.
In the above example, every profit division ( 19144 + ε,
17
144 − ε) also satisfies incentive constraints
if |ε| is sufficiently small.
Third, compared with even split of monopoly profit, uneven split with money transfer does
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not change each firm’s market share nor deviation payoff whereas uneven split with output
quota changes both. So one uneven profit split satisfying incentive constraint of each type
in one method does not necessarily satisfy incentive constraint in the other. Given these
observations, I will examine the possibility of collusion with uneven profit under Bayesian
environment both by money transfer and by output quota.
3.5.2 Counterfactual Model : Perfect Information
Given Assumption 1, cartel can be agreed on and sustained unless both firms have δL.
Since cartel cannot be agreed on with even split when at least one firm has δL, uneven split
enlarges the scope of collusion under perfect information. To see this, let Pr(δH) = γ for each
firm. Then, cartel can be agreed on with (ex-ante) probability
(
2γ − γ2), which is greater than
γ2, the (ex-ante) probability of cartel agreement when uneven split is not allowed. If both firms
have δH , they agree on collusion with even split pic whereas if one firm has δL and the other
δH , they agree on collusion in which low type firm’s profit is greater. The uneven split is not
unique because there are infinitely many ways to achieve incentive constraint for each type of
firm.
3.5.3 Bayesian Model with Money Transfer
As in the previous models, nature picks each firm’s discount rate δi ∈ ∆ with Pr(δH) = γ,
which is a common initial belief on δ−i = δH . In order to allow the possibility that firms agree
on uneven split collusion under Bayesian setting, I introduce a cheap-talk procedure before
firms make cartel or output decision. In this subsection, uneven split of monopoly profit is
done by money transfer.
After each firm learns its type, it says its discount rate to the other simultaneously. I will
let Pr(δH | δH) = p ∈ [0, 1] and Pr(δL | δL) = q ∈ [0, 1] as the strategy of each type of firm in
the cheap-talk game. The discount rate in front of bar (δX | · ) represents the revealed discount
rate of a firm, and that behind bar ( · | δY ) does the real discount rate of the firm. Then, p
(q) is the probability that a high (low) type firm reveals its real type truthfully in the cheap
talk game. Given the strategy profile (p, q) and the initial belief γ, the belief on δ−i = δH is
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updated by Bayes’ rule.
γ′ =
γp
γp+ (1− γ)(1− q) (3.15)
So γ′ would be 1 under the truth-telling strategy (p = q = 1) if the competitor’s revealed
type is δH . I will check whether there exists a truth-telling equilibrium in the cheap talk game
which has the following features in the subgame after cheap talk :
1. if (HH) is the outcome of cheap talk, cartel is agreed on with the same payoff pic,
2. if (HL) is the outcome, cartel is agreed on with uneven payoff (picH , pi
c
L) where pi
c
H +pi
c
L =
2pic, picH < pi
c
L and each type’s incentive constraint holds (pi
c
H > (1− δH)pid + δHpir and
picL > (1− δL)pid + δLpir),
3. finally, if (LL) is the outcome, cartel is not agreed on.
In other words, firms’ cartel agreement decision sticks to the outcome of cheap talk game.
Formally, the continuation strategy after the cheap talk is given as follows.
s¯i(δi | HH) =
 (Join, q
c) if δi = δ
H
(Join, qd) if δi = δ
L
s¯i(δi | HL) =
 (Join, q
c) if δi = δ
H or δi = δ
c
i = δ
L
(Join, qd) if δi = δ
L and δci = δ
H
(3.16)
s¯i(δi | LL) = (Not Join, qn)
Here, δi represents firm i’s real type while δ
c
i does its revealed type in the cheap talk. Given
the truth-telling strategy, the updated belief γ′ on δ−i = δH is either 0 or 1 for each firm
in every subgame after the cheap-talk. Put differently, no subgame after cheap talk involves
uncertainty on the other firm’s discount factor. Then the continuation strategy s¯i(δi | · ) is
sequentially rational in every history after the cheap-talk.
Now I want to check whether there exists a PBE that consists of truth-telling strategy in
the cheap talk stage and the continuation strategy (3.16) in the post cheap talk stage. If there
exists a truth-telling strategy, it must be the case that there is an uneven profit share (picH , pi
c
L)
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such that the expected payoff from truth-telling is greater than that from lying for every type
of firm.
First, consider a firm with δH . Given the truth-telling strategy of the other firm, the
outcome of cheap talk game would be (HH) with probability γ and (HL) with probability
(1− γ). From continuation strategy (3.16), the expected payoff of the high-type firm from
truth-telling comes to
EΠHH = γpi
c + (1− γ)picH
The first subscript in EΠXY represents firm’s real type and the second its revealed type. So
X = Y implies truth-telling, and X 6= Y implies lying. In a similar way, if the high type firm
lies about its discount rate, its expected payoff would be
EΠHL = γpi
c
L + (1− γ)pin
Hence, truth-telling would be more profitable for the high-type firm if and only if picH − pin ≥
γ
1−γ (pi
c
L − pic). If I use picL = 2pic − picH , this condition yields
picH ≥ γpic + (1− γ)pin (3.17)
Next consider a firm with δL. Given the truth-telling strategy of the other firm and con-
tinuation strategy (3.16), the expected payoff of the low type firm from truth-telling becomes
EΠLL = γpi
c
L + (1− γ)pin
If the low type firm lies, then its expected payoff would be
EΠLH = γ
[
(1− δL)pid + δLpir
]
+ (1− γ)
[
(1− δL)pid + δLpir
]
= (1− δL)pid + δLpir
Note that the deviation payoff in even split cartel is the same with that in uneven split cartel
because firms use money transfer. Hence, truth-telling would be profitable for the low-type
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firm if and only if γpicL + (1− γ)pin ≥ (1− δL)pid + δLpir, which is equivalent to
picH ≤ 2pic +
1− γ
γ
pin − 1
γ
(
(1− δL)pid + δLpir
)
(3.18)
Let D1 and D2 be the right-hand side of (3.17) and (3.18), respectively. Then, I can obtain
the following result.
Claim 16. There is no picH that satisfies both (3.17) and (3.18).
Proof. Define f(γ) ≡ D2 −D1, then
f(γ) = (2− γ)pic + (1− γ)
2
γ
pin − 1
γ
(
(1− δL)pid + δLpir
)
=
1
γ
(
γ(2− γ)pic + (1− γ)2pin −
(
(1− δL)pid + δLpir
))
=
1
γ
(
pic −
(
(1− δL)pid + δLpir
)
− (pic − pin)(1− γ)2
)
Since pic < (1− δL)pid + δLpir and γ ∈ (0, 1), f(γ) < 0 holds for all γ ∈ (0, 1).
This result shows that at least one type of firm has an incentive to lie about its type for
any feasible uneven profit split (picH , pi
c
L). Hence, truth-telling equilibrium for both types does
not exist under money transfer.
3.5.4 Bayesian Model with Output Quota
Similar to money transfer, I will check whether there exists a truth-telling equilibrium in
the cheap talk game which has the following features :
1. if (HH) is the outcome of cheap talk, cartel is agreed on with the same cartel payoff pic,
2. if (HL) is the outcome, cartel is agreed on with output quota (qcH , q
c
L) where q
c
L > q
c
H ,
pi(qcH , q
c
L) + pi(q
c
L, q
c
H) = 2pi
c and each type’s incentive constraint holds (pi(qcH , q
c
L) >
(1− δH)pi(qd(qcL), qcL) + δHpir and pi(qcL, qcH) > (1− δL)pi(qd(qcH), qcH) + δLpir),
3. finally, if (LL) is the outcome, cartel is not agreed on.
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As in money transfer, firms’ cartel agreement decision follows the outcome of cheap talk game.
Then, the continuation strategy is given as follows.
s¯i(δi | HH) =
 (Join, q
c) if δi = δ
H
(Join, qd) if δi = δ
L
s¯i(δi | HL) =

(Join, qcH) if δi = δ
c
i = δ
H
(Join, qcL) if δ
c
i = δ
L
(Join, qd(qcL)) if δi = δ
L and δci = δ
H
(3.19)
s¯i(δi | LL) = (Not Join, qn)
The continuation strategy (3.19) is different from (3.16) in money transfer when (HL) is the
outcome of cheap-talk; a high type firm chooses qcH if it revealed its type truthfully and q
c
L if
it lied, whereas a low type firm chooses qcL if it revealed truthfully and q
d(qcL) if it lied in the
cheap talk. Note that the deviation output qd(qcL) depends on the other firm’s output quota.
First, the expected payoff of a high type firm yields
EΠHH = γpi
c + (1− γ)pi(qcH , qcL)
Note that the high type firm earns pi(qcH , q
c
L) from the continuation strategy (3.19) when
δi = δ
c
i = δ
H and δ−i = δc−i = δ
L. If the high-type firm lies about its discount rate, its
expected payoff would be
EΠHL = γpi(q
c
L, q
c
H) + (1− γ)pin
Similarly, the high type firm earns pi(qcL, q
c
H) when δ
c
i = δ
L and δ−i = δc−i = δ
H . Hence,
truth-telling would be better for the high-type firm if and only if
pi(qcH , q
c
L) ≥ γpic + (1− γ)pin (3.20)
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Next consider a firm with δL. Given the truth-telling strategy of the other firm and
continuation strategy (3.19), the expected payoff from truth-telling becomes
EΠLL = γpi(q
c
L, q
c
H) + (1− γ)pin
When this firm lies, its expected payoff would be
EΠLH = γ
(
(1− δL)pid + δLpir
)
+ (1− γ)
(
(1− δL)pi(qd(qcL), qcL) + δLpir
)
EΠLH in output quota is less than that in money transfer; deviation payoff gets smaller
because of higher output of the other firm (qcL > q
c) when (HL) is the outcome of the cheap
talk. Hence, truth-telling would be profitable for the low-type firm if and only if
pi(qcH , q
c
L) ≤ 2pic +
1− γ
γ
pin − 1
γ
(
(1− δL)
(
γpid + (1− γ)pi(qd(qcL), qcL)
)
+ δLpir
)
(3.21)
LetD3 andD4 be the right-hand side of (3.20) and (3.21), respectively. If I define f(δ
L, qcL, γ) ≡
D4 −D3, then
f(δL, qcL, γ) = (2− γ)pic +
(1− γ)2
γ
pin − 1
γ
(
(1− δL)
[
γpid + (1− γ)pi(qd(qcL), qcL)
]
+ δLpir
)
=
1
γ
(
γ(2− γ)pic + (1− γ)2pin −
[
(1− δL)
(
γpid + (1− γ)pi(qd(qcL), qcL)
)
+ δLpir
])
=
1
γ
(
pic −
[
(1− δL)
(
γpid + (1− γ)pi(qd(qcL), qcL)
)
+ δLpir
]
− (pic − pin)(1− γ)2
)
Since pi(qd(qcL), q
c
L) < pi
d due to qcL > q
c, pic > (1 − δL) (γpid + (1− γ)pi(qd(qcL), qcL)) + δLpir
may hold if qcL is sufficiently large and δ
L is close enough to δ∗. Then, it can be the case that
f(δL, qcL, γ) > 0 for some (δ
L, qcL, γ), or equivalently there may exist pi(q
c
H , q
c
L) satisfying both
(3.20) and (3.21) for the (δL, qcL, γ). In that case, truth-telling equilibrium may exist if incentive
constraint is satisfied for the high type as well (pi(qcH , q
c
L) ≥ (1− δH)pi(qd(qcL), qcL) + δHpir).
It is crucial for the potential existence of truth-telling equilibrium that the deviation payoff
gets smaller in the output quota, which reduces low-type firm’s incentive to deviate. [Example
3.3] illustrates the potential existence of truth-telling equilibrium.
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Figure 3.1: Example of Truth-telling Equilibrium
Example 3.3 (Continued) In this example, f(δL, qcL, γ) is given by
f(δL, qcL, γ) =
1
γ
(
1
8
−
[
(1− δL)
(
γ
9
64
+ (1− γ)(1− q
c
L)
2
4
)
+
δL
9
]
− 1
72
(1− γ)2
)
Here, I only need to consider qcL ∈ (14 , 518) because both qcL > qc and pi(qcH , qcL) > pin should hold .
Figure 3.1 plots the space of (δL, qcL, γ) such that f(δ
L, qcL, γ) > 0. So truth-telling equilibrium
exists for any (δL, qcL, γ) in the blue shape, if δ
H satisfies pi(qcH , q
c
L) ≥ (1− δH)pi(qd(qcL), qcL) +
δHpir ⇔ 1−2qcL4 ≥
(1−δH)(1−qcL)2
4 +
δH
9 . If δ
H is close enough to 1, this condition can be satisfied.
This picture shows that truth-telling equilibrium may exist when δL is close to δ∗ = 917 , q
c
L is
larger than qc = 14 and γ is close to 1.
3.6 Conclusion
In this research, I studied cartel formation and its outcome path when there is uncertainty
on other firms’ discount rates. I could get a few results originated from this asymmetric
information, which are in contrast with perfect information model.
First, cartel agreement becomes more difficult under the uncertainty on other firms discount
93
rates, but it is possible even when each firm’s incentive constraint for cartel sustainability is
not satisfied. This result happens when each firm believes with sufficiently high probability
that its cartel partner has a high discount rate.
Second, cartel agreement in this environment contains the possibility that firms fall into
price war from the beginning. It may arise because low type firm can have an incentive to
agree on collusion and deviate at equilibrium. It is a unique feature of cartel agreement in this
Bayesian setting that punishment phase may be an equilibrium outcome path.
Third, if firms are allowed to agree on restricted payoff cartel, there may exist a continuum
of collusion equilibria where firms choose the payoff below the perfect cartel payoff at the first
period after they agree on collusion. It may happen because concern on the deviation of its
partner prevents duopolists from agreeing on full cartel output from the beginning. But the
output of the first period plays the role of signaling on each firm’s type, so cartel can achieve
perfect cartel output from period 2 and on if both firms abide by the agreed output in the first
period. Another interesting feature of this extension is the potential presence of low payoff
cartel. Although it requires a behavioral assumption that firms punish more severely than
Nash reversion, this low payoff cartel may exist in various settings.
Fourth, if I allow uneven split of monopoly profit between duopolists, I can find quite dif-
ferent characteristics between the perfect information setting and the Bayesian setting. The
uneven division of monopoly profit enlarges the scope of cartel agreement with the perfect
information whereas it is not the case with the Bayesian environment. The pregame commu-
nication under the Bayesian model quite often disturb cartel agreement rather than help it
because it fails to induce true information on the other firm’s discount factor.
Finally, this model is applicable to comparative statics. The equilibrium outcome before
entry, exit or merger serves as a signaling on the incumbents’ discount rates. So, the event
either turns the game into perfect information game or into different Bayesian game.
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CHAPTER 4
Antitrust Policy Issues for Effective Cartel Deterrence
4.1 Introduction
It is an important issue in antitrust policy to deter collusion effectively. Towards this end,
legislators have introduced some renovative law enforcement schemes, and antitrust authorities
put its highest priority on blocking cartels in many countries. Motivated by these efforts, this
paper examines two policies for effective cartel deterrence: corporate leniency program and
crackdown policy.
Leniency program is “the policy that reduces sanctions against colluding firms who report
information on their cartel to antitrust authority and cooperate with it along the prosecution
phase.” [Spagnolo (2008)] In the U.S., leniency program was introduced in 1978 and revised
in 1993. The 1993 version’s success in the detection of cartels led many other countries to
install similar programs. This paper focuses on three distinctive features that are commonly
observed in the countries having leniency program: discovered cartels increase steeply at least
in the early periods after the introduction of leniency program; most of leniency cases are
cartels that are just or already collapsed, so called “dying cartels” [Harrington and Chang
(2009a,b)]1; finally there is a simultaneous “rush to report” among cartel members. As is
shown in Figure 4.1 quoted from Bloom (2006), this aspect is conspicuous in the E.U. where
the second or subsequent applicants can get reduction in fine. This research examines what
1According to Harrington and Chang (2009b), O.Guersent, a European Commission official, mentioned at
the 11th Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop that many leniency applicants are from dying
cartels.
brings these facts on leniency program and whether they have any relation with leniency
program’s deterrent effect.
To this end, I assume firms consider that cartel may collapse due to an unexpected shock
or detection by antitrust authority when they agree on a cartel. Empirical researches report
about 5 to 9 years as the estimates of average cartel duration depending on their data set.
[Posner (1970), Eckbo (1976), Griffin (1989), Zimmerman and Connor (2005), Suslow (2005),
Levenstein and Suslow (2010), etc.] There can be many reasons why cartel collapses. Rotem-
berg and Saloner (1986) suggested a model where cartels are fragile during booms. Empirical
researches add various sources of cartel instability: antitrust policy, change in firms’ patience,
demand shock, entry, buyer/seller concentration and etc. [Zimmerman and Connor (2005),
Levenstein and Suslow (2006, 2010), Oindrila (2009), etc.]
From this perspective, firms take the presence of law enforcement and leniency program
into account when they form a cartel. So each firm considers not only the expected duration of
cartel but also the expected penalty due to the conviction by antitrust authority when it makes
cartel decision, and hence cartel is formed only when this adjusted discounted payoff is greater
than its unilateral deviation payoff. Using the stationary Markov perfect equilibrium concept
based on the recursive game structure, I show that every cartel member applies leniency
when cartel is just collapsed and no firm applies when cartel is active. A surge of leniency
applications from dying cartels comes from this characterization of equilibrium on leniency
decision. Because this application pattern arises in a wide range of leniency program, the fact
that antitrust authority discovers more cartels with leniency program does not guarantee that
there are fewer cartels under law enforcement with leniency program.
Optimal leniency program, which maximizes deterrent effect to cartel, is one that gives full
exemption to deviator irrespective of its leniency application and no reduction to simultaneous
leniency applicants; full benefit to deviator maximizes the incentive to deviate from cartel
agreement while no benefit to simultaneous leniency applicants maintains the expected fine
under the law enforcement with leniency program at the highest level. For the same reason,
optimal leniency program does not necessarily give full exemption to the first applicant in my
model. Optimal leniency program increases the effectiveness of law enforcement if fines are
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Figure 4.1: EC Leniency Notice Cases
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sufficiently high or firms retaliate severely enough against deviation. The feature of optimal
leniency program implies that leniency program should restrict benefits to the first reporting
firm in order to minimize its negative effect on the expected fine.
Crackdown policy, on the other hand, means that antitrust authority spends all its resources
on the target industry at a given period, then moves its focus to another in the next period and
so on. Less extreme form is selective law enforcement where antitrust authority spends more
on the target industry’s cartel conviction at a given period. Assuming antitrust authority’s
resource is fixed, I examine whether crackdown policy or selective law enforcement is more
effective to deter cartel than non-selective one.
Using two-industry model under the standard repeated game setting, I find that there
exists selective law enforcement more effective than non-selective law enforcement given any
increasing conviction technology function, which relates antitrust authority’s resources to con-
viction probability. The efficacy of crackdown policy depends on the curvature of conviction
technology function. Crackdown policy is more likely to be effective than non-selective law
enforcement as this function is less concave. For example, crackdown policy is optimal if
conviction probability is linearly related to the amount of budget.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 develops a cartel duration model
and then analyze the effect of law enforcement. Section 4.3 introduces leniency program
into the model and characterizes firms’ leniency decision in every possible state. Section 4.4
characterizes optimal leniency program and discusses some policy issues on leniency program
and the relation of this paper with literatures. Section 4.5 discusses the effect of selective law
enforcement or crackdown policy on cartel deterrence. Conclusion follows in Section 4.6.
4.2 Cartel Duration Model
This section develops a model where cartels may collapse due to the presence of a stochastic
shock after they are formed. Then, the model is extended into an environment with law
enforcement.
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4.2.1 A Representative Industry of Economy
A representative industry of the economy consists of n ≥ 2 risk-neutral symmetric firms
interacting repeatedly in the infinite, discrete time t = 1, 2, · · · , and discounting future profit
with the common discount rate δ ∈ (0, 1).
I assume that a stage game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, and each firm gets
payoff pin at Nash equilibrium. Let pic denote cartel payoff of each firm and pid the static payoff
from unilaterally deviating and choosing the static best response. Finally, pir (pip) will denote
the payoff that a defector (non-defector) would get in the subsequent periods after defection
until shock occurs. I assume that pid > pic > max(pin, pir, pip) > 0 holds.
There is a shock with probability p ∈ (0, 1) in this industry at the beginning of each
period. The occurrence of shock is independent across periods. Shock causes cartel to break
down immediately and the industry to move to Nash equilibrium with expected stage payoff
pins.
4.2.2 Information
Collusion agreements need to be administered and monitored, and induce members to
communicate regularly, to exchange documents, and to produce other kind of hard evidence
on the cartel that exposes them to the risk of conviction. So I assume that a piece of “hard”
evidence is generated each period while a cartel is formulated and it is active. I also assume
that each cartel member possesses a copy of hard evidence produced by the cartel and can
costlessly transmit it to a third party if it wishes. For simplicity, I also assume that there is
no decay of this hard evidence, so it lasts forever.
4.2.3 Structure of Game
I now consider the simplest environment where there is no antitrust law enforcement. In
this environment, firms make cartel decision at the beginning of period 1 when there is no
shock without loss. Each firm chooses its output in every period t ≥ 1.
3 factors affect a firm’s payoff at period t in this game: (1) cartel decision at period 1,
(2) the presence of deviation action at period t or before and (3) the presence of shock until
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period t. For example, each firm earns pic at period 1 if the industry decides to collude and
no firms deviate, while it gets pin at period 1 if the industry decides not to collude. If a firm
deviates unilaterally from cartel agreement at period t ≥ 1 when there is no shock, it would
get pid at period t and pir from period (t+1) to one period before shock occurs. When a shock
occurs at period t ≥ 2, each firm gets pins at period t and on regardless of cartel decision at
period 1 and the presence of deviation until period (t-1).
4.2.4 Baseline Model
I will denote each firm’s expected discounted payoff from collusion by EΠC . Then EΠC
is given by
EΠC(p) = pic + δ((1− p)pic + ppins) + δ2((1− p)2pic + (p+ p(1− p))pins) + · · ·
=
pic
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) (4.1)
On the other hand, if one firm deviates unilaterally, its expected discounted payoff, denoted
by EΠD, will be
EΠD(p) = pid + δ((1− p)pir + ppins) + δ2((1− p)2pir + (p+ p(1− p))pins) + · · ·
= pid +
δ(1− p)pir
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) (4.2)
Note that the punishment payoff pir is obtained until one period before shock occurs. Firm
i′s expected discounted cartel payoff and deviation payoff can be seen as a function of shock
occurrence probability p in equation (4.1) and (4.2). Having these equations, cartel can be
supported as subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if EΠC(p) > EΠD(p), which is equivalent
to
pic
1− δ(1− p) > pi
d +
δ(1− p)pir
1− δ(1− p) (4.3)
In order to make the problem more interesting, I assume the following:
Assumption 2. pi
c
1−δ > pi
d + δ1−δpi
r
Assumption 2 means that the industry forms cartel if shock never occurs (p = 0). Note
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that the industry does not collude if shock occurs for sure at period 2 (p = 1) because pid > pic.
Then I can derive the threshold shock occurrence probability, p∗, such that cartel is supported
as subgame perfect equilibrium for all p < p∗.
Claim 17. p∗ = 1− pid−pic
δ(pid−pir) ∈ (0, 1) and EΠC > EΠD for all p ∈ [0, p∗).
Proof. Define f(p) ≡ EΠC(p)− EΠD(p). Then I get
f(p) = pic − pid + δ(1− p)(pi
c − pir)
1− δ(1− p)
If I let f(p) = 0, I can obtain a unique p∗ = 1 − pid−pic
δ(pid−pir) =
pic−(1−δ)pid−δpir
δ(pid−pir) . Assumption 2
implies pic − (1− δ)pid − δpir > 0, so p∗ > 0. Since pid−pic
δ(pid−pir) > 0, p
∗ < 1. Moreover,
df
dp
=
δ(pir − pic)
(1− δ(1− p))2 < 0 (4.4)
for all p ∈ [0, 1] from pir < pic. So f(p) > 0 for all p ∈ [0, p∗).
This result shows that cartel is supported as subgame perfect equilibrium only when the
expected cartel duration is longer than the threshold duration D∗ = 1p∗ =
δ(pid−pir)
pic−(1−δ)pid−δpir . It is
easy to see that D∗ is negatively related to pic or δ, and positively related to pid or pir. Hence,
an industry’s cartelization depends on each firm’s cartel or deviation payoff
(
pic, pid
)
, strategy
against deviation (pir), the industry’s patience (δ), and the shock occurrence possibility (p):
higher pic or δ increases the likelihood of cartelization, but higher pid, pir, or p decreases it.
4.2.5 Introduction of Law Enforcement
I now introduce law enforcement into the baseline model. The analysis of this step serves
as a benchmark that I evaluate the effect of leniency program on cartel deterrence after I
construct the full model in the next section. Following literatures on antitrust policy [Motta
and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2004), Harrington (2008), etc.], I assume that antitrust authority
sets and commits policy parameters and then firms interact in the oligopolistic supergame.
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Model Modification
The baseline model is modified in order to examine how law enforcement affects the firms’
incentive to collude.
 Law enforcement : Antitrust authority can set and execute a policy vector (F,R, α):
1. A monetary fine F > 0 that a colluding firm has to pay when the cartel is convicted,
2. A reduced fine R ∈ [0, F ] that a cartel member can pay if it deviates,
3. Conviction probability α ∈ (0, 1) with which cartel is discovered and convicted in each
period t ≥ 1 provided that it was not until period (t− 1).
So the probability that cartel is convicted at period t is given by (1 − α)t−1α. I assume that
antitrust authority detects and convicts cartel at the end of each period, fines are charged at
period (t+1), and the industry turns into Nash equilibrium from period (t+1) and on if cartel
is convicted. In addition, cartel can be detected and convicted after it collapses. Since there
does not exist leniency program yet, a monetary fine of each cartel member does not depend
on whether it reveals the hard evidence to antitrust authority or not.
 Timing of the game : With law enforcement, the sequence of the game is as follows.
1. Antitrust authority commit the policy vector (F,R, α) at period 0.
2. The industry decides whether it colludes or not at the beginning of period 1.
3. Each firm chooses its output in every period t ≥ 1.
Figure 4.2 shows the game tree of this game until period 2.
 Factors affecting each period’s payoff : 3 factors in the baseline model affect a firm’s
payoff in each period of this game as well. Now, the presence of law enforcement also affects
a firm’s payoff at period t based on cartel conviction at period (t-1) or before. For example,
suppose that a firm deviates unilaterally from cartel agreement and cartel is detected and
convicted at period t ≥ 1. Suppose also that shock happens at (t + 1). Then, the deviator
earns pid at period t, (pins −R) at period (t+1) and pins at period (t+2) and on.
102
Figure 4.2: Game Tree without Leniency Program
The Effect of Law Enforcement
I need to examine the incentive compatibility constraint of each firm for cartel formation
under the law enforcement (F,R, α) in order to see the effect of law enforcement. EΠCL denotes
each firm’s expected discounted cartel payoff under the law enforcement. Then EΠCL is equal
to the following infinite sum.
EΠCL = pic + δ[(1− α)(1− p)pic + α(1− p)(pin − F ) + (1− α)ppins + αp(pins − F )]
+δ2[(1− α)2(1− p)2pic + α(1− α)(1− p)2(pin − F )
+ (1− α)2p(1− p)pins + α(1− α)p(1− p)(pins − F ) + α(1− p)2pin
+ α(1− p)ppins + α(1− α)p(pins − F ) + (1− α)2ppins + αppins] + · · ·
At period 1, payoff from cartel is equal to pic. But the payoff at period 2 depends on both
whether the cartel is convicted at period 1 and whether shock takes place at period 2. With
probability (1− α)(1− p), there is no conviction at period 1 nor shock at period 2. pic would
103
be the payoff at period 2 in this case. α(1 − p) is the probability that cartel is convicted at
period 1 but there is no shock at period 2. (pin − F ) would be the payoff at period 2 in this
case. With probability (1 − α)p, cartel is not convicted at period 1 but a shock occurs at
period 2. Each firm would earn pins at period 2 in this case. Finally, αp is the probability that
cartel is convicted at period 1 and shock occurs at period 2. (pins −F ) would be the payoff at
period 2 in this case. So the expected sum of these four terms amounts to the expected payoff
at period 2, and I can proceed in this way in order to get the payoff in the following periods.
With some algebra and notation EΠC(p) in equation (4.1), EΠCL is simplified into2
EΠCL = EΠC(α+ p− αp)− αδF
1− δ(1− α) +
δα(1− p)(pin − pins)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) (4.5)
Equation (4.5) shows that the expected discounted payoff of cartel consists of three parts under
the law enforcement (F,R, α). The first term, EΠC(α + p − αp), is the expected discounted
payoff of cartel with expected duration 1α+p−αp , which is shortened due to law enforcement.
This effect decreases the expected discounted payoff of cartel compared with the baseline model.
The second term is the expected discounted fine from detection and conviction, which clearly
decreases the cartel payoff. The last term reflects that Nash equilibrium payoff changes pre-
and post-shock. If a cartel is convicted, each firm obtains pin from one period after conviction
to one period before shock occurs. This effect is not decisive because it depends on which is
greater between pin and pins. In aggregate, EΠCL is smaller than EΠC(p) in equation (4.1).
On the other hand, since a unilateral defector pays reduced fine R when cartel is convicted
by antitrust authority, the expected discounted payoff from deviation comes to the following
infinite sum.
EΠDL = pid + δ[(1− α)(1− p)pir + α(1− p)(pin −R) + (1− α)ppins + αp(pins −R)]
+ δ2[(1− α)2(1− p)2pir + α(1− α)(1− p)2(pin −R)
+ (1− α)2p(1− p)pins + α(1− α)p(1− p)(pins −R) + α(1− p)2pin
+ α(1− p)ppins + α(1− α)p(pins −R) + (1− α)2ppins + αppins] + · · ·
2See the appendix for the derivation of equation (4.5), (4.8), (4.10), (4.11), (4.12), (4.16) and (4.24).
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Note that pir is obtained until the period when cartel is convicted or one period before a shock
occurs. With notation EΠD(p) in equation (4.2), EΠDL becomes
EΠDL = EΠD(α+ p− αp)− αδR
1− δ(1− α) +
δα(1− p)(pin − pins)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) (4.6)
Hence, under the law enforcement (F,R, α), cartel is supported as subgame perfect equilibrium
if and only if EΠCL > EΠDL, or equivalently
EΠC(α+ p− αp) > EΠD(α+ p− αp) + αδ(F −R)
1− δ(1− α) (4.7)
Similar to the baseline model, I can derive the threshold shock occurrence probability under law
enforcement, pL, such that cartel is supported as subgame perfect equilibrium for all p < pL.
Claim 18. (a) pL < p∗ holds for any law enforcement (F,R, α).
(b) The optimal reduced fine is given by R∗ = 0.
Proof. [Part (a)] If I define fL(p) = EΠ
C(α+ p−αp)−EΠD(α+ p−αp)− αδ(F−R)1−δ(1−α) and let
fL(p) = 0, I can obtain
pL = 1− 1
1− α ∗
pid + αδ(F−R)1−δ(1−α) − pic
δ(pid + αδ(F−R)1−δ(1−α) − pir)
Since α ∈ (0, 1) and αδ(F−R)1−δ(1−α) ≥ 0, pL < p∗ = 1− pi
d−pic
δ(pid−pir) holds for any (F,R, α) .
[Part (b)] R∗ has to make it most difficult that condition (4.7) is satisfied. Hence, R∗ = 0 is
immediate.
Claim 18 implies that any industry with p ∈ [pL, p∗) cannot be cartelized any longer after
the introduction of law enforcement (F,R, α). The deterrence of law enforcement (F,R, α)
comes from two different effects. The first is a duration effect, which occurs because law
enforcement makes the expected duration of cartel shorter from 1p to
1
α+p−αp . This shortened
duration reduces the incentive for firms to collude. The other is fine difference effect, which
happens because a unilateral defector pays less fine than non-defector. This effect is maximized
when the defector pays nothing.
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4.3 Leniency Decision under Law Enforcement
4.3.1 Model Modification
Now I am ready to analyze a firm’s leniency decision and the effectiveness of leniency
program on cartel deterrence. To this end, I need to introduce leniency program into the
model.
 Leniency Program : Leniency program in this paper is defined as (RL1 , RL2 ) under the law
enforcement (F,R, α):
1. A reduced fine RL1 ∈ [0, F ) that a leniency applicant has to pay if it is a unique applicant
when it transmits the hard evidence of cartel to antitrust authority,
2. A reduced fine RL2 ∈ [R1, F ] that a leniency applicant has to pay if it is not a unique
applicant when it transmits the hard evidence of cartel to antitrust authority3.
Leniency program is defined as a reduced fine RLj , where j ∈ {1, 2}, so the amount of
reduction is (F − RLj ). RLj may be negative conceptually, but I restrict RLj as non-negative
because antitrust law in most countries set this value in this range and in any country’s legal
system it is not easy to reward a cartel member just because it noticed its illegal action. If a
cartel member is a unilateral deviator and applies leniency, then it only need to pay min(RLj , R)
as fine. A firm, who does not apply leniency when there is a leniency application by another
cartel member, will be fined by F for non-deviator or R for deviator. If one or more cartel
members report the hard evidence to antitrust authority in a period, the other cartel members
are convicted in the period for sure. Firms have to pay fines at the same period when leniency
application is made. The industry turns to Nash equilibrium from the period and on when
leniency notice is made.
3This paper proves the existence of simultaneous leniency application equilibrium in some states. In reality,
however, even when the equilibrium is a simultaneous application of all cartel members, there can be a slight
time gap among leniency applicants; one of them can be the first applicant, another firm can be the second,
and so on. So RL2 can be interpreted as the expected reduced fine when there are multiple leniency applicants.
For example, suppose that antitrust law gives 100% reduction for the first applicant, 50% for the second, and
30% for the third. Also suppose that 3 cartel members apply leniency simultaneously in equilibrium. Then,
RL2 =
1
3
(0.0 + 0.5 + 0.7)F = 0.4F .
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 Timing of the game : Introduction of leniency program changes timing of the game as
follows.
1. Antitrust authority commit the policy vector
(
F,R,RL1 , R
L
2 , α
)
at period 0.
2. The industry decides whether it colludes or not at the beginning of period 1 and each
firm chooses its output at period 1.
3. If leniency is applicable, firms make leniency application decision at the beginning of
each period t ≥ 2 when they learn the existence of shock.
4. Each firm chooses its output at every period t ≥ 2.
There are three conditions that Step 3 can be played at period t in this game: first, cartel
should be formed in Step 2; second, cartel was not convicted until period (t−1); third, leniency
was not applied by any firm until period (t − 1). If leniency was applied by at least one firm
before period t, there is no chance to apply leniency at period t because cartel was already
convicted due to leniency notice. If one of these conditions fails at period t ≥ 1, Step 3 is not
played from period t and on.
 Factors affecting each period’s payoff : In addition to the factors under law enforce-
ment, a firm’s or competitors’ leniency decision at period t or before affects its payoff at period
t. For example, suppose that a firm deviates unilaterally from cartel agreement and cartel is
not detected and convicted at period t. Suppose also that there is no shock until period t, but
shock takes place at (t+1) and the firm applies leniency unilaterally at (t+1). Then, it would
get pid at period t, (pins −min(RL1 , R)) at period (t+1) and pins at period (t+2) and on. But
its competitors would get pi(qc, qd) at period t, (pins − F ) at period (t+1) and pins at period
(t+2) and on.
Figure 4.3 shows the game tree of this game until the leniency decision stage in period 2. I
will proceed backwards in order to characterize the equilibrium of this game. So leniency deci-
sion game is analyzed first and then cartel agreement decision and optimal policy parameters
are characterized.
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Figure 4.3: Game Tree with Leniency Program
4.3.2 Leniency Decision
In this subsection, I will characterize leniency application decision under law enforcement
with leniency program,
(
F,R,RL1 , R
L
2 , α
)
. Given three common conditions that leniency deci-
sion can be made, there are 4 different states in which firms make leniency decision at period
t as shown in Figure 4.3:
1. (State 1) a shock at period t or before, but no deviation until (t− 1),
2. (State 2) a shock at period t or before, and a deviation by a firm at (t− 1) or before,
3. (State 3) no shock until period t, but a deviation by a firm at (t− 1) or before,
4. (State 4) no shock until period t, nor deviation until (t− 1).
I assume that each firm plays stationary Markov strategy in the sense that its strategy only
depends on the payoff-relevant state whenever it moves. Then, leniency application decision
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game in each state can be represented by the following strategic game form.
Gs(M) = (N,Σ, EΠ
s) , where
s ∈ {State 1, State 2, State 3, State 4}
N = {1, 2, · · · , n} is a set of firms
Σ = Πni=1∆Si is action space, where
∆Si = [0, 1] is firm i’s strategy space,
βi = Pr(not report) ∈ ∆Si is a strategy chosen by firm i
β = (β1, β2, · · · , βn) ∈ Σ is a strategy profile
EΠs = {EΠs1, EΠs2, · · · , EΠsn} is an expected payoff vector, where
EΠsi : Σ 7→ R is firm i’s payoff function
Here the expected payoff vector EΠs varies according to the states. Before I characterize
leniency decision, I introduce one assumption:
Assumption 3. RL1 <
αδF
1−δ(1−α)
Assumption 3 requires that the reduced fine from unilateral leniency application is lower
than the expected discounted fine when no firms ever apply for leniency. If this condition fails,
the minimum fine of a leniency applicant is greater than the expected discounted fine of each
firm without leniency program. Given δ, this assumption holds more easily when RL1 is lower,
and α or F is higher. For example, if RL1 is equal to 0, this condition trivially holds.
Leniency Decision in (State 1 : Shock +No Deviation) The characterization of leniency
decision in (State 1) is provided in the following result.
Claim 19. The dominant strategy equilibrium in G1(M) =
(
N,Σ, EΠ1
)
is that all firms apply
leniency (i.e. β1∗ = 0).
Proof. Consider each firm i’s expected discounted continuation payoff in (State 1) denoted by
EΠ1i . The set of each firm’s pure strategies is given by Si = {s1i , s2i }, where s1i is to report and
s2i is not to report. Since there happened a shock and firm i is not a defector, EΠ
1
i (si, s−i) can
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be derived as follows.
EΠ1i (s
1
i , s−i) =
 pi
ns
1−δ −RL1 if s−i = Πj 6=is2j
pins
1−δ −RL2 if s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j
EΠ1i (s
2
i , s−i) =
 pi
ns
1−δ − αδF1−δ(1−α) if s−i = Πj 6=is2j
pins
1−δ − F if s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j
Here, s−i = Πj 6=is2j represents that none of other firms choose to report while s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j
means that there is at least one firm who reports. Hence, firm i′s best response is to report
regardless of other firms’ strategy because
pins
1− δ −R
L
1 >
pins
1− δ −
αδF
1− δ(1− α) if s−i = Πj 6=is
2
j
pins
1− δ −R
L
2 ≥
pins
1− δ − F if s−i 6= Πj 6=is
2
j
The first inequality comes from Assumption 3.
This result holds because leniency application reduces the expected fine irrespective of
other firms’ strategy profile. So all cartel members apply leniency in (State 1).
Leniency Decision in (State 2 : Shock+Deviation) The characterization of firms’ leniency
decision in (State 2) is quite similar to that in (State 1).
Claim 20. The equilibrium after iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies in G2(M) =(
N,Σ, EΠ2
)
is that all firms (or all non-defectors) make leniency application. (i.e. β2∗ = 0)
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that firms’ leniency decision is not affected by the presence of deviation when there
is a shock. Claim 19 and 20 guarantee that leniency application is made whenever there is
shock.
Leniency Decision in (State 3 : No Shock+Deviation) Since there happened a deviation
at period s < t and shock has not occurred until period t in (State 3), the industry would be
in the punishment phase at period t. Like leniency decision in (State 1) and (State 2), I need
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to derive the expected continuation payoff of each firm from all possible combinations of pure
strategies in order to characterize leniency decision.
It is not difficult to get the payoff when there is a leniency application. Since leniency
application turns the industry into Nash equilibrium and shock did not occur in this state, le-
niency applicant’s expected discounted continuation payoff when it is a defector (non-defector)
comes to
EΠ
Lj
i=d = pi
n −min(R,RLj ) + δ((1− p)pin + ppins) + δ2((1− p)2pin + (1− (1− p)2)pins) + · · ·
=
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −min(R,R
L
j )
EΠ
Lj
i=n = pi
n −RLj + δ((1− p)pin + ppins) + δ2((1− p)2pin + (1− (1− p)2)pins) + · · ·
=
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −R
L
j
Here, subscript d (n) represents a deviator (non-defector), RLj = R
L
1 if s−i = Πj 6=is2j , and
RLj = R
L
2 if s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j . Similarly, when a firm does not apply leniency while at least one
other firm self-reports, its expected discounted continuation payoff yields the following.
EΠL
−i
i=d =
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −R
EΠL
−i
i=n =
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) − F
In contrast, it is not trivial to get the expected discounted continuation payoff when no
firms apply leniency. Let me denote the expected discounted continuation payoff of a defector
by EΠNLi=d. Then, EΠ
NL
i=d can be obtained from the following sum.
EΠNLi=d = pi
r + δ[(1− α)(1− p)pir + α(1− p)(pin −R)
+ (1− α)p(pins −min{R,RL2 }) + αp(pins −R)]
+ δ2[(1− α)2(1− p)2pir + α(1− α)(1− p)2(pin −R)
+ (1− α)2p(1− p)(pins −min{R,RL2 }) + α(1− α)p(1− p)(pins −R)
+ α(1− p)2pin + α(1− p)ppins + (1− α)ppins + αppins] + · · ·
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A deviator earns pir at period t because the industry is in the punishment phase. The payoff at
period (t+ 1) depends on cartel conviction at period t and shock occurrence at period (t+ 1).
With probability (1−α)(1− p), there is no conviction at period t nor shock at period (t+ 1).
pir would be the payoff at period (t + 1) in this case. With probability α(1 − p), cartel is
convicted at period t but there is no shock at period (t + 1). Then, (pin − R) would be the
payoff at period (t + 1). With probability (1 − α)p, cartel is not convicted at period t but
there happens a shock at period (t + 1). Since the industry is in (State 2) at period (t + 1)
in this case, all firms including the deviator would apply for leniency from Claim 20. Hence,
(pins −min{R,RL2 }) would be the payoff at period (t+ 1). Finally, αp is the probability that
cartel is convicted at period t and there happens a shock at period (t+ 1), so (pins−R) would
be the payoff at period (t + 1) in this case. As a result, the expected sum of payoffs in these
four cases amounts to the expected payoff at period (t + 1). I can proceed in this way in
order to get the expected payoff in the following periods. Note that Claim 20 is used at all
the subsequent histories which end up with (State 2) when EΠNLi=d is calculated. With some
algebra, EΠNLi=d is simplified into
EΠNLi=d =
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) (4.8)
−pi
n − pir + δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }]
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
Similarly, the expected discounted continuation payoff of non-defector when no firms apply
leniency in (State 3), denoted by EΠNLi=n, comes to the following infinite sum.
EΠNLi=n = pi
p + δ[(1− α)(1− p)pip + α(1− p)(pin − F )
+ (1− α)p(pins −RL2 ) + αp(pins − F )]
+ δ2[(1− α)2(1− p)2pip + α(1− α)(1− p)2(pin − F )
+ (1− α)2p(1− p)(pins −RL2 ) + α(1− α)p(1− p)(pins − F )
+ α(1− p)2pin + α(1− p)ppins + (1− α)ppins + αppins] + · · ·
Again, we use Claim 20 at all the subsequent histories which end up with (State 2). Then,
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EΠNLi=n is given by
EΠNLi=n =
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −
pin − pip + δ(αF + (1− α)pRL2 )
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)) (4.9)
Given EΠ
Lj
i=d, EΠ
Lj
i=n, EΠ
L−i
i=d , EΠ
L−i
i=n, EΠ
NL
i=d and EΠ
NL
i=n, the characterization of leniency
decision in (State 3) is similar to (State 1) or (State 2).
Claim 21. (a) If RL1 <
pin−pip+δ(αF+(1−α)pRL2 )
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) or min(R,R
L
1 ) <
pin−pir+δ(αR+(1−α)pmin(R,RL2 ))
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp))
holds, the equilibrium after iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies in G3(M) =(
N,Σ, EΠ3
)
is that all firms make leniency application. (i.e. β3∗ = 0)
(b) If RL1 >
pin−pip+δ(αF+(1−α)pRL2 )
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) and min(R,R
L
1 ) >
pin−pir+δ(αR+(1−α)pmin(R,RL2 ))
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) hold,
the unique efficient Nash equilibrium is that no firm applies leniency. (i.e. β3∗ = 1)
Proof. See the appendix.
Note that each part of Claim 21 requires one additional condition besides Assumption 3:
Condition 1. RL1 <
pin−pip+δ(αF+(1−α)pRL2 )
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) or min(R,R
L
1 ) <
pin−pir+δ(αR+(1−α)pmin(R,RL2 )
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp))
Condition 2. RL1 >
pin−pip+δ(αF+(1−α)pRL2 )
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) and min(R,R
L
1 ) >
pin−pir+δ(αR+(1−α)pmin(R,RL2 ))
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp))
Any policy parameter vector (F,R,RL1 , R
L
2 , α) satisfies at least one condition, but which
condition would hold for a given policy depends also on firms’ strategy (pip, pir), Nash equi-
librium payoff (pin) and shock occurrence probability (p). For example, if firms use trigger
strategy (pin = pip = pir) and RL1 = 0, Condition 1 is applied. So all firms make leniency
application in (State 3) under this strategy. But if firms retaliate mildly against deviation
(pin < pip, pin < pir) and the expected discounted fine is small enough compared with reduced
fine, it might be the case that Condition 2 holds.
Leniency Decision in (State 4 : No Shock+No Deviation) Similar to other states, I need
to derive the expected discounted continuation payoff in all combinations of pure strategies in
order to characterize the leniency decision in (State 4).
As before, non-trivial case is to get the expected discounted continuation payoff of each
firm when no firms apply leniency in (State 4). After no leniency, each firm can choose either
113
collusion output or deviation output. First, look at the expected discounted continuation
payoff from collusion given all other firms also stick to collusion continuously. Then each
firm’s expected discounted continuation payoff, denoted by EΠNC , comes to the following.
EΠNC = pic + δ[(1− α)(1− p)pic + α(1− p)(pin − F ) + (1− α)p(pins −RL2 ) + αp(pins − F )]
+ δ2[(1− α)2(1− p)2pic + α(1− α)(1− p)2(pin − F )
+ (1− α)2p(1− p)(pins −RL2 ) + α(1− α)p(1− p)(pins − F )
+ α(1− p)2pin + α(1− p)ppins + (1− α)ppins + αppins] + · · ·
Each firm earns pic at period t because the industry still colludes. The payoff at period (t+ 1)
again depends on cartel conviction at period t and shock occurrence at period (t+ 1). So the
firm earns pic with probability (1− α)(1− p), (pin − F ) with probability α(1− p), (pins −RL2 )
with probability (1 − α)p, and (pins − F ) with probability αp, respectively. Here, the payoff
(pins − RL2 ) that the firm obtains when cartel is not convicted and shock takes place reflects
Claim 19 because the industry is in (State 1) at period (t + 1) and all firms apply leniency.
Then, the expected sum of payoffs in these four cases amounts to the expected payoff at period
(t + 1). I can derive the expected payoff in the following periods similarly. Claim 19 is used
at all the subsequent histories which end up with (State 1) when EΠNC is calculated. With
the notation EΠC(p) in equation (1), EΠNC is simplified into
EΠNC = EΠC(α+ p− αp)− δ(αF + (1− α)pR
L
2 )
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp))
+
δα(1− p)(pin − pins)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) (4.10)
Suppose, on the other hand, that a firm unilaterally deviate after no cartel member applies
leniency in (State 4). If Condition 1 holds, then leniency application would be made for sure
in one period after the deviation from Claim 20 and 21 (a). Given these leniency decisions in
(State 2) and (State 3), the expected discounted continuation payoff of a firm who deviates
after no firm applies leniency in (State 4), denoted by EΠND1 , comes to the following infinite
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sum.
EΠND1 = pid + δ[(1− α)(1− p)(pin −min{R,RL2 }) + α(1− p)(pin −R)
+ (1− α)p(pins −min{R,RL2 }) + αp(pins −R)]
+ δ2[(1− p)2pin + (1− (1− p)2)pins] + · · ·
After some algebra, EΠND1 is simplified into
EΠND1 = EΠD(p)− δ(αR+ (1− α) min{R,RL2 }) +
δ(1− p)(pin − pir)
1− δ(1− p) (4.11)
EΠNC and EΠND1 are the same in every period t ≥ 1 because they only depend on the states
in the subsequent periods and are constructed in a recursive way. Then, EΠNC > EΠND1
holds because it is an incentive constraint for firms to agree on collusion in period 1.
If Condition 2 holds, leniency application in the subsequent histories would be made only
at the period when there is a shock from Claim 20 and 21 (b). Given these leniency decisions
in (State 2) and (State 3), the expected discounted continuation payoff of a firm who deviates
after no leniency application in (State 4), denoted by EΠND2 , comes to
EΠND2 = pid + δ[(1− α)(1− p)pir + α(1− p)(pin −R)
+ (1− α)p(pins −min(R,RL2 )) + αp(pins −R)]
+ δ2[(1− α)2(1− p)2pir + α(1− α)(1− p)2(pin −R)
+ (1− α)2p(1− p)(pins −min(R,RL2 )) + α(1− α)p(1− p)(pins −R)
+ α(1− p)2pin + α(1− p)ppins + (1− α)ppins + αppins] + · · ·
EΠND2 is simplified into the following equation.
EΠND2 = EΠD(α+ p− αp)− δ(αR+ (1− α)pmin(R,R
L
2 ))
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp))
+
δα(1− p)(pin − pins)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) (4.12)
Similar to EΠNC and EΠND1 , EΠND2 is also the same in every period t ≥ 1 for the same
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reason. So EΠNC > EΠND2 holds from the incentive constraint of cartel agreement.
Next, consider the strategy to apply leniency in (State 4). Clearly, cartel cannot be sus-
tained from period t. So the firm’s expected discounted payoff, denoted by EΠLj for j ∈ {1, 2},
becomes the following.
EΠLj =
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −R
L
j
As before, RLj = R
L
1 if s−i = Πj 6=is2j and R
L
j = R
L
2 if s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j . Since EΠNC >
pin
1−δ(1−p) +
δppins
(1−δ)(1−δ(1−p)) is just a participation constraint for firms to agree on collusion in
period 1, EΠNC > EΠLDj must hold for all j ∈ {1, 2} because leniency decision requires cartel
agreement at period 1.
Finally, when a firm does not apply leniency while at least one other firm self-reports, its
expected discounted continuation payoff yields the following.
EΠL
−i
=
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) − F
Having these continuation payoffs (EΠNC , EΠND1 , EΠND2 , EΠLj , EΠL
−i
), leniency decision
in (State 4) can be characterized as follows.
Claim 22. (a) The set of Nash equilibria in G4(M) =
(
N,Σ, EΠ4
)
includes (1) all firms
report (β4∗ = 0), (2) no firm reports (β4∗ = 1) and (3) a symmetric mixed strategy with Pr(not
report) = β4∗ ∈ [0, 1) for all firms.
(b) The unique efficient Nash equilibrium is the one that no firm report (β4∗ = 1).
Proof. See the appendix.
Claim 22 says that although there are multiple Nash equilibria on leniency decision in
active cartel, no reporting equilibrium is most efficient in that this equilibrium gives the highest
expected discounted payoff to every cartel member.
Table 4.1 summarizes leniency decision in each state. Since Claim 19 to Claim 22 charac-
terize leniency decision in all possible states, I can pin down the equilibrium outcome path on
leniency decision.
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Table 4.1: Leniency Decision in Each State
State Leniency Decision
State 1 Shock + No Deviation All apply
State 2 Shock + Deviation All apply
State 3 (Condition 1) No Shock + Deviation All apply
State 3 (Condition 2) No Shock + Deviation None applies
State 4 No Shock + No Deviation None applies
Proposition 6. Leniency application is made only in (State 1) on the equilibrium path.
Proof. Claim 22 implies that leniency application is not made in (State 4). Since EΠNC >
EΠNDj is satisfied when Condition j holds for j ∈ {1, 2}, deviation from cartel agreement is
not on the equilibrium path. So (State 2) and (State 3) is not reached on the equilibrium
path. Hence, the only state that firms apply leniency is (State 1) on the equilibrium path.
Proposition 6 and Claim 22 imply that any firm in “active cartel” would not reveal cartel
evidence to antitrust authority because it can get the highest expected payoff by sticking to
cartel agreement. Put it differently, “active cartel” has an incentive device to block whistle-
blow by cartel members in itself. On the other hand, Proposition 6 and Claim 19 say that
leniency application is made when there happens a shock on the equilibrium path, and this
leniency notice is applied by all cartel members. In other words, “dying cartel” cannot sustain
the incentive device to block leniency any longer. These results explain two facts that I
addressed in the introduction: why most leniency applications are made by “dying cartels”
and there is a simultaneous “rush to report” if cartel collapses. In short, these two facts are
equilibrium outcomes of firms’ leniency decision in this duration model.
Given Proposition 6, the result on the detection rate follows.
Corollary 7. If leniency program does not affect α, it increases the discovery rate of cartel in
each period from α to (α+ (1− α)p).
Proof. From Proposition 6 and assumption on α, cartel is discovered when it is detected and
convicted by antitrust authority or it collapses due to shock. So, the discovery rate of a cartel
in each period comes to (α+ (1− α)p).
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There are some remarks on Corollary 7. First, if α is fixed, leniency program does not
affect the expected duration of an individual cartel. So in this particular case, we can evaluate
the effect of leniency program on social welfare - sum of consumer surplus and the aggregate
profit of firms - by looking at whether the incentive constraint becomes harder to satisfy or
not.
Second, let me compare the number of discovered cartels without and with leniency pro-
gram. Just for comparison, assume that the number of cartelized industries in the economy,
denoted by K, is the same without and with leniency program and that α is also the same
in both environments (i.e. leniency is neutral on social welfare). Then, the sequence of the
number of discovered cartels is given by
〈
(1− α)t−1α ∗K〉∞
t=1
without leniency program and〈
αK,
(
(1− α)t−1(1− p)t−2(α+ p− αp) ∗K)∞
t=2
〉
with leniency program, respectively. So, the
discovered cartel cases become concentrated in the early periods when there is leniency pro-
gram. Even if K gets smaller with leniency program, the same pattern can be observed when
the number of cartelized industries under leniency program is not too small compared with
that without leniency program. If K is larger with leniency program, this pattern becomes
more conspicuous.
Finally, consider the effect of policy change that arises at the period when leniency program
is introduced. Suppose that leniency program is installed at period t unexpectedly, leniency
does not affect α and each firm’s incentive constraint for cartel sustainability. Then, all dead
cartels which were not caught until period (t− 1) are now in (State 1) after the introduction
of leniency program, so leniency application would be made from those dead cartels. So if I
add the transition issue on top of Corollary 7, the steep increase in the number of discovered
cartels becomes more remarkable right after the introduction of leniency program. These
observations imply that the increase in the number of discovered cartels does not necessarily
mean that leniency program is effective on cartel deterrence.
Recall that Assumption 3 is the restriction for policy parameters of these results. Dif-
ferently put, leniency is not applied at all if law enforcement against cartel is not strong
(i.e low α and F ) and RL1 is high or uncertain for some reason, say antitrust authority’s dis-
cretion. This kind of situation seemed to be prevalent under the 1978 version of leniency
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program in the U.S. which failed to induce colluding firms to come forward. Now Assumption
3 is more easily satisfied in any country having leniency program because it is a common
practice that the first reporting firm gets full exemption for sure.4 So three facts on leniency
application pattern are quite robust to the change in other policy parameters
(
F,R,RL2 , α
)
.
This robustness explains why most countries who adopted leniency program experience simi-
lar application pattern even though each country has a different law enforcement and leniency
program.
4.4 The Effect of Leniency Program
4.4.1 Cartel Decision and Optimal Leniency Program
Since I obtain each cartel member’s leniency decision in every period t ≥ 2, cartel agree-
ment decision in period 1 and optimal leniency program is characterized in this subsection. To
this end, I suppose that conviction rate α does not change due to the presence of leniency pro-
gram. Given fixed α, optimal leniency program is one that makes this incentive constraint most
difficult to be satisfied. Then, the best policy that antitrust authority can do is to choose the
parameters
(
R,RL1 , R
L
2
)
optimally. In addition, I introduce one assumption on firms’ strategy
before the characterization of optimal leniency program.
Assumption 4. pip < pin + δ(α+ p− αp)F and pir < pin + δ(α+ p− αp)F
This assumption implies that firms do not retaliate too mild against deviation from cartel
agreement. When F is big enough or δ, α, p are not too small, this assumption is satisfied in
general.
Now we need to derive incentive compatibility condition for cartel agreement in period
1. Given law enforcement with leniency program
(
F,R,RL1 , R
L
2 , α
)
, the expected discounted
cartel payoff of each firm, denoted by EΠCLLt=1 , is given by EΠ
CLL
t=1 = EΠ
NC in equation (4.10).
4This practice does not necessarily mean RL1 = 0 in reality because there may exist other type of sanctions,
such as private damage suit. In addition, αδF
1−δ(1−α) is over-estimation for the expected discounted fine because it
is derived from the assumption that every cartel is discovered in the end. Hence, there still exists the possibility
that some cartels fail to satisfy Assumption 3 under this practice.
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In contrast, the expected discounted payoff from unilateral deviation, denoted by EΠDLLt=1 ,
depends on whether Condition 1 or Condition 2 holds.
If Condition 1 holds, EΠDLLt=1 is given by EΠ
ND1 in equation (4.11). Then, cartel is
supported as stationary Markov perfect equilibrium if and only if EΠCLLt=1 > EΠ
DLL
t=1 under law
enforcement with leniency program
(
F,R,RL1 , R
L
2 , α
)
, or equivalently
EΠC(α+ p− αp) > EΠD(p) + δ(αF + (1− α)pR
L
2 )
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)) − δ(αR+ (1− α) min{R,R
L
2 })
+
δ(1− p)(pin − pir)
1− δ(1− p) +
δα(1− p)(pins − pin)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)) (4.13)
When Condition 2 holds, EΠDLLt=1 comes to EΠ
ND2 in equation (4.12). So cartel is supported
as stationary Markov perfect equilibrium if and only if
EΠC(α+ p− αp) > EΠD(α+ p− αp) + δ[α(F −R) + (1− α)p(R
L
2 −min{R,RL2 })]
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)) (4.14)
Let D1 and D2 be the right-hand side of inequality (4.13) and (4.14), respectively, and define
sets of feasible parameter vectors as X1, X2, Y1 and Y2 reflecting two possible conditions.
W =
{
(R,RL1 , R
L
2 ) | RL1<
αδF
1− δ(1− α)
}
X1 = W ∩
{
(R,RL1 , R
L
2 ) | RL1<
pin−pip+δ(αF + (1− α)pRL2 )
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp))
}
X2 = W ∩
{
(R,RL1 , R
L
2 ) | RL1>
pin−pip+δ(αF + (1− α)pRL2 )
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp))
}
Y1 = W ∩
{
(R,RL1 , R
L
2 ) | min (RL1 , R) <
pin−pir+δ(αR+ (1− α)pmin (R,RL2 ))
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp))
}
Y2 = W ∩
{
(R,RL1 , R
L
2 ) | min (RL1 , R) >
pin−pir+δ(αR+ (1− α)pmin (R,RL2 ))
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp))
}
, where R ∈ [0, F ], RL1 ∈ [0, F ), RL2 ∈ [RL1 , F ]
X1 ∪ Y1 (X2 ∩ Y2) is all feasible parameter vector (R,RL1 , RL2 ) that satisfies Condition 1
(Condition 2). Neither X1 nor Y1 is an empty set because (R,R
L
1 , R
L
2 ) = (R, 0, F ) ∈ X1
and (R,RL1 , R
L
2 ) = (F, 0, F ) ∈ Y1 from Assumption 4. Then, optimal leniency program
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(
R∗, RL∗1 , RL∗2
)
solves the following optimization problem.
max
{
max
(R,RL1 ,R
L
2 )∈X1∪Y1
D1, max
(R,RL1 ,R
L
2 )∈X2∩Y2
D2
}
(4.15)
Let
(
R1, RL11 , R
L1
2
)
be the argument maximizer of D1 and
(
R2, RL21 , R
L2
2
)
be the argument
maximizer of D2, respectively. Clearly,
(
R∗, RL∗1 , RL∗2
) ∈ {(R1, RL11 , RL12 ) , (R2, RL21 , RL22 )}
holds.
Given that α is fixed,
(
R1, RL11 , R
L1
2
)
solves
max
(R,RL1 ,R
L
2 )∈X1∪Y1
{
δ(αF + (1− α)pRL2 )
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)) − δ(αR+ (1− α) min{R,R
L
2 })
}
because (R,RL1 , R
L
2 ) does not affect the other terms in D1. Since there exists some (R,R
L
1 , R
L
2 )
∈ X1 from X1 6= ∅, (0, RL1 , F ) ∈ X1 for the same RL1 because RL1 < αδF1−δ(1−α) and RL1 <
pin−pip+δ(αF+(1−α)pRL2 )
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) ≤ pi
n−pip+δ(αF+(1−α)pF )
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) holds. Then, it is easy to see that
(
R1, RL11 , R
L1
2
)
=
(
R∗, RL∗1 , RL∗2
)
= (0, RL1 , F ) if X2 ∩ Y2 = ∅.
Now suppose that X2 ∩ Y2 6= ∅, and let me denote the closure of X2 ∩ Y2 by set Z. Then
the maximization problem
max
(R,RL1 ,R
L
2 )∈Z
{
δ[α(F −R) + (1− α)p(RL2 −min{R,RL2 })]
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp))
}
has solution z′ =
(
R′, RL′1 , RL′2
) ∈ Z because the objective function is continuous and Z is
compact. So z′ =
(
R2, RL21 , R
L2
2
)
if z′ ∈ X2 ∩ Y2. While
(
R2, RL21 , R
L2
2
)
does not exist if
z′ /∈ X2 ∩ Y2, there exists z ∈ X2 ∩ Y2 in Bε(z′) for all ε > 0. Hence, I can almost treat
z′ =
(
R2, RL21 , R
L2
2
)
. From this discussion, I can characterize optimal leniency program.
Proposition 7. Given that α is fixed, optimal leniency program is given by
(a)
(
R∗, RL∗1 , RL∗2
)
=
(
0, RL1 , F
)
if either (1) X2 ∩ Y2 = ∅ or (2) X2 ∩ Y2 6= ∅ and
D1
(
0, RL1 , F
)
> D2
(
R′, RL′1 , RL′2
)
.
(b)
(
R∗, RL∗1 , RL∗2
)
=
(
R′, RL′1 , RL′2
)
if X2 ∩ Y2 6= ∅ and D1
(
0, RL1 , F
)
< D2
(
R′, RL′1 , RL′2
)
.
Note that leniency decision under optimal leniency program in (State 3 : No Shock +
Deviation) is different between case (a) and (b) in Proposition 7.
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4.4.2 The Effect of Optimal Leniency Program and Policy Implication
In this subsection, I analyze the effect of leniency program on cartel deterrence when law
enforcement with leniency program is η∗ =
(
F, 0, RL1 , F, α
)
. From the previous discussion, η∗
is optimal leniency program if either (1) X2 ∩ Y2 = ∅ or (2) X2 ∩ Y2 6= ∅ and D1
(
0, RL1 , F
)
>
D2
(
R′, RL′1 , RL′2
)
holds, otherwise it is at least sub-optimal leniency program in the sense
that
(
0, RL1 , F
)
is a maximizer of D1. Comparison is made between optimal law enforcement
without leniency program (F,R, α) = (F, 0, α) and optimal leniency program (or sub-optimal
leniency program) η∗ =
(
F, 0, RL1 , F, α
)
for consistency. Recall that welfare effect of leniency
program is equivalent to the cartel deterrence effect when α is fixed.
Using condition (4.7) and (4.13), I obtain the necessary sufficient condition that optimal
leniency program η∗ increases cartel deterrence.
EΠD(p)− EΠD(α+ p− αp) + δ(α+ p− αp)F
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)) −
δαF
1− δ(1− α)
+
δ(1− p)(pin − pir)
1− δ(1− p) +
δα(1− p)(pins − pin)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)))
> 0
With some algebra, this condition is simplified into
[
(α+ p− αp)
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)) −
α
1− δ(1− α)
]
δF +
(1− (α+ p− αp))(pin − pir)
1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)) > 0 (4.16)
The first term in left side of equation (4.16) is positive and reflects the increase in the expected
fine under η∗. The reason why the expected fine increases is that cartel is discovered by antitrust
authority at least until cartel collapses under leniency program, whereas cartel may not be
discovered even after cartel collapses under law enforcement without leniency program. In
contrast, the second term depends on firms’ strategy. Under trigger (pip = pir = pin) or
more severe strategy (pir < pin), optimal leniency program increases the effectiveness of law
enforcement. In addition, equation (4.16) shows that if monetary fine F is high enough, optimal
leniency program is effective irrespective of firms’ strategy.
One interesting aspect of optimal leniency program in Proposition 7 (a) is not to give
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any reduction to the simultaneous applications. Proposition 7 (b) also implies that optimal
leniency program gives the least reduction to the simultaneous applications among the policy
vector (R,RL1 , R
L
2 ) ∈ X2∩Y2. This is because no or least reduction to simultaneous applicants
maximizes the expected fine when firms make cartel decision. However, it is not technically
easy to set RL2 = F because R
L
2 is an expected fine when the leniency equilibrium is application
by multiple firms in reality. Because antitrust authority need to maintain RL2 as high as possible
given this characterization of optimal leniency program, it is a questionable practice to give
significant reduction to the second or subsequent applicants.
It is also worthwhile to note that the first reporting firm does not necessarily get full
exemption under optimal leniency program. In fact, optimal leniency program only requires
that firms choose to report when cartel collapses, or equivalently Assumption 3 is satisfied
for RL1 . In our model, the deterrent effect of leniency program comes mainly from increased
expected sanctions, which arises because cartel is discovered at least until it collapses. Since
Assumption 3 holds for wide range of positive RL1 if law enforcement is strong enough (i.e.
high F and α), a partial reduction for the first reporting firm can be a way to improve the
efficacy of optimal leniency program because it has an effect to raise RL2 . Put differently, while
optimal leniency program reinforces the effectiveness of law enforcement under high enough
F , strong law enforcement enlarges the room to design leniency program more effectively.
4.4.3 Discussion
Now I consider a law enforcement with leniency program
(
F,R,RL1 , R
L
2 , α
)
, and assume
that (F,R,RL1 , R
L
2 , α) is more effective to deter cartel than (F,R, α). I also assume that
[Condition 1] holds for
(
F,R,RL1 , R
L
2 , α
)
, which is a more realistic case. Then, it must be
the case that condition (4.13) fails for pL, the threshold shock occurrence probability under
law enforcement. In other words, if I let pLP be the threshold shock occurrence probability
under law enforcement with leniency program, then pLP < pL holds when
(
F,R,RL1 , R
L
2 , α
)
is
more effective to deter cartel than (F,R, α). Hence, given α, the average duration of cartelized
industries becomes longer under the law enforcement with effective leniency program. In
addition, the effective leniency program has an immediate effect to collapse unstable cartels
123
when it is introduced because any cartel such that p ∈ [pLP , pL) fails to maintain the incentive
compatibility condition under leniency program. These cartels are discovered by leniency
applications and expected to have a shorter duration on average because they collapse due to
the introduction of leniency program.
On the other hand, the effectiveness of leniency program may be affected by possible
change in α. Because leniency program increases the number of discovered cartels at least in
the early periods after its introduction, antitrust authority can use fewer personnel and less
budget for non-leniency “active” cases given its resource constraint. Antitrust authority’s case
burden is likely to reduce α after the introduction of leniency program. On the other hand,
while antitrust authority deals with more cartel cases, it may accumulate more information
on cartel and its personnel may improve their investigation skill thanks to more experiences of
cartel cases. If the first effect dominates the learning effect, the expected duration of individual
cartel would get longer after the introduction of leniency program. In addition, lower α offsets
the effect that leniency program increases the expected discounted fine because
δ(αF+(1−α)pRL2 )
1−δ(1−p)(1−α)
in equation (4.10) gets smaller. Hence, the effectiveness of leniency program gets worse and
the average duration of cartelized industries becomes longer as α becomes lower.
Endogeneity of firms’ strategy may also affect the effectiveness of leniency program. If
leniency program is introduced, then firms may change the payoff in punishment phase (pip, pir)
when they agree on cartel agreement in a direction where incentive constraint can be satisfied
with leniency program. This effect, if exists, weakens the effect of leniency program.
Admitting the possibility that α and firm’s strategy may change, I can get some clue to
whether the adopted leniency program enhanced effectiveness of law enforcement from leniency
cases right after the introduction of leniency program. If leniency program is introduced
unexpectedly enough, cartels that are active at the period of introduction are likely to be agreed
on without full consideration about the new policy. Due to the unexpected introduction of
leniency program, the incentive compatibility constraint of each firm in those cartels converts
from EΠCL(F,R, α ;pip, pir) > EΠDL(F,R, α ;pip, pir) to EΠCLLt=1 (F,R,R
L
1 , R
L
2 , α
L ;pip′, pir′) >
EΠDLLt=1 (F,R,R
L
1 , R
L
2 , α
L ;pip′, pir′). So if the new incentive constraint is more binding, some
active cartels may fail to satisfy the new incentive constraint whereas they satisfied the old
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one. Then active cartels may collapse only because of policy change, and then cartel members
apply the leniency in that case. Hence this type of leniency will take the form of a “dying
cartel” purely caused by introduction of leniency program. This line of argument implies that
the collapsing rate of cartel is likely to be higher at the period when leniency program was
introduced than other periods. If the old incentive constraint is more binding and leniency
program does not bring higher deterrence, then the collapsing probability of cartel would not
change at the period when leniency was introduced or later. In that case, leniency cases would
only report “dead” or “dying cartel” caused by some shock, not caused by leniency program.
Hence, an effective leniency is likely to imply that significantly more cartels collapse right after
its introduction than the other periods.
4.4.4 Relation to the Literature
There have been many studies on the effect of leniency program. The first paper addressing
this issue is Motta and Polo (2003). They mainly focus on the value of Section B5: whether firms
that report information while already under investigation by antitrust authority should also
be eligible to leniency. Their central result is that leniency program may increase deterrence
by making prosecution more effective although it has a negative effect by reducing overall
sanctions. My model deals with Section A and the prosecution technology is simplified by
assuming that only one leniency application is sufficient to convict cartel for sure.
Spagnolo (2004) examined the ability of Section A to deter cartels. After he divides “coura-
geous” leniency programs, which reward the first reporting party with the fines paid by all
other members, and “moderate” leniency programs that only reduce or cancel sanctions, he
shows that the former achieves the first best of complete and costless deterrence while the
latter may deter cartels under restrictive conditions. Other researches also confirm that posi-
tive rewards provide stronger tools for the prevention of cartels. [Brisset and Thomas (2004),
Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006), etc.] In particular, Brisset and Thomas (2004) illustrate
5Section A of leniency policy is to grant leniency to a corporation reporting illegal activity before an in-
vestigation has begun, while section B is to give it to a firm reporting after antitrust authority’s investigation
began.
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that the moderate leniency does not prevent cartel formation under the first price sealed bid
auction setting with the asymmetric information on costs. In contrast, Chen and Harrington
(2007) and Harrington (2008) show that the maximum moderate leniency makes collusion
more difficult whereas softer leniency programs may have pro-collusive effects. While I focus
on the pattern of leniency notice under “moderate” leniency program, I show that optimal
leniency program among moderate leniency program may have an effect to deter cartels and
it may includes a partial reduction for the first reporting firm.
Motchenkova (2004) is closely related to this research in that both papers deal with the
“rush to report” phenomenon and cartel duration explicitly. But the timing of firm’s leniency
application is quite different in two papers. Cartel members either self-report simultaneously
and immediately after cartel is formed or never apply leniency in Motchenkova (2004), whereas
this paper predicts that they apply leniency simultaneously right after cartel collapses. The
timing of leniency application in Motchenkova (2004) is related to the feature of his model that
firms stop colluding because of the potential sanctions from law enforcement. My paper adds
unexpected shocks to the sources of cartel instability, examines the incentive compatibility
constraint of each firm under this environment, and hence provides more realistic leniency
decision outcome.
In contrast, Harrington and Chang (2009a) develops a rich model that endogenizes the
birth and death process for cartels given a population of heterogeneous industries. While
they focus on how one can infer the impact of competition policy on the population of cartels
by measuring its impact on the population of discovered cartels, they show that the average
duration of discovered cartels rises in the short run in response to a more effective competition
policy because the marginally stable cartels tend to be of relatively short duration and they
exit from the cartel population due to the new policy. This paper confirms that they pointed
out one important effect of an effective leniency program on the average duration of discovered
cartels in a different way, but I also add three additional immediate or short-run effects caused
by the introduction of leniency program. First, if leniency program is introduced, all dead
cartels satisfying Assumption 3 would be discovered by self-report. Their average duration
(
1
p
)
is longer than that of the cartels discovered by antitrust authority’s investigation
(
1
α+p−αp
)
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because law enforcement did not affect their collapse. Second, leniency program may lower
detection rate for non-leniency cases at least in the short run as discussed above. Harrington
and Chang (2009b) also points out this possibility based on antitrust authority’s incentive
structure.6 In that case, the average duration gets longer in the short run. Finally, cartels that
exit from the cartel population due to the installation of an effective leniency program would
also be discovered by self report. These cartels have shorter average duration because they
did not collapse due to an innate shock or antitrust authority’s conviction. The overall effect
of leniency program on discovered cartels’ average duration should be evaluated considering
all these effects besides the inference of Harrington and Chang (2009a).
In an empirical side, Miller (2009) develops a dynamic model which predicts that leniency
program increases the detection rate and decreases the cartel formation rate if the number
of detected cartels temporarily increases and then decreases in the long term. Using Poisson
estimation method, he assessed that the 1993 version of leniency program in the U.S. is effective
to both detect and deter cartels. I show that leniency program increases the detection rate if it
reduces the sanctions of the first reporting firm sufficiently. In contrast, using the E.U. cartel
data and hazard model, Brenner (2009) found that the 1996 version of leniency program in the
E.U. did not change the average duration of discovered cartels, and interpreted that leniency
program did not affect cartel’s instability based on the inference of Harrington and Chang
(2009a). Because of the same reason mentioned above, careful interpretation is required about
this result.
4.5 Cartel Deterrence by Selective Law Enforcement
This section considers the environment where there is no shock nor leniency program,
and tries to find a way that antitrust authority spends its resources available for cartel con-
viction most effectively. The idea to examine here is whether the principle of “selection and
concentration” works in antitrust policy area.
6Given the resource constraint, antitrust authority has higher incentive to deal with leniency cases than
non-leniency cases because antitrust authority can win easily in the court and enhance its reputation. So the
law enforcement for non-leniency cases becomes loose.
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4.5.1 Model
The model consists of industry, law enforcement, and timing of the game. As before, I
assume that antitrust authority sets and commits policy parameters and then firms interact
in the oligopolistic supergame.
 Industry : There are 2 representative industries (sectors). Each industry i ∈ {1, 2} consists
of ni ≥ 2 risk-neutral symmetric firms interacting repeatedly in the infinite, discrete time
t = 1, 2, · · · . All firms in the same industry i discount future profit with the common discount
factor δi ∈ (0, 1).
As in the baseline model, a stage game has a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium in each
industry, and each firm gets payoff pini at Nash equilibrium. Let pi
c
i denote payoff of each firm
when industry i colludes and pidi the static payoff from unilaterally deviating and choosing the
static best response. Finally, piri will denote payoff that a defector in industry i would get in
the punishment phase. pidi > pi
c
i > max(pi
n
i , pi
r
i ) > 0 holds for each industry i.
 Law enforcement : Antitrust authority can set and execute the policy parameter vector
(F,R, αo, αe).
1. Monetary fine F > 0 that a cartel member has to pay when cartel is convicted,
2. A reduced fine R ∈ [0, F ] that a deviator from cartel agreement can pay instead of F
when cartel is convicted,
3. Probability αo ∈ [0, α¯] with which cartel in industry 1 (industry 2) is convicted at odd
(even) period t ≥ 1 provided that it was not until period (t− 1),
4. Probability αe ∈ [0, α¯] with which cartel in industry 2 (industry 1) is convicted at odd
(even) period t ≥ 1 provided that it was not until period (t− 1)
Here, α¯ represents probability to convict a cartel of an industry at period t when antitrust
authority spends all the resources in the industry. I assume that antitrust authority’s budget
for cartel conviction is fixed in every period (B¯ = Bo+Be) and that αo ≤ αe holds without loss.
(αo, αe) captures the concept of selective law enforcement if αo < αe is satisfied. Antitrust
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authority’s conviction technology is given by an increasing concave function of budget in both
industries.
Assumption 5. αj = f(Bj) where f(0) = 0, f(B¯) = α¯, f
′
> 0, f
′′ ≤ 0 for j ∈ {o, e}
So I can let αo = f(
B¯
2 −ε) and αe = f( B¯2 +ε) for ε ∈ [0, B¯2 ]. Then ε > 0 represents a selective
law enforcement while ε = 0 represents non-selective law enforcement. I let αm = f(
B¯
2 ), then
αo = αe = αm under non-selective law enforcement. Crackdown policy can be represented by
(αo, αe) = (0, α¯), or equivalently ε =
B¯
2 .
Antitrust authority convicts cartel at the end of each period. If cartel is convicted, fines
are charged at period (t+1) and the industry turns into Nash equilibrium from period (t+1)
and on.
 Timing of the game : The game proceeds as follows.
1. Antitrust authority commits the policy vector (F,R, αo, αe) at period 0.
2. Each industry decides whether it colludes or not at the beginning of period 1.
3. Each firm chooses its output in every period t ≥ 1.
4.5.2 The Effect of Selective Law Enforcement
The following analysis focuses on the cartel deterrent effect of selective law enforcement
in industry 1. The same inference is possible for industry 2 because of the symmetric structure
of the model. Let the cartel payoff of industry 1 at odd period be V c1o and that at even period
V c1e. Then, V
c
1o and V
c
1e are obtained from these simultaneous equations.
V c1o = pi
c
1 + δ1
(
(1− αo)V c1e + αo(
pin1
1− δ1 − F )
)
V c1e = pi
c
1 + δ1
(
(1− αe)V c1o + αe(
pin1
1− δ1 − F )
)
Each firm in industry 1 earns pic1 in the current period when industry 1 colludes. The future
value of the cartel consists of two parts. The cartel is not convicted with probability 1 − αo
(1 − αe) at odd (even) period, and the future payoff of this cartel becomes V c1e (V c1o) in this
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case because the industry is still cartelized at even (odd) period. The cartel is convicted with
probability αo (αe), and the future payoff of this case is simply the discounted sum of Nash
equilibrium payoff minus monetary fine. So V c1o and V
c
1e are given by
V c1o =
1 + δ1(1− αo)
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
pic1 +
δ1αo + δ
2
1αe(1− αo)
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
(
pin1
1− δ1 − F
)
(4.17)
V c1e =
1 + δ1(1− αe)
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
pic1 +
δ1αe + δ
2
1αo(1− αe)
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
(
pin1
1− δ1 − F
)
(4.18)
I also need the deviation payoff in each period in order to evaluate incentive compatibility
condition for cartel formation. V d1o (V
d
1e) denotes the deviation payoff of a firm in industry 1
when it deviates at odd (even) period. Then, I can let
V d1o = pi
d
1 + δ1
(
(1− αo)V r1e + αo(
pin1
1− δ1 −R)
)
V d1e = pi
d
1 + δ1
(
(1− αe)V r1o + αe(
pin1
1− δ1 −R)
)
Here, V r1o(V
r
1e) represents each firm’s continuation payoff at odd (even) period in the punish-
ment phase. The above equations reflects that if a firm deviates at odd (even) period and the
cartel is not convicted, then the industry would be in the punishment phase at the next even
(odd) period. If I solve V r1o and V
r
1e in a similar way and substitute the solutions for V
r
1o and
V r1e, V
d
1o and V
d
1e yield
V d1o = pi
d
1 +
δ1(1− αo)(1 + δ1(1− αe))
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
pir1 (4.19)
+
δ1αo + δ
2
1αe(1− αo)
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
(
pin1
1− δ1 −R
)
V d1e = pi
d
1 +
δ1(1− αe)(1 + δ1(1− αo))
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
pir1 (4.20)
+
δ1αe + δ
2
1αo(1− αe)
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
(
pin1
1− δ1 −R
)
Under selective law enforcement (αo, αe), cartel is supported as subgame perfect equilibrium
if and only if V c1o ≥ V d1o and V c1e ≥ V d1e hold. We can obtain these conditions from equation
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(4.17) to (4.20), which are equivalent to
pic1 ≥
1
1 + δ1(1− αo) ∗ (
(
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
)
pid1 (4.21)
+ (δ1(1− αo)(1 + δ1(1− αe)))pir1 +
(
δ1αo + δ
2
1αe(1− αo)
)
(F −R))
pic1 ≥
1
1 + δ1(1− αe) ∗ (
(
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
)
pid1 (4.22)
+ (δ1(1− αe)(1 + δ1(1− αo)))pir1 +
(
δ1αe + δ
2
1αo(1− αe)
)
(F −R))
If antitrust authority commits non-selective law enforcement (αo = αe = α) instead, condition
(4.21) and (4.22) become the same and are simplified into
pic1 ≥ (1− δ1(1− α))pid1 + δ1(1− α)pir1 + δ1α (F −R) (4.23)
The incentive compatibility conditions from (4.21) to (4.23) imply that the optimal reduced
fine is R = 0 in any law enforcement. Then, the optimal non-selective law enforcement is
given by (R,α) = (0, αm). In order to compare the effect of selective law enforcement with
the optimal non-selective law enforcement, let (R,α) = (0, αm) , and let E1, E2, and E be the
right side of (4.21), (4.22) and (4.23), respectively. With some algebra, we can obtain
E − E1 = δ1 [(αm − αo)− δ1(1− αo)(αe − αm)]
1 + δ1(1− αo) ∗ (pi
d
1 − pir1 + F ) (4.24)
E2 − E = δ1 [(αe − αm)− δ1(1− αe)(αm − αo)]
1 + δ1(1− αe) ∗ (pi
d
1 − pir1 + F ) (4.25)
It is easy to see that E > E1 holds from equation (4.24) and Assumption 5. Hence, the sign of
equation (4.25) determines the effectiveness of selective law enforcement (αo, αe) (equivalently,
selective law enforcement ε such that αe = f(
B¯
2 + ε)).
Proposition 8. Either (a) every selective law enforcement is more effective than non-selective
law enforcement, or (b) there is ε∗ ∈ (0, B¯2 ] such that for all ε ∈ (0, ε∗) selective law enforcement
ε is more effective than non-selective law enforcement (i.e. E < E2 either for all ε > 0 or for
ε ∈ (0, ε∗)).
Proof. See the appendix.
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Proposition 8 shows that there is a continuum of selective law enforcement in which even
period’s incentive constraint of industry 1 gets more binding for every ε close enough to
0. Symmetrically, there is a continuum of selective law enforcement such that odd period’s
incentive constraint of industry 2 gets more binding for all ε sufficiently close to 0. So, selective
law enforcement ε is more effective to deter cartel in both industries if ε is close enough to 0.
Using equation (4.25), I can evaluate the effect of crackdown policy as well. The sign
of (E2 − E) is equal to that of [(αe − αm)− δ1(1− αe)(αm − αo)]. Let me define a function
g : [0, B¯2 ] 7→ R as
g(ε) = αe(ε)− αm − δ1(1− αe(ε))(αm − αo(ε))
= f(
B¯
2
+ ε)− f(B¯
2
)− δ1(1− f(B¯
2
+ ε))(f(
B¯
2
)− f(B¯
2
− ε))
Since ε = B¯2 under crackdown policy, it is more effective than non-selective law enforcement if
and only if g( B¯2 ) > 0, or equivalently
α¯ > αm(1 + δ1(1− α¯)) (4.26)
Condition (4.26) depends on the curvature of conviction technology and the discount factor
of industry 1. It is more likely to be satisfied when conviction technology is less concave
and the discount factor is smaller. Suppose conviction technology is convex instead. Then
αe − αm ≥ αm − αo holds for any ε ∈ (0, B¯2 ], and E < E2 is satisfied from equation (4.25).
So any selective law enforcement is more effective than non-selective law enforcement under
convex conviction technology.
4.5.3 Selective Law Enforcement under Linear Conviction Technology
In this subsection, I assume that conviction technology is linearly correlated to the budget
in both industries as a special case of concave conviction function.
Assumption 6. αj = k ∗Bj for j = 1, 2 where k > 0
With this conviction technology, αo + αe = α¯ holds for any selective law enforcement
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(αo, αe). The optimal non-selective law enforcement is given by (αo, αe) =
(
α¯
2 ,
α¯
2
)
because
αm =
kB¯
2 =
α¯
2 . Then for any (αo, αe) such that αo < αe, I obtain
E2 − E =
δ1
[
(αe − α¯2 )− δ1(1− αe)( α¯2 − αo)
]
1 + δ1(1− αe) ∗ (pi
d
1 − pir1 + F )
=
δ1(2αe − α¯)(1− δ1(1− αe))
2(1 + δ1(1− αe)) ∗ (pi
d
1 − pir1 + F ) > 0
The second equality holds from αe − α¯2 = α¯2 − αo from Assumption 6. So antitrust authority
can enhance deterrence to cartel with any selective law enforcement under linear conviction
technology. In order to find an optimal selective law enforcement in this case, let me define a
function h : [ α¯2 , α¯] 7→ R as E2 − E. Then I obtain
h(αe) =
δ1(2αe − α¯)(1− δ1(1− αe))
2(1 + δ1(1− αe))
The first derivative of this function yields
h
′
(αe) =
δ1(1− δ21(1− αe)2 + δ1(2αe − α¯))
(1 + δ1(1− αe))2
Hence, h
′
(αe) > 0 holds for all αe ∈ [ α¯2 , α¯]. Since the optimal selective law enforcement is the
one that maximizes (E2 − E), the optimal selective law enforcement comes to αe = α¯ from
h
′
(αe) > 0.
Corollary 8. If conviction technology is linear, crackdown policy is the optimal.
4.5.4 The Effect of Randomized Selective Law Enforcement
I now consider a cartel agreement decision when firms do not know which detection rate
between αo and αe would be applied at period 1. Then, V
c
1o (V
c
1e) can be interpreted as the
continuation payoff from cartel of a firm in industry 1 at the period when antitrust authority
applies αo (αe). Similarly, V
d
1o (V
d
1e) can be interpreted as the continuation payoff from devi-
ation at the period when αo (αe) is applied. So a firm’s expected payoff from cartel is given
by V c1 =
1
2(V
c
1o + V
c
1e) while the expected payoff from deviation comes to V
d
1 =
1
2(V
d
1o + V
d
1e) at
the beginning of the game. Hence, cartel can be supported as subgame perfect equilibrium if
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and only if V c1 ≥ V d1 , V c1o ≥ V d1o and V c1e ≥ V d1e hold simultaneously. Equation (4.24) and (4.25)
implies that E2 is greater than E1, so V
c
1e ≥ V d1e is more binding than V c1o ≥ V d1o. The remaining
thing is to examine which condition is more binding between V c1 ≥ V d1 and V c1e ≥ V d1e.
For the purpose, I need to derive V c1 and V
d
1 using equation (4.17) to (4.20).
V c1 =
2 + δ1(2− αo − αe)
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
∗ pi
c
1
2
+
δ1(αo + αe) + δ
2
1(αo + αe − 2αoαe)
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
∗ pi
n
1 − F
2
V d1 = pi
d
1 +
δ1(2− αo − αe) + 2δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
∗ pi
r
1
2
+
δ1(αo + αe) + δ
2
1(αo + αe − 2αoαe)
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
∗ pi
n
1 −R
2
So V c1 ≥ V d1 is equivalent to
pic1 ≥
2
(
1− δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
)
pid1
2 + δ1(2− αo − αe) +
(
δ1(2− αo − αe) + 2δ21(1− αo)(1− αe)
)
pir1
2 + δ1(2− αo − αe)
+
(
δ1(αo + αe) + δ
2
1(αo + αe − 2αoαe)
)
(F −R)
2 + δ1(2− αo − αe) (4.27)
Let E3 be the right-hand side of condition (4.27) and R = 0, then it is easy to show that
E1 < E3 < E2 holds. Hence V
c
1e ≥ V d1e is the most binding constraint. So, randomization
between αo and αe at the beginning of the game does not enhance the efficacy of selective law
enforcement (αo, αe).
Another exercise is to see the effect of a randomized crackdown policy where antitrust
authority chooses industry 1 as a target with probability (1− q) and industry 2 with probability
q every period. Again I need to derive the (continuation) payoff from collusion in industry 1
denoted by V c1R. In order to get V
c
1R, I have to introduce the continuation payoff from collusion
when industry 1 is not selected as a target industry, denoted by V c1N , and that when industry
1 is selected, denoted by V c1T . Then V
c
1R is obtained from these simultaneous equations.
V c1R = qV
c
1N + (1− q)V c1T
V c1N = pi
c
1 + δ1V
c
1R
V c1T = pi
c
1 + δ1
(
(1− α¯)V c1R + α¯(
pin1
1− δ1 − F )
)
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So I have
V c1R =
pic1
1− δ1(1− α¯(1− q)) +
δ1α¯(1− q)
1− δ1(1− α¯(1− q))
(
pin1
1− δ1 − F
)
Using the similar method, I can get the (continuation) payoff from deviation in industry 1
denoted by V d1R.
V d1R = pi
d
1 +
δ1(1− α¯(1− q))
1− δ1(1− α¯(1− q))pi
r
1 +
δ1α¯(1− q)
1− δ1(1− α¯(1− q))
(
pin1
1− δ1 −R
)
Then cartel can be formed under the randomized crackdown policy if and only if V c1R ≥ V d1R,
or equivalently
pic1 ≥ (1− δ1(1− α¯(1− q)))pid1 + δ1(1− α¯(1− q))pir1 + δ1α¯(1− q) (F −R) (4.28)
Let E4 be the right-hand side of condition (4.28), then E4 is monotonically decreasing in q.
Hence E4 is maximized (minimized) at q = 0 (q = 1). Suppose q =
1
2 as a special case, where
antitrust authority chooses a target industry by tossing a fair coin. Let R = 0 as usual. Then
I have the following result.
Claim 23. Under concave conviction technology, non-selective law enforcement is more effec-
tive than a randomized crackdown policy in which each industry is selected with probability 12
in every period.
Proof.
E − E4 =
[
(1− δ1(1− αm))pid1 + δ1(1− αm)pir1 + δ1αmF
]
−
[
(1− δ1(1− α¯
2
))pid1 + δ1(1−
α¯
2
)pir1 + δ1
α¯
2
F
]
= δ1
(
αm − α¯
2
)(
pid1 − pir1 + F
)
So E ≥ E4 holds under Assumption 5 while E = E4 holds under Assumption 6.
Comparing this result with condition (4.26) shows that randomization weakens the effi-
cacy of crackdown policy. Condition (4.26) implies that the commitment crackdown policy is
more effective than non-selective law enforcement if conviction technology is not too concave.
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Claim 23 also shows that the randomized crackdown policy is more effective only if conviction
technology is convex.
4.6 Conclusion
In this research, I studied leniency program and crackdown policy focusing on their de-
terrence effect to cartels. This research gives some policy implications on how these policies
should be designed and operated given antitrust authority’s resource constraint.
Regarding to leniency program, antitrust authority should not be enraptured by its suc-
cess in discovering more cartels because the number of discovered cartels explodes even under
ineffective leniency program. As most of collapsed cartels are reported to antitrust author-
ity, the number of discovered cartels cannot be taken as an indicator of leniency program’s
effectiveness. Given antitrust authority’s resource constraint, the following factors are crucial
to construct an effective law enforcement scheme with leniency program: full reduction to a
deviator irrespective of its leniency application; to restrict the leniency benefits to the first
reporting firm and to decrease the amount of reduction in sanctions; to maintain the level of
sanctions as high as possible.
Selective law enforcement can enhance the effectiveness of antitrust law enforcement with
the same amount of resources if it is well-designed. The optimal degree of selectivity depends
on the curvature of conviction technology function. In particular, crackdown policy is more
effective than non-selective law enforcement only when more resource on one industry increases
the conviction probability by much.
Both leniency program and crackdown policy are “double-bladed sword” in that they may
have an effect to deter cartel or may not. So it is important to design and operate these policy
tools prudently. Antitrust authority has to keep in mind that too lenient leniency program
may give higher incentive to collude and too selective law enforcement may lower the efficacy
of antitrust law enforcement.
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 2
A.1 Identical Constant Marginal Cost Model
The Relation between δ∗ and L
(Nash Reversion Strategy)
Under this strategy, the deviation payoff of each firm comes to piD(L) =
(
L+1
4L
)2
+ δ
(1−δ)(L+1)2 .
So, collusion is sustainable if and only if δ ≥ L2+2L+1
L2+6L+1
. Given δ∗ = L
2+2L+1
L2+6L+1
, f ′(L) > 0 holds.
(Optimal Punishment Strategy)
Let fn(N) be the threshold discount rate under Nash reversion strategy and fo(N) be that under
optimal punishment strategy σ(q¯, q˜). [Abreu (1986), Mailath and Samuelson (2006)] Define µN (q) =
q(1−Nq). Then, under optimal punishment strategy σ(q¯, q˜), I can have piD(N) = (N+14N )2+ δ(1−δ)v∗N ,
where v∗N = µN (q˜)+
δ
1−δµN (q¯). Since firms compete a` la Cournot pre-merger, the following inequality
holds:
piC(N) < piD(N)⇔ 1
4N
<
(
N + 1
4N
)2
+ δv∗N
Differently put, δ < fo(N) holds. Note that v
∗
N ≤ pi∞(N) ≡ 1(1−δ)(L+1)2 holds because v∗N is the
minimum payoff for each player possible under a (strongly symmetric) subgame perfect equilibrium
and pi∞(N) is one feasible subgame perfect equilibrium payoff. So, fo(N) ≤ fn(N) is satisfied.
Furthermore, we already know that fn(N) is strictly increasing function.
Now suppose that δ > fn(L) post-merger for some L < N . Since δ > fn(L) and v
∗
L ≤ pi∞(L),
we have
1
4L
>
(
L+ 1
4L
)2
+ δpi∞(L) ≥
(
L+ 1
4L
)2
+ δv∗L
Hence, optimal punishment strategy supports perfect collusion as subgame perfect equilibrium, which
means that fo(L) < δ < fo(N) for such L < N . Even when δ < fn(L) post-merger, it may be the
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case that 14L ≥
(
L+1
4L
)2
+ δ(1−δ)v
∗
L from v
∗
L ≤ pi∞(L), which also means that fo(L) < δ < fo(N) for
such L < N .
Proof of Claim 3
[Part (a)]For M > 0, g2(N,M) =
1
4(N−M) − M+1(N+1)2 = (N−2M−1)
2
4(N−M)(N+1)2 . It holds trivially that
g2(N,
N−1
2 ) = 0 and g2(N,M) > 0 if M 6= N−12 .
[Part (b)]From definition, g2(N,N − 1) = 14 − N(N+1)2 while g2(N, 1) = 14(N−1) − 2(N+1)2 . Hence,
g2(N,N − 1)− g2(N, 1) = (N−2)(N
2−2N+5)
4(N−1)(N+1)2 > 0 for all N ≥ 3.
Proof of Corollary 1
[Part (a)]g2(N,M)− g1(N,M) = 14(N−M) − 1(N−M+1)2 = (N−M−1)
2
4(N−M)(N−M+1)2 > 0.
[Part (b)]∂S1∂M = − 1(N−M+1)3 < 0 and ∂
2S1
∂M2
= − 1
(N−M+1)4 < 0, so S1(N,M) is decreasing and
concave in M . Since S2(N,N − 1) = 4−(N+1)
2
8(N+1)2
, S1(N,M) > S2(N,M) for ∀ M ∈ (0, N − 1)
Proof of Proposition 1
Recall that Mˆ be such that g1(N, Mˆ) = 0 and g1(N,M) < 0 (g1(N,M) > 0) for all M < Mˆ
(M > Mˆ resp.). M∗ is either (1) M∗ < Mˆ or (2) M∗ ≥ Mˆ . If M∗ < Mˆ , then g1(N,M∗) < 0.
Hence, g3(N,M
∗) = g2(N,M∗) ≥ 0 and g3(N,M) = g1(N,M) < 0 for all M ∈ (0,M∗). So,
M∗∗ = M∗ in case (1). If M∗ ≥ Mˆ , then g1(N,M∗) ≥ 0. Hence, g3(N, Mˆ) = g1(N, Mˆ) = 0 and
g3(N,M) = g1(N,M) < 0 for all M < Mˆ . So, M
∗∗ = Mˆ in case (2). So M∗∗ ≤ Mˆ holds in any
case.
Efficiency-Gaining Merger’s Profitability & Welfare Effect in [Case 3]
[Case 3-E-1 : gˆ3(N, 1) ≥ 0, Sˆ3(N, 1) > 0] Define DM ≡ [1,M∗ − 1], then DM is com-
pact in R+ and Sˆ3(N,M) is continuous in DM . Hence, there exists M˜ ∈ DM such that M˜ ∈
{arg max
M∈DM
Sˆ3(N,M)}. Since Sˆ3(N, 1) > 0, Sˆ3(N, M˜) > 0. So Sˆ3(N,M) is maximized at either
M˜ if Sˆ3(N, M˜) > Sˆ3(N,N − 1), or N − 1 if Sˆ3(N, M˜) < Sˆ3(N,N − 1). Moreover, merger is
privately profitable at M˜ from gˆ3(N, 1) ≥ 0 and convexity of g1(N,M), whereas merger to monopoly
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is also privately profitable. Therefore, the optimal size of merger is compatible with the incentive of
firms in this case.
[Case 3-E-2 : gˆ3(N, 1) < 0, Sˆ3(N, 1) ≥ 0] There exists M˜ ∈ DM such that M˜ ∈ {arg max
M∈DM
Sˆ3(N,M)} and Sˆ3(N, M˜) > 0 as before. Contrary to [Case 3-E-1], however, it can be the case that
gˆ3(N, M˜) < 0. In fact, for ∀ M ∈ DM such that Sˆ3(N,M) ≥ 0, gˆ3(N,M) may be negative.
Moreover, Sˆ3(N,M) ≤ Sˆ3(N,N − 1) < 4−(N+1)
2
8(N+1)2
+ (N − 1)
[
2
(N+1)2
− 1
N2
]
< 0 for all N ≥ 4. So
Sˆ3(N,M) < 0 holds for M ≥M∗. Then, if gˆ3(N,M) < 0 for all M ∈ DM such that Sˆ3(N,M) ≥ 0,
there is no M that is both privately profitable and socially beneficial. But, if there is M ∈ DM such
that gˆ3(N,M) ≥ 0 and Sˆ3(N,M) ≥ 0, then there exists Mˇ which gives the highest Sˆ3(N,M) among
privately profitable M ′s.
[Case 3-E-3 : gˆ3(N, 1) < 0, Sˆ3(N, 1) < 0] Since S1(N,M) is concave in M and M ∗F is linear
in M , Sˆ3(N,M) < 0 for ∀M ≥ 1 in this case. Hence, every size of merger is socially injurious in this
case while any merger such that M ≥M∗ is privately profitable.
A.2 Asymmetric Increasing Marginal Cost Model
Proof of Claim 4
Take a partial derivative of g1+2R (e) with respect to ej for some j ≥ 3, then I have
∂
∂ej
g1+2R (e) =
1
(1 + ej)2
[
e1(1 + 2e1)
(1 + e1)2(1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)3
+
e2(1 + 2e2)
(1 + e2)2(1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)3
− (e1 + e2)(1 + 2(e1 + e2))
(1 + e1 + e2)2(1 +
e1+e2
1+e1+e2
+
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
)3
]
=
2
(1 + ej)2
[
pi∗1 + pi∗2
1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
− pi
1+2
M
1 + e1+e21+e1+e2 +
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
]
Given g1+2R (e) = pi
1+2
M − (pi∗1 + pi∗2) > 0, ∂∂ej g
1+2
R (e) < 0 holds from
e1+e2
1+e1+e2
< e11+e1 +
e2
1+e2
.
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Figure A.1: Comparative Statics - Outsider’s Efficiency
Numerical Proof of ∂∂e3 g
1+2
R (e) < 0 when N = 3
Taking a partial derivative of g1+2R (e) with respect to e3 when N = 3, then I have
∂
∂e3
g1+2R (e) =
1
(1 + e3)
2 [
e1(1 + 2e1)
(1 + e1)
2(1+
∑3
k=1
ek
1+ek
)3
+
e2(1 + 2e2)
(1 + e2)
2(1+
∑3
k=1
ek
1+ek
)3
− (e1 + e2)(1 + 2(e1 + e2))
(1 + e1 + e2)
2(1 + e1+e21+e1+e2 +
e3
1+e3
)3
]
So the sign of ∂∂e3 g
1+2
R (e) can be checked for any e ∈ R3+ with the help of mathematica. Figure A.1
shows that the area such that ∂∂e3 g
1+2
R (e) ≥ 0 is empty, which means that ∂∂e3 g1+2R (e) < 0 for all e
∈ [0.16, 109]3.
Numerical Proof that ∂∂ν g
1+2
R (es, e3, ν) > 0 if g
1+2
R (es, e3, ν) ≤ 0
If I take a partial derivative of g1+2R (es, e3, ν) with respect to ν, then I obtain
∂
∂ν
g1+2R (es, e3, ν) =
e3s(1 + e3)
2(2ν − 1)
2
∗
(1 + 2es(1− 2ν)2+e2s(ν − 1)ν + e3(−2 + 4e2s(ν − 1)ν + es(1− 16ν + 16ν2)))
(−1− 2es + 3e2s(ν − 1)ν + e3(−2− 3es + 4e2s(ν − 1)ν))3
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Figure A.2: Comparative Statics - Asymmetry
Although it looks complicated, the sign of ∂∂ν g
1+2
R (es, e3, ν) can be checked for any (es, e3, ν) ∈ R2+ ×
(0.5, 1.0) with the help of mathematica. Panel (A) in Figure A.2 plots the area such that g1+2R (es, e3, ν) ≤ 0
for e = (es, e3) ∈ [0.1, 10]2. Panel (B) in Figure A.2 shows that there is no e ∈ [0.16, 109]2 such that
g1+2R (es, e3, ν) ≤ 0 and ∂∂ν g1+2R (es, e3, ν) ≤ 0.
Derivation of Condition (2.21)
w1+2R (e) = g
1+2
R (e) +
N∑
k=3
(pi1+2k − pi∗k)−
∫ P 1+2N
P ∗N
(1− P )dP
=
(e1 + e2)(1 + 2(e1 + e2))
2(1 + e1 + e2)2(1 +
e1+e2
1+e1+e2
+
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
)2
− 1
2(1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
[
e1(1 + 2e1)
(1 + e1)2
+
e2(1 + 2e2)
(1 + e2)2
]
+
N∑
k=3
ek(1 + 2ek)
2(1 + ek)2
[
1
(1 + e1+e21+e1+e2 +
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
)2
− 1
(1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
]
−[ 1
1 + e1+e21+e1+e2 +
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
− 1
2
(
1
1 + e1+e21+e1+e2 +
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
)2
− 1
1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
+
1
2
(
1
1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2]
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=
1
2(1 + e1+e21+e1+e2 +
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
)2
[
(e1+e2)(1 + 2(e1+e2))
(1 + e1+e2)
2 +
N∑
k=3
ek(1 + 2ek)
(1 + ek)2
− 2(1+ e1+e2
1 + e1+e2
+
N∑
k=3
ek
1 + ek
) + 1]
− 1
2(1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
[
e1(1 + 2e1)
(1 + e1)2
+
e2(1 + 2e2)
(1 + e2)2
+
N∑
k=3
ek(1 + 2ek)
(1 + ek)2
−2(1+
N∑
k=1
ek
1 + ek
) + 1]
=
1
2
[
1
(1 + e1+e21+e1+e2 +
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
)2
(
(e1+e2)(1 + 2(e1+e2))
(1 + e1+e2)
2 −
2(e1+e2)
1 + e1+e2
+
N∑
k=3
(
ek(1 + 2ek)
(1 + ek)2
− 2ek
1 + ek
)
− 1)
− 1
(1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
(
N∑
k=1
(
ek(1 + 2ek)
(1 + ek)2
− 2ek
1 + ek
)
− 1)]
=
1
2
[
1
(1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
(
1 +
N∑
k=1
ek
(1 + ek)2
)
− 1
(1 + e1+e21+e1+e2 +
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
)2
(
1 +
e1+e2
(1 + e1+e2)
2 +
N∑
k=3
ek
(1 + ek)2
)
]
Using equation (2.13), (2.14) and cost function, the above expression becomes
w1+2R (e) =
1
2
[{(P ∗N )2 +
N∑
k=1
q∗kMC
k(q∗k)} −
{(P 1+2N )2 + q1+2M MC1+2(q1+2M ) +
N∑
k=3
q1+2k MC
k(q1+2k )}]
Since a merger is welfare-increasing if and only if w1+2R (e) > 0, we can get condition (2.21). Condition
(2.27) can be similarly derived.
Proof of Claim 5
By the construction of g1+2S (e, eM ), it is enough to show that eM < e
′
M implies pi
1+2
M (eM , e3, · · · , eN ) <
pi1+2M (e
′
M , e3, · · · , eN ).
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First, note that outsider’s post-merger output is smaller with higher synergies.
q1+2o (e
′
M ) =
eo
1+eo
1 +
e′M
1+e′M
+
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
<
eo
1+eo
1 + eM1+eM +
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
= q1+2o (eM )
The inequality comes from
e′M
1+e′M
> eM1+eM . Let the merged firm’s output be q
1+2
M (eM ) given that eM
is synergies of the merger. Then,
pi1+2M (eM , e3, · · · , eN ) = (1− q1+2M (eM )−
N∑
k=3
q1+2k (eM )) ∗ q1+2M (eM )−
(
q1+2M (eM )
)2
2eM
< (1− q1+2M (eM )−
N∑
k=3
q1+2k (e
′
M )) ∗ q1+2M (eM )−
(
q1+2M (eM )
)2
2e′M
≤ (1− q1+2M (e′M )−
N∑
k=3
q1+2k (e
′
M )) ∗ q1+2M (e′M )−
(
q1+2M (e
′
M )
)2
2e′M
= pi1+2M (e
′
M , e3, · · · , eN )
The first inequality comes from
∑N
k=3 q
1+2
k (eM ) >
∑N
k=3 q
1+2
k (e
′
M ) and eM < e
′
M , and the second
inequality comes from the revealed preference argument.
Proof of Claim 6
If I take a partial derivative on equation (2.26) with respect to eM , I have
∂
∂eM
w1+2S (e, eM ) =
1 + 4em + (em − 1)
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
+ 2(1 + em)
∑N
k=3
ek
(1+ek)2
(1 + 2em +
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
+ em
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
)3
Then, ∂∂eM
w1+2S (e, eM ) > 0 is equivalent that numerator of the above expression is strictly positive,
which yields condition (2.28).
Proof of Claim 7
CS-increasing merger decreases equilibrium price after merger. From equation (2.13) and (2.25), I can
obtain
P ∗N > P
1+2
N (eM )⇔
1
P ∗N
<
1
P 1+2N (eM )
⇔ λ1 + λ2 < λM
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Proof of Claim 8
I want to show that condition (2.29) implies g1+2S (e, eM ) > 0. Define δ =
eM
1+eM
− e11+e1 − e21+e2 , then
δ > 0 holds for a CS-increasing merger. Now, g1+2S (e, eM ) can be rewritten by
g1+2S (e, δ) =
(δ + e11+e1 +
e2
1+e2
)(1 + δ + e11+e1 +
e2
1+e2
)
2(1 + δ +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
−
e1
1+e1
(1 + e11+e1 ) +
e2
1+e2
(1 + e21+e2 )
2(1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
Evaluate g1+2S (e, δ) at δ = 0, then I get
g1+2S (e, 0) =
e1e2
(1+e1)(1+e2)
(1 +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
> 0
Moreover, the partial derivative of g1+2S (e, δ) with respect to δ yields
∂
∂δ
g1+2S (e, δ) =
1 + δ +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
+ 2eM1+eM
∑N
k=3
ek
1+ek
2(1 + δ +
∑N
k=1
ek
1+ek
)3
Hence, ∂∂δg
1+2
S (e, δ) > 0 for all δ > 0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Claim 8 under General Setting Revealed preference argument implies
P (q1+2M +
N∑
k=3
q1+2k ) q
1+2
M − C1+2(q1+2M ) ≥ P (q +
N∑
k=3
q1+2k ) q− C1+2(q) (A.1)
for all q > 0. Suppose pi∗1 + pi∗2 ≥ pi1+2M to the contrary, then I have
P (q∗1 + q
∗
2+
N∑
k=3
q∗k) (q
∗
1 + q
∗
2)− C1(q∗1)− C2(q∗2)
≥ P (q1+2M +
∑N
k=3 q
1+2
k ) q
1+2
M − C1+2(q1+2M )
Since outsider firm j’s λj = −dqjdQ= − P
′+qiP ′′
d2
dq2
i
Ci−P ′> 0 holds for all j ≥ 3 from condition (3) and (4) in
Farrell-Shapiro,
∑N
k=3 q
∗
k >
∑N
k=3 q
1+2
k is satisfied in CS-increasing merger. Moreover, C
1+2(q∗1 + q∗2)
144
< C1(q∗1) + C
2(q∗2) holds from rationalization and synergy effect. Then, I can get
P (q∗1 + q
∗
2+
N∑
k=3
q1+2k ) (q
∗
1 + q
∗
2)− C1+2(q∗1 + q∗2)
> P (q∗1 + q∗2+
∑N
k=3 q
∗
k) (q
∗
1 + q
∗
2)− C1(q∗1)− C2(q∗2)
≥ P (q1+2M +
∑N
k=3 q
1+2
k ) q
1+2
M − C1+2(q1+2M ),
which contradicts equation (A.1).
Using similar method, I can show that CS-increasing merger decreases outsider’s profit and CS-
neutral merger is welfare increasing under condition (3) and (4) in Farrell-Shapiro.
CS-increasing Merger’s Effect on Outsider’s Profit Given condition (3) and (4) in Farrell-
Shapiro, outsider firm o’s λo = −dqodQ> 0 holds. Since Q1+2N > Q∗N holds in CS-increasing merger,
q1+2o < q
∗
o and q
1+2
−o > q∗−o is satisfied. Revealed preference argument implies
P (q∗o + q
∗
−o) q
∗
o − Co(q∗o) ≥ P (q + q∗−o)q − Co(q) (A.2)
P (q1+2o + q
1+2
−o ) q
1+2
o −Co(q1+2o ) ≥ P (q + q1+2−o )q − Co(q)
for all q > 0. Suppose pi1+2o ≥ pi∗o to the contrary, then I have
P (q1+2o + q
1+2
−o ) q
1+2
o −Co(q1+2o ) ≥ P (q∗o + q∗−o)q∗o − Co(q∗o)
Since P (q1+2o + q
1+2
−o ) < P (q1+2o + q∗−o) from q
1+2
−o > q∗−o, I obtain
P (q1+2o + q
∗
−o) q
1+2
o − Co(q1+2o ) > P (q1+2o + q1+2−o )q1+2o − Co(q1+2o )
≥ P (q∗o + q∗−o) q∗o − Co(q∗o),
which contradicts equation (A.2).
Welfare Effect of CS-neutral Merger Contraposition of Farrell-Shapiro’s Proposition 2 is
that a merger generates synergies if it doesn’t cause price to rise. So CS-neutral merger creates synergy
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effect. Since the welfare effect of CS-neutral merger is given by w1+2= pi1+2M −pi1−pi2, I have
w1+2 = P 1+2N q
1+2
M − C1+2(q1+2M )− (P ∗Nq∗1 − C1(q∗1))− (P ∗Nq∗2 − C2(q∗2))
= C1(q∗1) + C
2(q∗2)− C1+2(q1+2M ) > 0,
where the second equality comes from P 1+2N = P
∗
N and q
1+2
M = q
∗
1 + q
∗
2, and the final inequality reflects
that CS-neutral merger generates synergies and q1+2M = q
∗
1 + q
∗
2.
Proof of Claim 9
g1+2(e1, e2, eM , y) = 0 is given. Claim 8 implies that λ1 +λ2 > λM holds if g
1+2(e1, e2, eM , y) = 0.
Hence ∂∂yg
1+2(e1, e2, eM , y) < 0 holds, so g
1+2(e1, e2, eM , y
′) > 0.
A.3 Free Entry-Exit Model
Proof of Claim 11
We know that N † ≥ N∗ holds in this case. If N † = N∗, P i+j
N† > P
∗
N∗+1 is satisfied because
P i+j
N† > P
∗
N∗ from Claim 7 and P
∗
N∗ > P
∗
N∗+1 holds. If N
† = N∗+ 1, P i+j
N† > P
∗
N∗+1 is also satisfied
from Claim 7.
Now let N † ≥ N∗ + 2 and suppose P i+j
N† ≤ P ∗N∗+1 for contradiction. Since N † is incumbent
post-merger, pii+j
N† > F should be satisfied.
pii+j
N† =
eN†(1 + 2eN†)
2(1 + eN†)
2(1 + eM1+eM +
∑N†
k 6=i,j
ek
1+ek
)2
> F
From P i+j
N† ≤ P ∗N∗+1, I have
1
P i+j
N†
≥ 1
P ∗N∗+1
⇔ 1 + eM
1 + eM
+
N†∑
k 6=i,j
ek
1 + ek
≥ 1 +
N∗+1∑
k=1
ek
1 + ek
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So I get
F < pii+j
N† ≤
eN†(1 + 2eN†)
2(1 + eN†)
2(1 +
∑N∗+1
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
<
eN∗+1(1 + 2eN∗+1)
2(1 + eN∗+1)2(1 +
∑N∗+1
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
= piN∗+1
The last strict inequality comes from eN† < eN∗+1, which holds because N
† ≥ N∗ + 2 and 〈en〉∞n=1
is a decreasing sequence. This result contradicts that N∗ is the equilibrium number of firms before
merger.
Proof of Claim 12
We know that N † ≤ L holds in this case. If N † = L, (a) P i+j
N† < P
∗
N∗ holds from Claim 7. Now
suppose that N † < L and (a) P i+j
N† < P
∗
N∗ does not hold. Then, I need to show that (b) P
i+j
N†+1 < P
∗
N∗
holds in order to prove the result. If (N †+ 1) = L, then P i+j
N†+1 < P
∗
N∗ trivially holds from Claim 7.
Now suppose (N †+1) < L and P i+j
N†+1 ≥ P ∗N∗ for contradiction. Then we know that pi∗N†+1(N∗) >
F because it is an incumbent pre-merger from (N † + 1) < N∗, which is equivalent to
pi∗N†+1(N
∗) =
eN†+1(1 + 2eN†+1)
2(1 + eN†+1)
2(1 +
∑N∗
k=1
ek
1+ek
)2
> F
In contrast, P i+j
N†+1 ≥ P ∗N∗ implies
1
P i+j
N†+1
≤ 1
P ∗N∗
⇔ 1 + eM
1 + eM
+
N†+1∑
k 6=i,j
ek
1 + ek
≤ 1 +
N∗∑
k=1
ek
1 + ek
Hence, we obtain
pii+j
N†+1 =
eN†+1(1 + 2eN†+1)
2(1 + eN†+1)
2(1 + eM1+eM +
∑N†+1
k 6=i,j
ek
1+ek
)2
≥ pi∗N†+1(N∗) > F
Then, firm (N †+1) does not exit, which is contradiction because firmN † is the least efficient incumbent
at post-merger equilibrium.
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Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter 3
Proof of Lemma 1
The first order condition implies that best response function q∗i = q
d(q−i, γ) satisfies
γ
∂
∂qi
pii(q
∗
i , q
c) + (1− γ) ∂
∂qi
pii(q
∗
i , q−i) = 0
Denote pii1(q
∗
i , q
c) ≡ ∂∂qipii(q∗i , qc) and pii1(q∗i , q−i) ≡ ∂∂qipii(q∗i , q−i). Using implicit function theorem,
I can obtain
∂
∂γ
qd(q−i, γ) = − pii1(q
∗
i , q
c)− pii1(q∗i , q−i)
γpii11(q∗i , qc) + (1− γ)pii11(q∗i , q−i)
, where pii11(q
∗
i , q
c) ≡ ∂2
∂q2i
pii(q
∗
i , q
c) and pii11(q
∗
i , q−i) ≡ ∂
2
∂q2i
pii(q
∗
i , q−i)
pii11 < 0 because pii is concave and pii1(q
∗
i , q
c) − pii1(q∗i , q−i) > 0 for all q−i > qc. Hence,
∂
∂γ q
d(q−i, γ) > 0 holds for all q−i > qc. Let the fixed output be qd = qd(qd(γ), γ) ≡ qd(γ).
Then
dqd
dγ
=
∂qd
∂q−i
dqd
dγ
+
∂qd
∂γ
⇔ dq
d
dγ
=
∂qd
∂γ
1− ∂qd∂q−i
Since I know ∂∂γ q
d(q−i, γ) > 0 holds for q−i > qc, it is sufficient to show ∂q
d
∂q−i < 0 in order to prove
the lemma. From implicit function theorem, I have
∂
∂q−i
qd(q−i, γ) = − (1− γ)pii12(q
∗
i , q−i)
γpii11(q∗i , qc) + (1− γ)pii11(q∗i , q−i)
So ∂∂q−i q
d(q−i, γ) < 0 at q−i = qd is equivalent to pii12(qd, qd) < 0. From the assumption, I can get
pii12(q
d, qd) = p′(qd + qd) + qdp′′(qd + qd) < 0,
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which completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
Given s−i(δ−i) = s¯−i(δ−i), I can also derive the expected payoff of firm i when he chooses si(δH) 6=
(Join, qc) as follows;
Πi(Not Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δH) = pin
Πi(ai, s¯−i(δ−i); δH) = γ
[
(1− δH)pii(qi, qc) + δHpir
]
+(1− γ)
[
(1− δH)pii(qi, qd(γ)) + δHpir
]
,
where ai ∈ Ai{(Join, qc), (Not Join)}.
Similarly, the expected payoff of firm i when he chooses si(δ
L) 6= (Join, qd(γ)) is given by the following
equations;
Πi(Not Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δL) = pin
Πi(ai, s¯−i(δ−i); δL) = γ
{
1qi 6=qci
[
(1− δL)pii(qi, qc) + δLpir
]
+ 1qi=qci pi
c
}
+(1− γ)
[
(1− δL)pii(qi, qd(γ)) + δLpir
]
,
where ai ∈ Ai{(Join, qd(γ)), (Not Join)}.
Given these deviation payoffs, it is required to show condition (3.1) holds for strategy profile s¯ =
(s¯1(δ1), s¯2(δ2)). First, check the condition (3.1) for type δ
H . If ai = (Not Join), then
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δH)−Πi(Not Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δH)
= γ(pic − pin) + (1− γ)
[
(1− δH)pii(qc, qd(γ)) + δHpir − pin
]
≥ γ(pic − pin) + (1− γ)
[
(1− δH)pid− + δHpir − pin
]
The inequality comes from pii(q
c, qd(γ)) ≥ pii(qc, qd(1)) = pid− from Lemma 1. Since pic > pin for
all i ∈ N , there exists γ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that the right side of the inequality is non-negative for ∀
γ ∈ [γ1, 1). But then, there must exists γ∗1 ∈ (0, γ1] such that Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δH) − Πi(Not
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Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δH) ≥ 0 for ∀ γ ∈ [γ∗1 , 1) and ∀ firm i with δi = δH . Similarly, if ai = (Join, qi)
such that qi 6= qc, then I have
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δH)−Πi(ai, s¯−i(δ−i); δH)
= γ
[
pic − (1− δH)pii(qi, qc)− δHpir
]
+ (1− γ)(1− δH)
[
pii(q
c, qd(γ))− pii(qi, qd(γ))
]
≥ γ [pic − (1− δH)pii(qi, qc)− δHpir]+ (1− γ)(1− δH) [pid− − pim]
The inequality comes from pii(q
c, qd(γ)) ≥ pid− and pii(qi, qd(γ)) ≤ pim, where pim is the profit that
firm i would get if he were a monopolist. Because pic − (1 − δH)pii(qi, qc) − δHpir ≥ pic − (1 −
δH)pid+ − δHpir > 0 for any qi ∈ R+ and i ∈ N , there exists γ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that the right side of
the inequality is non-negative for ∀ γ ∈ [γ2, 1), i ∈ N and ∀ qi ∈ R+. But then, there must exists
γ∗2 ∈ (0, γ2] such that Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δH)−Πi(ai, s¯−i(δ−i); δH) ≥ 0 for ∀ γ ∈ [γ∗2 , 1), ∀ firm i
and any qi ∈ R+.
Next examine the condition (3.1) for type δL. Note that pid+ = pii(q
d(1), qc) and pid+ ≥
pii(q
d(γ), qc) for all γ ∈ (0, 1) because of Lemma 1 and concavity of profit function. Since (1 −
δL)pid+ + δLpir > pic, either there exists γ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that (1 − δL)pii(qd(γ∗), qc) + δLpir = pic
or (1− δL)pii(qd(0), qc) + δLpir ≥ pic holds. If (1− δL)pii(qd(0), qc) + δLpir ≥ pic holds, let γ∗ = 0.
If ai = (Not Join), then
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL)−Πi(Not Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δL)
= γ[(1− δL)pii(qd(γ), qc) + δLpir − pin] + (1− γ)
[
(1− δL)pii(qd(γ), qd(γ)) + δLpir − pin
]
≥ γ[(1− δL)pii(qd(γ∗), qc) + δLpir − pin] + (1− γ)
[
(1− δL)pˆi + δLpir − pin]
for all γ ∈ [γ∗, 1)
The inequality holds from pii(q
d(γ), qc) ≥ pii(qd(γ∗), qc) for all γ ∈ [γ∗, 1) and pii(qd(γ), qd(γ)) ≥
pˆi ≡ min
γ∈[0,1]
pii(q
d(γ), qd(γ)). Note that pid+ = pii(q
d(1), qc) ≥ pii(qd(γ), qc) for all γ ∈ (0, 1). So for
all γ ∈ [γ∗, 1), pii(qd(γ), qc) ≥ pii(qd(γ∗), qc) holds from Lemma 1 and concavity of profit function.
Then (1−δL)pii(qd(γ), qc)+δLpir ≥ pic > pin holds for all γ ∈ [γ∗, 1). Hence, there exists γ3 ∈ [γ∗, 1)
such that the right side of the inequality is non-negative for ∀ γ ∈ [γ3, 1), i ∈ N. But then, there
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must exists γ∗3 ∈ (0, γ3] such that Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL) − Πi(Not Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δL) ≥ 0 for ∀
γ ∈ [γ∗3 , 1) and ∀ firm i. If ai = (Join, qc), then
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL)−Πi((Join, qc), s¯−i(δ−i); δL)
= γ
[
(1− δL)pii(qd(γ), qc) + δLpir − pic
]
+ (1− γ)(1− δL)
[
pii(q
d(γ), qd(γ))− pii(qc, qd(γ))
]
≥ γ[(1− δL)pii(qd(γ∗ + ε), qc) + δLpir − pic] + (1− γ)(1− δL) [pˆi − pim]
for all γ ∈ (γ∗ + ε, 1) given ε > 0 and γ∗ + ε < 1
Since (1 − δL)pii(qd(γ∗), qc) + δLpir ≥ pic by definition, (1 − δL)pii(qd(γ∗ + ε), qc) + δLpir >
pic holds. So by the same argument, there exists γ∗4 ∈ (0, 1) such that Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL) −
Πi((Join, q
c), s¯−i(δ−i); δL) ≥ 0 for ∀ γ ∈ [γ∗4 , 1) and ∀ firm i. Finally, consider ai = (Join, qi) such
that qi ∈ R+{qd(γ), qc}, then
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL)−Πi(ai, s¯−i(δ−i); δL)
= γ(1− δL)
[
pii(q
d(γ), qc)− pii(qi, qc)
]
+ (1− γ)(1− δL)
[
pii(q
d(γ), qd(γ))− pii(qi, qd(γ))
]
= (1− δL)[{γpii(qd(γ), qc) + (1− γ)pii(qd(γ), qd(γ))} − {γpii(qi, qc) + (1− γ)pii(qi, qd(γ))}]
≥ 0
Last inequality holds because qd(γ) ∈ arg maxqi γpii(qi, qc) + (1− γ)pii(qi, qd(γ)). Hence, if I define
γ∗ = max{γ∗1 , γ∗2 , γ∗3 , γ∗4}, then the condition (3.1) holds for every γ ∈ (γ∗, 1).
Proof of Proposition 3
When firm i with δH chooses si(δi) 6= (Join, qc) given s¯−i(δ−i) = (s¯1(δ1), · · · , s¯i−1(δi−1), s¯i+1(δi+1),
· · · , s¯n(δn)), the expected payoff of it yields
Πi(Not Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δH) = pin
Πi(ai, s¯−i(δ−i); δH) =
n−1∑
j=0
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j [(1− δH)pij−ii (qi) + δHpir],
where ai ∈ Ai{(Join, qc), (Not Join)}.
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Similarly, when firm i with type δL chooses si(δi) 6= (Join, qd(γ)), the expected payoff of firm i
comes to
Πi(Not Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δL) = pin
Πi(ai, s¯−i(δ−i); δL) = γn−1[1qi 6=qci
[
(1− δL)pii(qi, qc−i) + δLpir
]
+ 1qi=qci pi
c]
+
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j [(1− δL)pij−ii (qi) + δLpir],
where ai ∈ Ai{(Join, qd(γ)), (Not Join)}
First, check the condition (3.5) for type δH . Then,
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δH)−Πi(Not Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δH)
= γn−1(pic − pin) +
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j [(1− δH)pij−ii (qc) + δHpir − pin]
≥ γn−1(pic − pin) +
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j [(1− δH)pid− + δHpir − pin]
Let me denote pid− ≡ pii(qc, q−i(qc−i)), where qc−i = (qc1, · · · , qc−i−1, qc−i+1, · · · , qcn). Then, the
inequality comes from pi
j−i
i (q
c) ≥ pid− . Since pic > pin, there exists γ1 ∈ (0, 1) such that the
right side of the inequality is non-negative for ∀ γ ∈ [γ1, 1) and i ∈ N . But then, there must exist
γ∗1 ∈ (0, γ1] such that Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δH)− Πi(Not Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δH) ≥ 0 for ∀ γ ∈ [γ∗1 , 1)
and ∀ firm i with type δH . Similarly,
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δH)−Πi(ai, s¯−i(δ−i); δH)
= γn−1[pic − (1− δH)pii(qi, qc−i)− δHpir]
+
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j(1− δH)[pij−ii (qc)− pij−ii (qi)]
≥ γn−1[pic − (1− δH)pii(qi, qc−i)− δHpir] +
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j(1− δH)[pid− − pim]
The inequality comes from pi
j−i
i (q
c) ≥ pid− and pij−ii (qi) ≤ pim, where pim is the profit that firm i would
get if he were a monopolist. Because pic−(1−δH)pii(qi, qc−i)−δHpir ≥ pic−(1−δH)pid+−δHpir > 0
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for any qi ∈ R+ and i ∈ N for type δH , there exists γ2 ∈ (0, 1) such that the right side of the inequality
is non-negative for ∀ γ ∈ [γ2, 1), i ∈ N and ∀ qi ∈ R+. But then, there must exist γ∗2 ∈ (0, γ2] such
that Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δH) − Πi(ai, s¯−i(δ−i); δH) ≥ 0 for ∀ γ ∈ [γ∗2 , 1), ∀ ai ∈ Ai and ∀ firm i
with type δH .
Next examine the condition (3.5) for type δL. If ai = (Not Join), then
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL)−Πi(Not Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δL)
= γn−1[(1− δL)pii(qd(γ), qc−i) + δLpir − pin]
+
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j [(1− δL)pij−ii (qd(γ)) + δLpir − pin]
Notice that pii(q
d(γ), qc−i) converges to pi
d+ as γ approaches 1. Since (1− δL)pid+ + δLpir > pic > pin
for all i ∈ N with type δL, there exists γ∗3 ∈ (0, 1) such that Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL) − Πi(Not
Join, s¯−i(δ−i); δL) ≥ 0 for ∀ γ ∈ [γ∗3 , 1) and ∀ firm i with type δL. Similarly, if ai = (Join, qc),
then
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL)−Πi((Join, qc), s¯−i(δ−i); δL)
= γn−1[(1− δL)pii(qd(γ), qc−i) + δLpir − pic]
+
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j(1− δL)[pij−ii (qd(γ))− pij−ii (qc)]
Again pii(q
d(γ), qc−i) converges to pi
d+ as γ approaches 1. Because pid+ > pii(qi, q
c
−i) for any qi ∈
R+{qi(qc−i)} and (1−δL)pid++δLpir > pic, there exists γ∗4 ∈ (0, 1) such that Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL)
−Πi((Join, qc), s¯−i(δ−i); δL) ≥ 0 for ∀ γ ∈ [γ∗4 , 1) and ∀ firm i with type δL. Finally, consider
ai = (Join, qi) such that qi /∈ {qd(γ), qc}, then
Πi(s¯i(δi), s¯−i(δ−i); δL)−Πi(ai, s¯−i(δ−i); δL)
= γn−1(1− δL)
[
pii(q
d(γ), qc−i)− pii(qi, qc−i)
]
+
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)j(1− δL)
[
pi
j−i
i (q
d(γ))− pij−ii (qi)
]
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= (1− δL)[{γn−1pii(qd(γ), qc−i) +
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)jpij−ii (qd(γ))}
− {γn−1pii(qi, qc−i) +
n−1∑
j=1
n−1Cj γn−1−j(1− γ)jpij−ii (qi)}]
≥ 0
Last inequality holds from qd(γ) ∈ arg maxqi γn−1pii(qi, qc−i)+
∑n−1
j=1 n−1Cj γ
n−1−j(1−γ)jpij−ii (qi).
Hence, if I define γ∗ = max{γ∗1 , γ∗2 , γ∗3 , γ∗4}, then the condition (3.5) holds for every γ ∈ (γ∗, 1).
Proof of Proposition 4
It is required to show that two conditions in (3.9) holds for strategy profile s¯ = (s¯1(δ1), s¯2(δ2))and
the system of belief γ = (γ1t, γ2t)
∞
t=0 constructed in subsection 3.4.2.
In order to show the first condition, I will use the principle of optimality. For that purpose, consider
one shot deviation and its expected payoff or continuation payoff in each history. If a firm deviates
not to join the collusion at the beginning of the game, then its payoff is simply given by Πi(s¯i(Not
Join), s¯−i ; δi, γ0) = pin for each type of firm. Here, s¯i(Not Join) denotes the same strategy with
s¯i except that s¯i(Not Join) chooses not to join the collusion at t = 0. If a firm with δ
H chooses
qi1 6= q¯c at h1 = (Join, Join), then its expected continuation payoff comes to
Πi1(s¯i(qi1)|h1, s¯−i|h1 ; δH , γ0) = γ0[(1− δH)pi(qi1, q¯c) + δHpir]
+(1− γ0)[(1− δH)pi(qi1, qd(γ0, q¯c)) + δHpir]
s¯i(qi1)|h1 denotes the same continuation strategy with s¯i|h1 except that high type firm chooses qi1 6= q¯c
at h1 = (Join, Join). If a firm with δ
L chooses qi1 = q¯
c at h1 = (Join, Join), then its expected
continuation payoff comes to
Πi1(s¯i(q¯
c)|h1, s¯−i|h1 ; δL, γ0) = γ0[(1− δL)p¯ic + (1− δL)δLpid+ + (δL)2pir]
+(1− γ0)[(1− δL)pi(q¯c, qd(γ0, q¯c)) + δLpir]
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s¯i(q¯
c)|h1 denotes the same continuation strategy with s¯i|h1 except that low type firm chooses qi1 =
q¯c 6= qd(γ0, q¯c) at h1 = (Join, Join). If a firm with δL chooses qi1 ∈ Ai1{qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c} at
h1 = (Join, Join), then its expected continuation payoff comes to
Πi1(s¯i(qi1)|h1, s¯−i|h1 ; δL, γ0) = γ0[(1− δL)pi(qi1, q¯c) + δLpir]
+(1− γ0)[(1− δL)pi(qi1, qd(γ0, q¯c)) + δLpir]
Finally, if a firm with δH chooses qit 6= qc or a firm with δL chooses qit 6= qd+ at ht such that
h1 = (Join, Join) and q
t−1
i = q
t−1
−i = (q¯
c, qc, · · · , qc) for t ≥ 2, its continuation payoff comes to
Πit(s¯i(qit)|ht, s¯−i|ht ; δi, γit= 1) = (1− δi)pi(qit, qc) + δipir, where δi∈ ∆
Now, check the sequential rationality of s¯ for type δH . If t = 0 and deviation action ai0 = (Not
Join), then I get
Πi(s¯i, s¯−i ; δH , γ0)−Πi(s¯i(Not Join), s¯−i; δH , γ0)
= γ0[(1− δH)p¯ic + δHpic − pin] + (1− γ0)[(1− δH)pi(q¯c, qd(γ0, q¯c)) + δHpir − pin]
Define f1 : X 7−→ R such that X = [0, 1]× [qc, qn] and
f1(γ, q) = γ[(1− δH)pi(q, q) + δHpic − pin] + (1− γ)[(1− δH)pi(q, qd(γ, q)) + δHpir − pin]
Clearly, f1(γ, q) is continuous and f1(1, q
c) = pic−pin > 0. So U1(0) = {(γ, q) ∈ X | f1(γ, q) > 0} is
non-empty and open. Since (1, qc) ∈ U1(0), there exists ∗1 > 0 such that f1(γ, q) > 0 for all (γ, q) ∈
B∗1(1, q
c). From the construction of f1(γ, q), Πi(s¯i, s¯−i ; δH , γ0)−Πi(s¯i(Not Join), s¯−i; δH , γ0) > 0
holds for all (γ0, q¯
c) ∈ B∗1(1, qc).
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If t = 1 and deviation action of δH type firm is ai1 = qi1, then I get
Πi1(s¯i|h1, s¯−i|h1; δH , γi1)−Πi1(s¯i(qi1)|h1, s¯−i|h1 ; δH , γ0)
= γ0[(1− δH)p¯ic + δHpic − (1− δH)pi(qi1, q¯c)− δHpir]
+(1− γ0)(1− δH)[pi(q¯c, qd(γ0, q¯c))− pi(qi1, qd(γ0, q¯c))]
≥ γ0[(1− δH)p¯ic + δHpic − (1− δH)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c)− δHpir] + (1− γ0)(1− δH)
[
pid− − pim
]
Similarly, define f2 : X 7−→ R such that
f2(γ, q) = γ[(1− δH)pi(q, q) + δHpic− (1− δH)pi(qd(γ, q), q)− δHpir] + (1−γ)(1− δH)[pid−−pim]
Clearly, f2(γ, q) is continuous and f2(1, q
c) = pic− (1− δH)pid+− δHpir > 0. So U2(0) = {(γ, q) ∈
X | f2(γ, q) > 0} is non-empty and open. Since (1, qc) ∈ U2(0), there exists 2 > 0 such that
f2(γ, q) > 0 for all (γ, q) ∈ B2(1, qc). From the construction of f2(γ, q), the right side of the
inequality is positive for all (γ0, q¯
c) ∈ B2(1, qc). But then, there must exists ∗2 ≥ 2 > 0 such that
Πi1(s¯i|h1, s¯−i|h1; δH , γi1)−Πi1(s¯i(qi1)|h1, s¯−i|h1 ; δH , γ0) > 0 holds for all (γ0, q¯c) ∈ B∗2(1, qc).
Next, check the sequential rationality of s¯ for type δL. If t = 0 and deviation action ai0 = (Not
Join), then I have
Πi(s¯i, s¯−i ; δL, γ0)−Πi(s¯i(Not Join), s¯−i; δL, γ0)
= γ0[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c) + δLpir − pin]
+(1− γ0)[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c)) + δLpir − pin]
Define f3 : X 7−→ R such that
f3(γ, q) = γ[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ, q), q) + δLpir − pin]
+(1− γ)[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ, q), qd(γ, q)) + δLpir − pin]
Clearly, f3(γ, q) is continuous and f3(1, q
c) = (1−δL)pid++δLpir−pin > 0. So U3(0) = {(γ, q) ∈ X |
f3(γ, q) > 0} is non-empty and open. Since (1, qc) ∈ U3(0), there exists ∗3 > 0 such that f3(γ, q) >
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0 for all (γ, q) ∈ B∗3(1, qc). From the construction of f3(γ, q), Πi(s¯i, s¯−i ; δL, γ0) − Πi(s¯i(Not
Join), s¯−i; δL, γ0) > 0 holds for all (γ0, q¯c) ∈ B∗3(1, qc).
If t = 1 and ai1 = q¯
c is a deviation action of δL type firm, I have
Πi1(s¯i|h1, s¯−i|h1; δL, γi1)−Πi1(s¯i(q¯c)|h1, s¯−i|h1 ; δL, γ0)
= γ0[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c) + δLpir − (1− δL)p¯ic − (1− δL)δLpid+ − (δL)2pir]
+(1− γ0)(1− δL)[pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c))− pi(q¯c, qd(γ0, q¯c))]
Note that Πi(t
∗ = 1; δL, γ0) − Πi(t∗ = 2; δL, γ0) > 0 holds from f(γ0, q¯c) > 0, which is equivalent
with the following;
Πi(t
∗ = 1; δL, γ0)−Πi(t∗ = 2; δL, γ0)
= γ0[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c) + δLpir − (1− δL)p¯ic − (1− δL)δLpi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c)− (δL)2pir]
+(1− γ0)[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c)) + δLpir
− (1− δL)p¯ic − (1− δL)δLpi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c))− (δL)2pir]
> 0
Let α(γ0, q¯
c) be defined as
α(γ0, q¯
c) = (1− γ0){(1− δL)p¯ic + (1− δL)δLpi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c)) + (δL)2pir
− (1− δL)pi(q¯c, qd(γ0, q¯c))− δLpir}
If α(γ0, q¯
c) ≥ 0, then Πi(t∗ = 1; δL, γ0) − Πi(t∗ = 2; δL, γ0) + α(γ0, q¯c) > 0. If α(γ0, q¯c) < 0
instead, define f4 : X 7−→ R such that
f4(γ, q) = (1− γ){(1− δL)pi(q, q) + (1− δL)δLpi(qd(γ, q), qd(γ, q)) + (δL)2pir
− (1− δL)pi(q, qd(γ, q))− δLpir}
Clearly, f4(γ, q) is continuous and f4(1, q
c) = 0. If I let β(γ0, q¯
c) ≡ Πi(t∗ = 1; δL, γ0) − Πi(t∗ =
2; δL, γ0) and pick κ ∈ (0, β(γ0, q¯c)), then U4(−κ) = {(γ, q) ∈ X | f4(γ, q) > −κ} is non-empty
157
and open for all κ ∈ (0, β(γ0, q¯c)). So, there exists ∗4(κ) > 0 such that f4(γ, q) > −κ for all
(γ, q) ∈ B∗4(κ)(1, qc). Define ζ(γ0, q¯c) ≡ Πi(t∗ = 1; δL, γ0) − Πi(t∗ = 2; δL, γ0) + α(γ0, q¯c), then
ζ(γ0, q¯
c) > 0 holds for all (γ0, q¯
c) ∈ B∗4(κ)(1, qc). Note that
ζ(γ0, q¯
c) = γ0[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c) + δLpir − (1− δL)p¯ic
− (1− δL)δLpi(qd(γ0, q¯c), q¯c)− (δL)2pir]
+ (1− γ0)(1− δL)[pi(qd(γ0, q¯c), qd(γ0, q¯c))− pi(q¯c, qd(γ0, q¯c))]
Define f5 : B∗4(κ)(1, q
c) 7−→ R such that f5(γ, q) = γ(1 − δL)δL[pi(qd(γ, q), q) − pid+]. Then
f5(γ, q) is continuous and f5(1, q
c) = 0. Finally, define f6 : B∗4(κ)(1, q
c) 7−→ R such that
f6(γ, q) = ζ(γ, q) + f5(γ, q)
= γ[(1− δL)pi(qd(γ, q), q) + δLpir − (1− δL)pi(q, q)− (1− δL)δLpid+ − (δL)2pir]
+(1− γ)(1− δL)[pi(qd(γ, q), qd(γ, q))− pi(q, qd(γ, q))]
Clearly, f6(γ, q) is continuous and f6(1, q
c) = ζ(1, qc) + f5(1, q
c) = ζ(1, qc) > 0. So U6(0) =
{(γ, q) ∈ B∗4(κ)(1, qc) | f6(γ, q) > 0} is non-empty and open. Since (1, qc) ∈ U6(0), there exists
∗6(κ) > 0 such that f6(γ, q) > 0 for all (γ, q) ∈ B∗6(κ)(1, qc). From the construction of f6(γ, q),
Πi1(s¯i|h1, s¯−i|h1; δL, γi1)−Πi1(s¯i(q¯c)|h1, s¯−i|h1 ; δL, γ0) > 0 holds for all (γ0, q¯c) ∈ B∗6(κ)(1, qc).
For all ht such that h1 6= (Join, Join), each firm chooses stage Nash output qn. So there is no
profitable deviation for such ht, which implies that sequential rationality condition is satisfied. If ht is
such that t ≥ 2 and h1 = (Join, Join), each subgame that starts from ht is a perfect information
game because γit ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 2. Moreover, all continuation strategy s¯i|ht
in equation (3.12) and (3.13) for such ht is constructed in a way that can be supported as subgame
perfect equilibrium in a dynamic game with perfect information. Hence, sequential rationality condition
holds trivially for those histories. Since all possible histories were checked, I can conclude that (s¯, γ)
is sequentially rational if (γ0, q¯
c) ∈ B∗(κ)(1, qc) if I define ∗(κ) ≡ min{∗1, ∗2, ∗3, ∗6(κ)}.
For the second condition of (3.9), γ is updated by Bayes rule along all the equilibrium outcome
path whereas γit = 0 for at least one firm on every off-equilibrium path, which completes the proof.
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Proof of Proposition 5
As in the proof of Proposition 4, consider one shot deviation and its expected payoff or continuation
payoff in all possible histories. If a firm chooses not to join the collusion at the beginning of game, then
its payoff is simply given by Πi(s¯i(Not Join), s¯−i ; δi, γ0) = pin. If a firm with δi chooses qit 6= q¯c at
ht ∈ Ht such that qt−1i = qt−1−i = (q¯c, q¯c, · · · , q¯c) for t ≥ 2 given with h1 = (Join, Join), then its
expected continuation payoff comes to
Πit(s¯i(qit)|ht, s¯−i|ht ; δi, γit = γ0) = (1− δi)pi(qit, q¯c) + δipir,
where s¯i(qit)|ht is similarly defined.
First, check the sequential rationality of s¯. If t = 0 and deviation action is ai0 = (Not Join),
then
Πi(s¯i, s¯−i ; δi, γ0)−Πi(s¯i(Not Join), s¯−i; δi, γ0) = p¯ic − pin > 0
for all i ∈ N, δi ∈ Θi. If deviation action is ait = qit 6= q¯c at history ht such that (1) either
h1 = (Join, Join) for t = 1 or (2) h1 = (Join, Join) and q
t−1
i = q
t−1
−i = (q¯
c, q¯c, · · · , q¯c) for t ≥ 2,
then I get
Πit(s¯i|ht, s¯−i|ht; δi, γit = γ0)−Πit(s¯i(qit)|ht, s¯−i|ht ; δi, γit = γ0)
= p¯ic − (1− δi)pi(qit, q¯c)− δipir
≥ p¯ic − (1− δi)pi(qd(q¯c), q¯c)− δipir
Define f : [qc, qn] 7→ R such that f(q) = pi(q, q)−(1−δi)pi(qd(q), q)−δipir. Then, f(q) is continuous
and f(qn) = δi(pi
n − pir) > 0. So U(0) = {q ∈ [qc, qn] | f(q) > 0} is non-empty and open. Hence,
there exists ∗ such that f(q) > 0 for all q ∈ (qn − ∗, qn].
For all ht such that h1 6= (Join, Join), each firm chooses stage Nash output qn. So there is no
profitable deviation for such ht, which implies that sequential rationality condition is satisfied. Finally,
suppose that ht is such that q
t−1
i 6= (q¯c, q¯c, · · · , q¯c) or qt−1−i 6= (q¯c, q¯c, · · · , q¯c) for t ≥ 2 given with
h1 = (Join, Join). Then, either γit is updated into 0 if firm −i deviates from q¯c at period (t− 1) or
γ−it is updated into 0 otherwise. Moreover, the continuation strategy s¯i|ht in equation (14) for such
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ht describes punishment phase when there is a deviation in a dynamic game with perfect information.
Hence, sequential rationality condition holds trivially for those histories. Since all possible histories
were checked, I can conclude that (s¯, γ) is sequentially rational if q¯c ∈ (qn − ∗, qn].
For the second condition of PBE in (3.9), the system of belief γ is updated by Bayes rule along
all the equilibrium outcome path whereas γit = 0 for at least one firm on every off-equilibrium path,
which completes the proof.
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Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 4
C.1 Cartel Duration Model: Leniency Program
Claim 20
Suppose that firm j ∈ N deviated from cartel agreement at period s < t. Then, firm j′s expected
discounted continuation payoff in (State 2), denoted by EΠ2j , comes to
EΠ2j (s
1
j , s−j) =

pins
1−δ −min(RL1 , R) if s−j = Πk 6=js2k
pins
1−δ −min(RL2 , R) if s−j 6= Πk 6=js2k
EΠ2j (s
2
j , s−j) =

pins
1−δ − αδR1−δ(1−α) if s−j = Πk 6=js2k
pins
1−δ −R if s−j 6= Πk 6=js2k
But all other firms i ∈ N except firm j would have the same expected discounted continuation payoff
with that in (State 1). Hence, the dominant strategy of all firms but firm j is to apply leniency as
well in (State 2). Given that non-defector’s dominant strategy, firm j′s best response is to report
(s1j ) if R
L
2 < R while it is indifferent for firm j whether to report or not if R
L
2 ≥ R. Hence, leniency
application to AA is at least weakly dominant strategy for a defector after eliminating s−j = Πk 6=js2k.
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Claim 21
[Part (a)] Given the set of pure strategy Si = {s1i , s2i }, the expected discounted continuation payoff
of unilateral defector, denoted by EΠ3i=d, can be derived as follows;
EΠ3i=d(s
1
i , s−i) =
 EΠ
L1
i=d if s−i = Πj 6=is
2
j
EΠL2i=d if s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j
EΠ3i=d(s
2
i , s−i) =
 EΠ
NL
i=d if s−i = Πj 6=is
2
j
EΠL
−i
i=d if s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j
Likewise, the expected discounted continuation payoff of non-defector, denoted by EΠ3i=n, can be
derived as follows;
EΠ3i=n(s
1
i , s−i) =
 EΠ
L1
i=n if s−i = Πj 6=is
2
j
EΠL2i=n if s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j
EΠ3i=n(s
2
i , s−i) =
 EΠ
NL
i=n if s−i = Πj 6=is
2
j
EΠL
−i
i=n if s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j
It is easy to see that EΠ3i=d(s
1
i , s−i) ≥ EΠ3i=d(s2i , s−i) and EΠ3i=n(s1i , s−i) ≥ EΠ3i=n(s2i , s−i) if
s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j . When RL1 < pi
n−pip+δ(αF+(1−α)pRL2 )
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) holds, EΠ
L1
i=n > EΠ
NL
i=n is satisfied for non-
defector. Hence, s1i is a dominant strategy of all non-defectors. In that case, the best response of
defector includes to report leniency.
Similarly, when min(R,RL1 ) <
pin−pir+δ(αR+(1−α)pmin(R,RL2 ))
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) holds, EΠ
L1
i=d > EΠ
NL
i=d is satisfied
for a defector. Hence, s1i is a dominant strategy of the defector. But then, the best response of
non-defector includes to report leniency.
[Part (b)] If RL1 >
pin−pip+δ(αF+(1−α)pRL2 )
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) holds,
EΠNLi=n >
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −R
L
1
≥ pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −R
L
2 = EΠ
L2
i=n
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Similarly, if min(R,RL1 ) >
pin−pir+δ(αR+(1−α)pmin(R,RL2 ))
1−δ(1−(α+p−αp)) holds,
EΠNLi=d >
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −min(R
L
1 , R)
≥ pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −min(R
L
2 , R) = EΠ
L2
i=d
So, the unique efficient Nash equilibrium is that no firm applies leniency.
Claim 22
[Part (a)] Firm i′s expected discounted continuation payoff in (State 4), denoted by EΠ4i (si, s−i),
can be derived as follows;
EΠ4i (s
1
i , s−i) =
 EΠ
L1 if s−i = Πj 6=is2j
EΠL2 if s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j
EΠ4i (s
2
i , s−i) =
 EΠ
NC if s−i = Πj 6=is2j
EΠL
−i
if s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j
Here, when other firms’ strategy profile is given by s−i = Πj 6=is2j , EΠ
4
i (s
2
i , s−i) = EΠ
NC holds
from EΠNC > EΠNDj depending on [Condition j], where j ∈ {1, 2}. Hence, when all other firms do
not report (s−i = Πj 6=is2j ), firm i
′s best response is also not to report because EΠNC > EΠLD1 .
But when there is at least one firm who apply leniency (s−i 6= Πj 6=is2j ), then firm i′s best response
is to report to AA because EΠL2 ≥ EΠL−i from RL2 ∈ [RL1 , F ]. To find out a symmetric mixed
strategy in (State 4), let Pr(not report) = β for all other firms (i.e. s−i = Πj 6=iβ) and define
f(β) ≡ EΠ4i (s2i , s−i)− EΠ4i (s1i , s−i), then
f(β) = βn−1(EΠNC − EΠL1) + (1− βn−1)(RL2 − F )
Clearly, f(0) ≤ 0 - the inequality is strict if RL2 < F - and f(1) > 0 holds. Moreover, f(β) is
monotonically increasing in β. Therefore, there exists a unique β∗ ∈ [0, 1) such that f(β∗) = 0.
Again, if RL2 < F , β∗ ∈ (0, 1).
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[Part (b)] Compare reporting equilibrium (β4∗ = 0) by all firms with no repoting equilibrium (β4∗ =
1). In each equilibrium, the continuation payoff of each firm, denoted by EΠ4i (0) and EΠ
4
i (1), will be
EΠ4i (0) = EΠ
L2 and EΠ4i (1) = EΠ
NC respectively. Since EΠNC > pi
n
1−δ(1−p) +
δppins
(1−δ)(1−δ(1−p)) ≥
EΠL2 , EΠ4i (1) > EΠ
4
i (0) holds for all firms.
Next, compare the symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium β∗ ∈ (0, 1) with the equilibrium
that no firm reports. In each equilibrium, the continuation payoff of each firm, denoted by EΠ4i (β∗)
and EΠ4i (1) respectively, will be
EΠ4i (β∗) = β∗[(β∗)
n−1 ∗ EΠNC + (1− (β∗)n−1) ∗ EΠL−i ]
+(1− β∗)[(β∗)n−1 ∗ EΠL1 + (1− (β∗)n−1) ∗ EΠL2 ]
EΠ4i (1) = EΠ
NC
AgainEΠNC > pi
n
1−δ(1−p)+
δppins
(1−δ)(1−δ(1−p)) andEΠ
NC > max{EΠL1 , EΠL2} implies thatEΠ4i (1) >
EΠ4i (β∗) for all firms. Hence, the equilibrium that no firm notice is a unique efficient equilibrium in
leniency decision. This proof also show that the not-reporting equilibrium is more efficient than any
non-symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, if it exists.
Equation (4.5)
Let EΠCL = V1, then
V1 = pi
c + δ[(1− α)(1− p)V1 + α(1− p)(V2 − F ) + (1− α)pV3 + αp(V4 − F ) (C.1)
For V2, I have
V2 = pi
n + δ[(1− p)V2 + ppi
ns
1− δ ]
⇒ V2 = pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
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For V3, I obtain
V3 = pi
ns + δ[(1− α)V3 + α( pi
ns
1− δ − F )]
V3 =
pins
1− δ(1− α) +
δαpins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)) −
δαF
1− δ(1− α)
=
pins
1− δ −
δαF
1− δ(1− α)
For V4, I get V4 =
pins
1−δ . Plug V2, V3 and V4 into (C.1), then I have
(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))V1 = pic + δα(1− p)pi
n
1− δ(1− p) + δppi
ns[
1
1− δ +
δα(1− p)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) ]
−δαF [1 + δ(1− α)p
1− δ(1− α) ]
(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))V1 = pic + δα(1− p)pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δp(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
−δα(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))F
1− δ(1− α)
Hence,
V1 =
pic
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δα(1− p)pin
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
+
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −
δαF
1− δ(1− α)
=
pic
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) −
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
+
δα(1− p)pin
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −
δαF
1− δ(1− α)
=
pic
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) −
δαF
1− δ(1− α)
+
δα(1− p)pin
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
+
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) ,
where
pic
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) = EΠ
C(α+ p− αp)
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and
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
=
δpins
(1− δ) [
p(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))− (α+ p− αp)(1− δ(1− p))
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) ]
=
δpins
(1− δ) ∗
−α(1− p)(1− δ)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
= − δα(1− p)pi
ns
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
Hence, V1 comes to
V1= EΠ
C(α+ p− αp)− δαF
1− δ(1− α)+
δα(1− p)(pin − pins)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
Equation (4.8)
Let EΠNLi=d = V1, then
V1 = pi
r + δ[(1− α)(1− p)V1 + α(1− p)(V2 −R) + αp( pi
ns
1− δ −R)
+(1− α)p( pi
ns
1− δ −min{R,R
L
2 })] (C.2)
For V2, I get
V2 = pi
n + δ[(1− p)V2 + ppi
ns
1− δ ]
⇒ V2 = pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
Plug V2 into (C.2), then I have
(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))V1 = pir + δα(1− p)pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
1− δ [1 +
δα(1− p)
1− δ(1− p) ]
−δαR− δ(1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }
(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))V1 = pir + δα(1− p)pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δp(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
−δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }]
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Hence,
V1 =
pir
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δα(1− p)pin
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
+
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −
δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }]
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
Here, notice that
δα(1− p)pin
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) = pi
n[
1
1− δ(1− p) −
1
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) ]
Therefore, V1 comes to
V1=
pin
1− δ(1− p)+
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))−
pin − pir + δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }]
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
Equation (4.10)
Let EΠNC = V1, then
V1 = pi
c + δ[(1− α)(1− p)V1 + α(1− p)(V2 − F )
+ (1− α)p( pi
ns
1− δ −R
L
2 ) + αp(
pins
1− δ − F )] (C.3)
For V2, I obtain
V2 = pi
n + δ[(1− p)V2 + ppi
ns
1− δ ]
⇒ V2 = pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
Plug V2 into (C.3), then I have
(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))V1 = pic + δα(1− p)pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
1− δ [1 +
δα(1− p)
1− δ(1− p) ]
−δαF − δ(1− α)pRL2
(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))V1 = pic + δα(1− p)pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δp(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
−δ[αF + (1− α)pRL2 ]
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Hence,
V1 =
pic
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δα(1− p)pin
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
+
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −
δ[αF + (1− α)pRL2 ]
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
Here, notice that
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
=
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) −
δα(1− p)pins
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
Therefore,
V1 =
pic
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
+
δα(1− p)(pin − pins)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) −
δ[αF + (1− α)pRL2 ]
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
= EΠC(α+ p− αp) + δα(1− p)(pi
n − pins)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) −
δ[αF + (1− α)pRL2 ]
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
Equation (4.11)
Let EΠND1 = V1, then
V1 = pi
d + δ[(1− α)(1− p)(V2 −min{R,RL2 }) + α(1− p)(V2 −R)
+αp(
pins
1− δ −R) + (1− α)p(
pins
1− δ −min{R,R
L
2 })] (C.4)
For V2, I get
V2 = pi
n + δ[(1− p)V2 + ppi
ns
1− δ ]
⇒ V2 = pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
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Plug V2 into (C.4), then I have
V1 = pi
d +
δ(1− p)pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
1− δ [1 +
δ(1− p)
1− δ(1− p) ]− δαR− δ(1− α) min{R,R
L
2 }
= pid +
δ(1− p)pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) − δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,R
L
2 }]
= pid +
δ(1− p)pir
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) − δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,R
L
2 }]
+
δ(1− p)(pin − pir)
1− δ(1− p)
= EΠD(p)− δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }] +
δ(1− p)(pin − pir)
1− δ(1− p)
Equation (4.12)
Let EΠND2 = V1, then
V1 = pi
d + δ[(1− α)(1− p)V2 + α(1− p)(V3 −R)
+αp(
pins
1− δ −R) + (1− α)p(
pins
1− δ −min{R,R
L
2 })] (C.5)
Here, V2 is given by
V2 = pi
r + δ[(1− α)(1− p)V2 + α(1− p)(V3 −R)
+αp(
pins
1− δ −R) + (1− α)p(
pins
1− δ −min{R,R
L
2 })] (C.6)
and V3 is given by
V3 =
pin
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
Plug V3 into (C.6), then I have
(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))V2 = pir + δα(1− p)pi
n
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
1− δ [1 +
δα(1− p)
1− δ(1− p) ]
−δαR− δ(1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }
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So V2 comes to
V2 =
pir
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δα(1− p)pin
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
+
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −
δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }]
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
Now, plug V2 and V3 into (C.5), then I have
V1 = pi
d +
δ(1− α)(1− p)pir
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δα(1− p)pin
1− δ(1− p) [1 +
δ(1− α)(1− p)
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) ]
+
δppins
1− δ [1 +
δ(1− p)
1− δ(1− p) ]
−δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }][1 +
δ(1− α)(1− p)
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) ]
= pid +
δ(1− α)(1− p)pir
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δα(1− p)pin
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
+
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −
δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }]
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
Using
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
=
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) −
δα(1− p)pins
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
, then I get
V1 = pi
d +
δ(1− α)(1− p)pir
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
+
δα(1− p)(pin − pins)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) −
δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }]
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
= EΠD(α+ p− αp)
+
δα(1− p)(pin − pins)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) −
δ[αR+ (1− α)pmin{R,RL2 }]
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
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Equation (4.16)
EΠD(p)− EΠD(α+ p− αp)
+
δ(1− p)(pin − pir)
1− δ(1− p) +
δα(1− p)(pins − pin)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)))
= pid +
δ(1− p)pir
1− δ(1− p) +
δppins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
−[pid + δ(1− α)(1− p)pi
r
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) +
δ(α+ p− αp)pins
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) ]
+
δ(1− p)(pin − pir)
1− δ(1− p) +
δα(1− p)(pins − pin)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
= pin[
δ(1− p)
1− δ(1− p) −
δα(1− p)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) ]
− δ(1− α)(1− p)pi
r
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
+pins[
δp
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p)) −
δ(α+ p− αp)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
+
δα(1− p)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) ],
where
δ(1− p)
1− δ(1− p) −
δα(1− p)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
=
δ(1− p)
1− δ(1− p) [1−
α
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) ]
=
δ(1− p)
1− δ(1− p) ∗
1− α− δ(1− α)(1− p)
1− δ(1− α)(1− p) =
δ(1− α)(1− p)
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
and
δp
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− p))
− δ(α+ p− αp)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) +
δα(1− p)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
=
δ(α+ p− αp)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) −
δα(1− p)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
− δ(α+ p− αp)
(1− δ)(1− δ(1− α)(1− p)) +
δα(1− p)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− α)(1− p))
= 0
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Hence, I get
EΠD(p)− EΠD(α+ p− αp)
+
δ(1− p)(pin − pir)
1− δ(1− p) +
δα(1− p)(pins − pin)
(1− δ(1− p))(1− δ(1− (α+ p− αp)))
=
δ(1− α)(1− p)(pin − pir)
1− δ(1− α)(1− p)
C.2 Two-Industry Model: Selective Law Enforcement
Proposition 8
The sign of (E2 − E) is equal to that of [(αe − αm)− δ1(1− αe)(αm − αo)]. Define a function
g : [0, B¯2 ] 7→ R such that
g(ε) = αe(ε)− αm − δ1(1− αe(ε))(αm − αo(ε))
= f(
B¯
2
+ ε)− f(B¯
2
)− δ1(1− f(B¯
2
+ ε))(f(
B¯
2
)− f(B¯
2
− ε))
Then, g(0) = 0 and the derivative of this function yields
g′(ε) = f
′
(
B¯
2
+ ε)− δ1[(1− f(B¯
2
+ ε))f
′
(
B¯
2
− ε)− f ′(B¯
2
+ ε)(f(
B¯
2
)− f(B¯
2
− ε)]
So g′(0) = f ′( B¯2 )(1 − δ(1 − f( B¯2 ))) > 0. Since g(ε) is continuous, it must be the case that either
g(ε) > 0 for all ε ∈ (0, B¯2 ] or there exists ε∗ ∈ (0, B¯2 ] such that g(ε) > 0 for all ε ∈ (0, ε∗) .
Equation (4.24)
E − E1 = (1− δ1(1− αm))pid1 + δ1(1− αm)pir1 + δ1αmF
− [1− δ
2
1(1− αo)(1− αe)
1 + δ1(1− αo) pi
d
1 +
δ1(1− αo)(1 + δ1(1− αe))
1 + δ1(1− αo) pi
r
1
+
δ1αo + δ
2
1αe(1− αo)
1 + δ1(1− αo) F ]
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Here,
(1− δ1(1− αm))− 1− δ
2
1(1− αo)(1− αe)
1 + δ1(1− αo) =
δ1(αm − αo)− δ21(1− αo)(αe − αm)
1 + δ1(1− αo)
δ1(1− αm)− δ1(1− αo)(1 + δ1(1− αe))
1 + δ1(1− αo) = −
δ1(αm − αo)− δ21(1− αo)(αe − αm)
1 + δ1(1− αo)
δ1αm − δ1αo + δ
2
1αe(1− αo)
1 + δ1(1− αo) =
δ1(αm − αo)− δ21(1− αo)(αe − αm)
1 + δ1(1− αo)
Hence, I have
E − E1 = δ1 [(αm − αo)− δ1(1− αo)(αe − αm)]
1 + δ1(1− αo) ∗ (pi
d
1 − pir1 + F )
Equation (4.25) can derived in a similar way.
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